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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
MODELING A PHOSPHORUS CREDIT TRADING PROGRAM IN THE LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE WATERSHED 
by 
Juliana Corrales 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Fernando Miralles-Wilhelm, Major Professor 
Lake Okeechobee is the largest lake in the southeastern United States and is a central 
component of the hydrology and environment of the Everglades ecosystem in South 
Florida. The natural state of the lake has been degraded as wetlands and natural 
habitats in the Lake Okeechobee watershed have been replaced with farms, urban 
areas, and dairy operations. Excessive phosphorus loadings from these diverse sources 
have been identified as the leading causes of the lake’s impairment. For more than 
four decades, many resources have been allocated to regional and local restoration 
efforts to reduce phosphorus loadings into the lake. However, phosphorus loadings 
have not decreased and the recovery of the lake could take more time, particularly 
with today’s limited local budgets. 
Market-based instruments, such as water quality trading programs, have emerged over 
the past decades to cost-effectively achieve water quality objectives in impaired 
watersheds. The main objective of this dissertation was to assess the environmental 
and economic benefits of implementing a phosphorus trading program in Lake 
Okeechobee watershed, compared to a conventional command-and-control approach. 
A comprehensive literature overview of nationally and internationally implemented 
trading programs was conducted to highlight advantages and challenges of these 
vi 
programs towards achieving water quality goals, and to outline the essential elements 
of a successful program. Furthermore, a modeling framework, integrating a 
hydrologic-water quality model with an economic model, was developed to assess the 
potential cost savings that trading might offer over a command-and-control approach. 
The modeling framework was applied in three priority basins of the Lake Okeechobee 
watershed. In each case, while developing trading scenarios to achieve phosphorus 
load reduction targets, the trading program was less expensive than the conventional 
command-and-control approach.  
This research provided the foundation for stakeholders to better understand whether 
water quality trading has the potential to work in the Lake Okeechobee watershed and 
to facilitate the development of a pilot program. In addition, it offered some insights 
on the potential economic opportunities that pollution sources would have by 
participating in the trading program. The modeling framework developed in this 
dissertation could facilitate the assessment of future water quality trading programs in 
other watersheds. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nutrient pollution, caused by excess nitrogen and phosphorus inputs to the 
environment, is one of the world’s most challenging, widespread, and costly 
environmental problems. For decades, the increase of nutrient enrichment has 
threatened the ecological integrity and economic sustainability of many rivers, lakes, 
and coastal waters. The proliferation of nutrients have been seen in Lake Ladoga and 
the Baltic Sea in Europe (Drabkova et al., 1996; Paerl and Huisman, 2008), Lake 
Victoria in Africa, Lake Taihu in Asia (Paerl et al., 2011), and the Amazon River and 
Lake Okeechobee in the Americas (Demaster and Pope, 1996; Havens and Gawlik, 
2005). In the United States alone, nutrient pollution ranks in the top three leading 
causes of impairment of rivers and lakes, affecting the public water supply, aquatic 
wildlife, and agricultural, recreational, and industrial activities (USEPA, 2009). 
Freshwater nutrient pollution is estimated to cost the United States at least $ 2.2 
billion annually (Dodds et al., 2009). Since the establishment of the Clean Water Act 
(CWA), considerable efforts have been adopted towards reducing nutrient pollution 
from point sources. However, with rapid urban and agricultural development, it seems 
that water body impairments that result from excessive nutrient inputs are a never-
ending environmental problem. Part of this environmental problem is the complex 
nature of nutrient pollution and the challenging task of controlling nonpoint emissions 
(Ouyang et al., 2009; Zhang and Huang, 2011). Undoubtedly, another part of the 
problem is today’s national and local economic constraints (Faeth, 2000). 
When devising environmental policy instruments for solving environmental 
problems, policymakers have the difficult task of evaluating different policies 
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strategies using several factors, such as efficiency, cost-effectiveness, fairness 
(distributional equity of benefits or costs), ability to address uncertainties, and 
political feasibility (Goulder and Parry, 2008). In the water quality arena, the 
environmental policies currently implemented have been heavily dominated by 
traditional command-and-control (CAC) or regulatory approaches (Harrington and 
Morgenstern, 2004). However, there has been a notable increase in popularity of 
incentive-based (IB) mechanisms to address water body impairments. One widely 
discussed IB approach is the cap-and-trade system (also known as a tradeable permit 
program) (Goodstein, 2011). The economic advantage that the IB approach offers 
over CAC approaches is the main reason for increased interest in this alternative tool 
(Stavins and Whitehead, 1996). Certainly, the successful experience of reducing 
sulfur dioxide and other air emissions using IB instruments has helped to boost the 
expectations for the implementation of cap-and-trade tools in the water quality field 
(Field and Field, 2006). 
Water quality trading is cost effective since pollution sources with low abatement 
costs can reduce their emissions beyond imposed limits and generate credits that can 
be sold to other sources with high treatment costs. Allowing the trade of credits 
reduces the overall costs of pollution control, while attaining water quality goals 
(Faeth, 2000). In addition, trading offers pollution sources the flexibility to control 
their emissions while exploring and implementing innovative technologies and 
practices for pollution control (Goodstein, 2011). Water quality trading programs 
(WQTPs) have been implemented in different countries, such as Australia, Canada, 
the United States, and New Zealand (Selman et al., 2009; Shortle, 2013). In a survey 
conducted by Selman et al. (2009), 57 WQTPs were identified worldwide, 51 of 
which are located in the United States. The implemented WQTPs have been evaluated 
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in several reports and articles (Borghesi, 2014; Mariola, 2009; Newburn and 
Woodward, 2012; USEPA, 2009), and while some studies reported successful 
outcomes, most of the papers underlined the limited trading activities that have 
actually taken place. Although trading is generally driven by regulations, it is 
incentivized by economics, which means that if there is not enough financial 
attractiveness, pollution sources might not be eager to participate in a trading program 
(USEPA, 2003). Therefore, it is critical that promoters of WQT understand and 
overcome the potential challenges and limitations associated with this type of 
program. It is widely accepted that WQTPs are not a panacea for water pollution 
control, and their success or failure to provide cost-effective water quality 
improvements will depend on how the program is designed and implemented (Newell 
and Stavins, 2003; Shortle, 2013). Therefore, before investing resources to implement 
a WQTP, it is important to conduct a feasibility analysis to determine the 
environmental and economic benefits of a trading program for improving water 
quality in a specific watershed. The feasibility analysis would also give insight to 
prospective trading entities about the economic opportunities they would have by 
participating in a trading program. 
1.1. Motivation 
Recognizing the economic prospects of IB tools over CAC approaches, the 
motivation of this dissertation is to investigate the feasibility of implementing a 
WQTP in an impaired freshwater body in the United States. With a surface area of 
1,890 km2, Lake Okeechobee (LO) is the second largest freshwater lake in the 
contiguous United States. Located in South Florida, it constitutes a critical link 
between the Kissimmee River in the north, wetlands and bays in the south, and 
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estuaries in the east and west. The natural state of the lake has been degraded as 
wetlands and natural habitats in the Lake Okeechobee watershed (LOW) have been 
replaced with farms, urban areas, and dairy operations (Hiscock et al., 2003). 
Excessive phosphorus loadings from agriculture and livestock, municipal and 
industrial wastewater discharges, and urban stormwater runoff have been identified as 
the leading causes of the lake’s impairment (FDEP, 2001). According to the 2015 
South Florida Environmental Report, the annual average (2010 – 2014) total 
phosphorus (TP) loading discharged to LO is 442 metric tons (mtons) (Sharfstein et 
al., 2015). The TP entering the LO is about 302 mtons greater than the Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) of 140 mtons of TP per year mandated by the Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP). For more than four decades, many 
resources have been allocated to regional and local restoration efforts to reduce 
nutrient loadings to the lake (Havens and Gawlik, 2005). However, TP loadings to the 
lake have not significantly decreased and the recovery of the lake could take more 
time, particularly with today’s limited local budgets. Therefore, it is important to 
investigate innovative economic incentives to address the phosphorus pollution 
problem in LOW. 
1.2. Objectives 
The main objective of the present dissertation was to assess the environmental and 
economic benefits of implementing a phosphorus trading program in the Lake 
Okeechobee watershed compared to a conventional regulatory command-and-control 
approach. In order to achieve this principal objective, the following specific 
objectives were identified: 
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• Conduct a literature overview of worldwide water quality trading programs to 1) 
assess advantages of these programs towards achieving water quality goals, 2) 
identify challenges confronted during the design through the implementation 
phase, and 3) outline the essential elements of a successful program. 
• Identify point and nonpoint phosphorus sources and estimate their associated TP 
loadings in two sub-watersheds within the Lake Okeechobee watershed, 
representing priority basins for phosphorus load controls and with different land 
use and hydrologic characteristics. 
• Estimate attenuation ratios to account for biophysical processes within the stream 
network of the sub-watersheds and derive delivery trading ratios to support the 
phosphorus loading equivalence between trading sources at a different distance 
from the outlet of the sub-watershed. 
• Develop an optimization model to identify the optimal combination of best 
management practices and technologies to be implemented in the sub-watersheds 
in order to minimize the cost of achieving a phosphorus reduction target. 
• Develop trading scenarios in the sub-watersheds to evaluate the potential trading 
cost savings for achieving different phosphorus reduction targets and to determine 
whether the conditions exist to support the implementation of a water quality 
trading program involving point and nonpoint pollution sources. 
 
1.3. Dissertation Structure 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized in three main chapters. Each 
chapter takes the form of a research paper intended to be a stand-alone chapter, that 
has been either published or prepared for publication, and addresses one or several of 
the specific objectives identified above.  
6 
Chapter 2, published in the Irrigation and Drainage Journal, provides a review of 
water quality trading programs around the world. This chapter identifies advantages, 
challenges, and essential elements for the design and implementation of a trading 
program. In addition, a meta-analysis is presented to prioritize the main factors 
driving the success of a trading program. 
Chapter 3, published in the Journal of Environmental Management, describes a 
modeling framework integrating a hydrologic-water quality model with an economic 
model to assess the cost-benefits of a phosphorus water quality trading program. It 
also presents the first attempt to apply the developed modeling framework in an 
agricultural sub-basin within the Lake Okeechobee watershed. 
Chapter 4, using the framework developed in Chapter 3, evaluates and compares 
the potential of a water quality trading program versus a command-and-control 
approach to cost-effectively achieve different phosphorus load reduction targets. This 
evaluation focuses on two sub-watersheds with different land use and hydrologic 
conditions within the Lake Okeechobee watershed. In addition, Chapter 4 presents an 
assessment of the effect of different caps on the trading program potential, while 
considering several factors, such as the least-cost solutions, credit prices, potential 
cost savings, and credit supply and demand. 
Finally, a summary of this dissertation is presented in Chapter 5. Major 
conclusions and recommendations for future work are also provided. 
  
7 
1.4. References 
Borghesi, S., 2014. Water tradable permits: a review of theoretical and case studies, J. 
Environ. Plann. Manage. 57, 1305-1332. 
Demaster, D.J., Pope, R.H., 1996. Nutrient dynamics in Amazon shelf waters: results 
from AMASSEDS, Cont. Shelf Res. 16, 263-289.  
Dodds, W.K., Bouska, W.W., Eitzmann, J.L., Pilger, T.J., Pitts, K.L., Riley, A.J., 
Schloesser, J.T., Thornbrugh, D.J., 2009. Eutrophication of U.S. freshwaters: 
analysis of potential economic damages, Environ. Sci. Technol. 43, 12-19. 
Drabkova, V., Rutnyantsev, V., Sergeeva, L., Slepukhina, T., 1996. Ecological 
problems of Lake Ladoga: causes and solutions, Hydrobiologia 322, 1-7. 
Faeth, P., 2000. Fertile ground: Nutrient trading's potential to cost-effectively improve 
water quality, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. 
FDEP, 2001. Total maximum daily load for total phosphorus Lake Okeechobee, 
Florida, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Atlanta, GA. 
Field, B.C., Field, M.K., 2006. Environmental Economics: An Introduction, Fourth 
edition ed. McGraw-Hill/Irwin, New York, NY. 
Goodstein, E.S., 2011. Economics and the Environment, Six edition ed. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. 
Goulder, L.H., Parry, I.W.H., 2008. Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy, 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 2, 152-174. 
Harrington, W., Morgenstern, R.D., 2004. Economic incentives versus command and 
control. What's the best approach for solving environmental problems? 
Resources 152, 13-17. 
Havens, K., Gawlik, D., 2005. Lake Okeechobee conceptual ecological model, 
Wetlands 25, 908-925. 
Hiscock, J., Thourot, C., Zhang, J., 2003. Phosphorus budget - land use relationships 
for the northern Lake Okeechobee watershed, Florida, Ecol. Eng. 21, 63-74.  
Mariola, M.J., 2009. Are markets the solution to water pollution? A sociological 
investigation of water quality trading, Doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus, OH. 
Newburn, D.A., Woodward, R.T., 2012. An ex post evaluation of Ohio’s Great Miami 
water quality trading program, J. Am. Water Resour. Assoc. 48, 156-169. 
Newell, R., Stavins, R., 2003. Cost heterogeneity and the potential savings from 
market-based policies, Journal of Regulatory Economics 23, 43-59. 
8 
Ouyang, W., Wang, X., Hao, F., Srinivasan, R., 2009. Temporal-spatial dynamics of 
vegetation variation on non-point source nutrient pollution, Ecological 
Modelling 220, 2702-2713. 
Paerl, H.W., Hall, N.S., Calandrino, E.S., 2011. Controlling harmful cyanobacterial 
blooms in a world experiencing anthropogenic and climatic-induced change, 
Sci. Total Environ. 409, 1739-1741. 
Paerl, H.W., Huisman, J., 2008. Climate. Blooms like it hot, Science 320, 57-58. 
Selman, M., Greenhalgh, S., Branosky, E., Jones, C., Guiling, J., 2009. Water quality 
trading programs: An international overview, World Resources Institute, 
Washington, DC. 
Sharfstein, B., Zhang, J., Bertolotti, L., 2015. Chapter 8: Lake Okeechobee watershed 
protection program annual update, South Florida Environmental Report, South 
Florida Water Management District, West Palm Beach, FL. 
Shortle, J.S., 2013. Economics and environmental markets: Lessons from water-
quality trading, Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 42, 57-74. 
Stavins, R.N., Whitehead, B.W., 1996. The next generation of market-based 
environmental policies, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. 
USEPA, 2009. National water quality inventory: Report to Congress - 2004 reporting 
cycle, EPA 841-R-08-001, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, 
DC. 
USEPA, 2003. Water quality trading assessment handbook: EPA region 10’s guide to 
analyzing your watershed, EPA 910-B-03-003, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Washington, DC. 
Zhang, H., Huang, G.H., 2011. Assessment of non-point source pollution using a 
spatial multicriteria analysis approach, Ecol. Model. 222, 313-321. 
 
  
9 
CHAPTER 2 
WATER QUALITY TRADING PROGRAMS TOWARDS SOLVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PROBLEMS 
Corrales J, Naja GM, Rivero RG, Miralles-Wilhelm F, Bhat MG. 2013. Water quality 
trading programs towards solving environmental pollution problems. Irrigation and 
Drainage 62 (Suppl. 2): 72-92. 
 
2.1. Abstract 
Increased regulatory attention in controlling pollutants has encouraged the 
development of water quality trading programs for the past several decades. These 
trading programs could provide the mechanisms to cost-effectively achieve water 
quality objectives. Encouragement of innovative methodologies for emission 
prevention and control, and the contributions from non-regulated pollution sources are 
also important factors in the development of successful water quality trading 
programs. The objectives of this paper are to: assess the advantages of a trading 
program to reach water quality goals while providing additional benefits to the whole 
watershed; describe the challenges confronted during the design to implementation 
phases; and outline the essential elements of a successful program. A meta-analysis 
was also conducted using several water quality trading programs to assess main 
market-based elements driving the success of trading programs between point and 
agricultural nonpoint sources. Uncertainty, policy drivers and social embeddedness - 
the degree to which stakeholders are integrated into the program development - seem 
to be the most influential determinant of the program success. 
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2.2. Introduction 
Interest in environmental trading programs has been increasing for several 
decades. The Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (Australia), South Nation 
Phosphorus Trading Program (Canada) and Lake Taupo Nitrogen Trading Program 
(New Zealand) are some examples of trading programs already implemented or under 
development around the world (Selman et al., 2009). In the United States (USA), 
trading programs have been developed promoting economic and environmental 
advantages (e.g., Breetz et al., 2004). The history of these environmental programs 
can be traced back to the 1980s where inter-refinery trading was used to address lead 
in gasoline (Kerr and Newell, 2003). Other environmental issues have been managed 
through trading programs, such as acid rain, wetland mitigation, endangered species 
habitat, stream bank restoration, greenhouse gas reduction, and most recent in the 
water quality arena (Boyner, 2004; Burtraw and Palmer, 2004; Shabman and 
Stephenson, 2004).  
In theory, trading programs allow one polluting source to meet its regulatory 
obligations by purchasing pollution reductions achieved by another source with lower 
abatement costs. The latter, in turn, obtains revenue for their efforts in reducing 
pollution (US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), 2007c). Generally 
speaking, the sources with lower abatement costs are the nonpoint sources 
unregulated under the Clean Water Act (CWA). In practice, because trading programs 
are site specific, such as in the water quality case, trading policies and rules must be 
applicable to suit the specific conditions of the watershed (Lal et al., 2009). For this 
reason, trading programs design, objectives and success vary widely. Promoters of 
trading have been using different names to define this type of program such as cap 
and trade, effluent trading, and pollutant exchange just to name a few. Regardless of 
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its name, the objective of any environmental trading program is to provide a cost-
effective mechanism and decision making flexibility to achieve an environmental goal 
(Horan et al., 2002a; Shabman and Stephenson, 2007; Hamstead and BenDor, 2010; 
Stephenson et al., 2010). In addition, water quality trading programs offer a policy 
mechanism to engage nonpoint sources, i.e., pollution sources not regulated under the 
federal regulatory extent of the CWA. 
In water quality programs, US regulatory agencies have been leading the efforts 
implementing trading systems to control effluents and achieve water quality standards 
(Stephenson et al., 1998). Most of these efforts have been devoted to developing 
trading policies and guidelines for different pollutants, such as nitrogen, phosphorus, 
sediments, temperature and biological oxygen demand (USEPA, 2004; Lal et al., 
2009) focusing on the contaminant of concern in the watershed, impacting a specific 
waterbody. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has encouraged the 
trading program concept while financing several feasibility studies and demonstration 
efforts and issuing a water quality trading policy guide, a handbook and a toolkit for 
permit writers (USEPA, 2003, 2004, 2007a). The United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) has also promoted water quality trading while releasing a new 
policy for environmental management with the aim of expanding the use of market 
mechanisms (USDA, 2006) and also targeting several aspects of point and nonpoint 
trading mechanisms (Letson, 1992; Malik et al., 1993; Crutchfield et al., 1994). 
Trading programs in the US have emerged in different watersheds to solve water 
quality problems associated especially with excessive nutrient levels (Virginia 
Department of Environmental Quality (VDEQ), 2008; Connecticut Department of 
Environmental Protection (CTDEP), 2010a; Hamstead and BenDor, 2010). However, 
even with several success stories, some authors remain skeptical and consider that the 
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majority of these trading programs lack market-based fundamentals (Stephenson et 
al., 1998; Collentine, 2006; Shabman and Stephenson, 2007), which would provide 
more equitable, efficient, and cost-effective ways to address water quality problems 
(Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team (CPNT), 2001). On 
the other hand, other trading program experts have demonstrated that it is possible to 
design a program endorsing the potential benefits of a market-based system within the 
existing regulatory structure (Boyd et al., 2003; Swift, 2005). 
The objectives of this paper are to: review the potentials of a trading program 
implemented to reach water quality goals; describe the challenges confronted during 
the design to implementation phases; define the essential elements of a successful 
program; and illustrate some examples of water quality trading programs to provide 
insight into the development of a trading program in a specific watershed. Finally, a 
meta-analysis was also conducted to rank the main elements driving the success of a 
trading program.  
2.3. Advantages of a Water Quality Trading Approach 
The benefits of a trading program have been well acknowledged by economists, 
policy makers and environmental groups in many reports and research papers (Boyd 
et al., 2003; USEPA, 2003; Swift, 2005). The main advantage of trading programs in 
comparison with the traditional command-and-control approaches is that trading 
allows flexibility on whom and where pollution control measures are implemented 
without prescribing how to achieve the reduction, thus creating incentives to innovate 
within the pollution reduction scope (Borisova and Roka, 2009). Other advantages 
cover a range of environmental, economic and social improvements in the specific 
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watershed where the trading program is implemented. Table 2-1 summarizes the most 
significant potential benefits of a water quality trading program.  
Environmental benefits 
From the environmental perspective, water quality trading programs advantages 
are mainly focused on attainment of water quality standards, improved compliance 
levels, and pollution prevention (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). The attainment of 
water quality targets is done through setting a mandatory watershed goal, commonly 
known as a cap. This cap is the total pollutant amount allowed to be discharged from 
a specific watershed. Under the CWA structure, the cap is often referred to as the 
Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), which is the maximum amount of pollutant that 
a water body can receive and still meet its designated use (Borisova and Roka, 2009). 
The cap is then distributed among sources by allocating permissions (or allowances) 
to discharge a certain amount of pollutant in a limited time. In a market-based trading 
program, the sources facing high pollution control costs (i.e. point sources) will meet 
their allowances by purchasing environmentally equivalent pollution reductions from 
other sources at a lower cost. Thus, trading has the potential to accomplish the same 
or better overall water quality improvement in a watershed (USEPA, 2007a), and 
reduce the cost of achieving pollution reductions mandated under the Clean Water 
Act. Generally, nonpoint sources are achieving pollution loading reductions through 
the implementation of Best Management Practices (BMP) monitored for efficiency, 
process to be evaluated and approved by the regulatory authorities. Broader and 
indirect potential environmental benefits could also be offered when implementing 
water quality trading programs and reaching water quality standards (Swift, 2005). 
Some of these additional benefits include improved wildlife habitat, endangered 
species protection, erosion reduction, co-control of pollutants, flood retention, and 
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potential restoration of wetlands (Hall and Biorn-Hansen, 2005). For instance, the 
Rahr Malting project (Minnesota, USA) have reduced sedimentation and improved 
soil conservation (USEPA, 2008). However, in general, the overriding focus on the 
accomplishment of water quality standards overshadows the value and attainment of 
ancillary environmental benefits. 
Economic benefits 
Economically, a water quality trading program's major benefit is to reduce the 
individual pollution abatement cost and to decrease the aggregate cost of achieving 
water quality goals in the watershed (Florida Department of Environmental Protection 
(FDEP), 2010a). Generally, agricultural nonpoint sources incur lower abatement costs 
than point sources (Newburn and Woodward, 2012), and therefore, any trading 
between these sources leads to an overall cost reduction. For instance, for the Great 
Miami River Pilot program (Ohio, USA), USEPA (2008) estimated the unit cost for 
treatment plant upgrades around US$ 23 per pound of phosphorus removed, whereas 
the unit cost for BMPs on farms were about US$ 1.08 per pound removed. The 
opportunity to trade allowances and to adopt the best pollution control technology 
based on specific conditions, are the means of creating financial incentives for this 
pollution prevention program (Stephenson and Shabman, 2010). These incentives 
apply to the sources seeking pollution reductions and those who are offering them: 
low-abatement cost sources are stimulated by the revenues from selling the credits 
accrued when reaching load reductions above their allocations, while high pollution 
reduction cost sources benefit from implementing low-cost alternatives. As a result, 
trading programs can provide an innovation mechanism to adopt – and even fund - 
new methodologies for emissions prevention and control. This additional benefit 
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creates a market demand for innovative technologies to reduce the pollution levels to 
even below the requirements (USEPA, 2004).  
Social benefits 
Trading programs also allow integrating economic and environmental advantages 
with social benefits to a greater extent than traditional programs. It encourages 
communication among point and nonpoint sources, regulatory agencies, the public 
and other stakeholders to promote concerted solutions for a watershed with multiples 
sources of pollution (USEPA, 1996; FDEP, 2010a). Exhaustive communication 
among all trading participants including those who oversee the program could reduce 
initial perceptions of risk and lack of equity, therefore enhancing the initial 
willingness to discuss trading. Effective partnerships transcend conventional barriers 
to sustain watershed management by establishing common goals, encouraging natural 
resources stewardship, with economic mechanisms to achieve environmental 
improvement. Furthermore, trading can offer the possibility for new and expanding 
sources to purchase credits from existing sources, thus accounting for population 
growth and water quality requirements (CPNT, 2001). One of the main benefits of 
water quality trading programs is to achieve and maintain water quality goals with 
population and economic growth.  
2.4. Challenges Associated With Water Quality Trading Programs 
Several limitations could hamper the practical and successful implementation of 
the water quality trading concept, and also increase the risk that trading will not be 
able to accomplish environmental quality goals. These challenges, summarized in 
Table 2-2, can be grouped in three main categories: 1) regulatory, 2) uncertainty, and 
3) economic barriers. The fourth program design category involving the credit supply 
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and demand, the cost / price dynamics to support a market as well the geographic 
restrictions was not discussed here but was mentioned in the Table for completeness. 
Regulatory 
The existing statutory and regulation constraints can limit the flexibility in the 
credit exchange, a fundamental market-based principle of a trading program. Through 
the issuance of individual National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permits, the current regulatory structure of the CWA grants legal permission to 
discharge polluted water only to point sources (USEPA, 2007b). These point sources, 
such as industrial and municipal wastewater treatment plants, discharge effluents into 
water bodies at an identifiable location (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). However, in the 
case of a nutrient trading program, nonpoint sources discharging over a diffuse area, 
such as agricultural operations, do not have legal liabilities to control nutrient 
discharges (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). Yet, nonpoint sources are well known to 
dominate the total nutrient loadings in the majority of watersheds (USEPA, 2000) and 
also to offer, under most circumstances, lower nutrient reduction costs (Ribaudo et al., 
2005). Although nutrient abatement costs are site specific and technology dependent, 
if a trading program fails to incorporate point and nonpoint sources of pollution, the 
cost savings and compliance itself could be compromised. In addition, the credit 
exchange flexibility could be threatened by covering just one category of pollution 
sources. 
There are practical ways of efficiently incorporating market-based characteristics 
into a trading program design within the existing regulatory structure. One approach 
already implemented is to perform trading under a group compliance permit (USEPA, 
2007b) whereby association members can choose and implement their own initiatives 
for pollution control with more credit exchange flexibility. In addition, under the 
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group compliance scheme, the role of regulatory agencies is shifted from imposing 
technologies to achieve effluent reduction to requiring monitoring and measurement 
of discharged pollutants. This approach has been effectively implemented in the 
Neuse River program (North Carolina, USA) where nitrogen loadings to estuaries 
have diminished by 70 % since 1995, and savings have been observed when the group 
permit association handled water quality monitoring (Neuse River Compliance 
Association (NRCA), 2011). The group permit option for the Neuse River program 
consisted of setting a collective cap for total nitrogen based on the sum of association 
members' individual nitrogen allocations. In this program, point and nonpoint trading 
occur indirectly through the North Carolina Wetland Restoration Fund. There are no 
individual penalties as long as the group as a whole is in compliance. Only when the 
group of regulated sources exceeds the cap, the group is then subject to a penalty that 
must be paid to the Fund, that secures that the payments collected result in nonpoint 
source nitrogen reductions (Breetz et al., 2004; Hamstead and BenDor, 2010). 
Although, the Neuse River program diverges from the standard permit with which 
regulatory agencies are familiar, it demonstrates that there is a way to facilitate a 
workable permitting approach for water quality trading programs (USEPA, 2008).  
A lack of consistent support in resources allocated to trading programs from 
environmental agencies at the federal and state levels is another institutional obstacle. 
While the federal government is encouraging trading program implementation, the 
position of regional environmental agencies, particularly among permit writer with 
preconceived notions of trading, is sceptical to explore new alternatives that stray 
from the conventional approach. It is only when compliance targets are not reached 
through the conventional rule making approach, that a trading program is explored as 
an alternative. While evaluating water quality trading programs, USEPA (2008) 
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reported that the lack of consistent support allocated to trading programs is a primary 
barrier hindering their growth. Overcoming this culture is a constant battle that may 
slow down the funding and implementation of water quality trading programs 
(USEPA, 2008). One of the reasons for this scepticism could be that the federal and 
regional agencies may not have invested enough time and resources into educating 
and persuading the polluting entities on the long-term economic benefits of trading. 
Uncertainty and hotspots 
Some sceptics of water quality trading assume that trading can lead to the creation 
of localized areas with high pollution levels (named 'pollution hotspots') within a 
watershed (Swift, 2005). These hotspots result when water quality equivalence has 
not been carefully taken into account in the program design. Water quality 
equivalence can be addressed by determining appropriate equivalency factors or 
trading ratios (USEPA, 2008). In order to develop these trading ratios, several factors, 
such as the geographic and hydrologic complexity of the watershed, the properties of 
the pollutant (e.g., different phosphorus forms can lead to different eutrophication 
potentials), and scientific data (whenever available) need to be considered (Kerr and 
Newell, 2003). Generally, a trading ratio means that more or less than one unit of 
nonpoint source discharge reduction is required to offset one unit of point source 
discharge (Borisova and Roka, 2009; Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Trading ratios are 
also generally used to account for the pollutant assimilation in the watershed (delivery 
ratio), for a polluting source impact on sensitive areas (water quality ratio), and to 
accommodate the uncertainty of the loading reduction efficiency (uncertainty ratio) 
particularly when nonpoint sources are participating in the program (Whitehead, 
2006). Moreover, some programs include an additional retirement ratio to provide a 
margin of safety for the overall trading program (CPNT, 2001). However, while these 
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ratios might be desirable, high trading ratios could become a disincentive for nonpoint 
source involvement by reducing the economic attractiveness of these trading 
programs. 
Moreover, additional uncertainties emerge when nonpoint sources are involved in 
a trading program. Some authors argue that the physical characteristics of nonpoint 
sources and their reliance on random weather events hinder the pollution loading 
measurement at a reasonable cost (Malik et al., 1993; Shortle and Abler, 1997; Horan 
et al., 2002b). The quantification challenge of nonpoint sources loadings can be 
resolved using direct (quantification of flow and pollutant concentration) or indirect 
measurement tools. Indirect estimation of the effluent reduction effectiveness of 
different management practices is based on simulation models or results from other 
studies (Lal et al., 2009). The Pennsylvania's Chesapeake Bay Water Quality Trading 
program (Pennsylvania, USA) is one of the best examples dealing with the nonpoint 
source loading uncertainty. A scientifically sound analysis assessing BMPs efficiency 
values, adjusted to account for uncertainties, was implemented and incorporated into 
the Bay watershed model (as long-term averages) (Simpson and Weammert, 2008). 
This reduced the need for uncertainties ratios when trading involved nonpoint sources, 
while maintaining the delivery, reserve and edge of segment ratios, (Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP), 2009). 
Economic barriers 
The costs associated with the measurement and monitoring of actual nonpoint 
sources loads are also identified as economic barriers in water quality trading 
programs (Breetz et al., 2004). These costs can curtail the expected savings in 
meeting water quality goals. Although direct measurement of nonpoint source 
discharges could be very expensive, current technologies provide less costly 
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alternatives to estimate effluent load reduction. For example, computer models, such 
as the Watershed Assessment Model (WAM), Soil and Water Assessment Tool 
(SWAT), and the Agricultural Policy/Environmental Extender (APEX) model (Soil 
and Water Engineering Technology, Inc. (SWET), 2010; APEX, 2011; SWAT, 2011), 
calculate site-specific effluent loads based on land use, soil type, topography, and 
weather conditions. These simulation models are relatively simple to use, reliable, and 
offer the possibility to simulate several scenarios before any control measure is 
actually implemented (Arnold et al., 1998; Gassman et al., 2010; Chebud et al., 
2011). However, it is important to be aware of the limitations, assumptions, and 
degree of uncertainty of these computer tools. Site-specific measurements and 
monitoring of nonpoint source loads should be conducted whenever possible to 
validate simulation results. 
Online market tools have also been developed for several water quality trading 
programs to estimate the amount of credits generated based on the adopted control 
practices (Hennessy, 2001). For instance, in the Chesapeake Bay, the World Resource 
Institute (WRI) in conjunction with environmental agencies have designed a site-
specific online trading platform called NutrientNet (World Resources Institute (WRI), 
2007). This tool is used to estimate the nutrient reductions achieved when 
implementing a certain type of mitigation practices, to post credit offers, and to 
provide a simple communicating platform among buyers and sellers. Another 
example of an online tool is the Nitrogen Tracking Tool (NTrT), an enhanced version 
of the Nitrogen Trading Tool (NTT) originally developed by the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) in cooperation with the Agricultural Research Service 
and the USEPA. The NTrT estimates nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment reductions 
and losses from fields managed under a variety of cropping patterns and management 
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practices. This tool helps farmers and other users to estimate the potential number of 
nitrogen and phosphorus credits to be generated and eventually sold in a water quality 
trading program, when a specific control program is implemented (Gross et al., 2008; 
Saleh et al., 2011). These simulation tools along with scientific research on nonpoint 
source loadings and BMP efficiencies might reduce the uncertainty ratios, therefore 
decreasing the cost of nonpoint source credits and making them more attractive to 
point sources (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011).  
Another economic barrier is related to the high transaction costs associated with 
research, negotiations, monitoring and enforcement, and finding trading partners 
(Stavins, 2003). The real challenge with transaction costs is to retain the cost 
effectiveness while still meeting environmental efficacy (Woodward et al., 2002). 
Given that nonpoint sources are generally widely spread throughout watersheds and 
each farmer would be able to generate few credits, point sources would encounter 
high transaction costs while searching for trading partners to comply with their 
requirements and thus hold back trading with nonpoint sources (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 
2011). Likewise, nonpoint sources may face high transaction costs when trying to 
identify sources interested to buy their credits. Nevertheless, a number of trading 
programs have implemented market configuration features such as clearinghouses and 
third-party aggregators to reduce the transaction costs (Breetz et al., 2004). These 
third-party aggregators are brokers between buyers and sellers, purchasing credits 
from sellers and then re-selling the credits to willing buyers. Having third-party 
aggregators in a trading program can minimize the transaction costs while also 
reducing the uncertainty issue associated to nonpoint sources performance by holding 
a portion of the purchased credits and taking the risk if a nonpoint source control 
practice fails to generate the expected credits (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Figure 2-
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1 summarizes the key challenges and benefits of water quality programs, as well as 
some of the suggested solutions discussed above. 
2.5. Elements of a Water Quality Trading Program 
Water quality trading programs may have different designs reflecting the water 
quality goals and the physical characteristics of each watershed (Borisova and Roka, 
2009). Nevertheless, there are some common elements to be implemented pre and 
post trading (summarized in Figure 2-2) that can be assembled differently to tailor 
each program needs. Table 2-3 presents a brief description of some trading programs 
and elements of the corresponding policies. Although many of these trading programs 
share common features, this paper details only some representative trading policies 
providing different design and implementation options. All of these trading programs 
are located in the United States and in Canada (Figure 2-3) with the exception of the 
Hunter River Trading Scheme located in Australia (not shown on the map).  
Tradable commodity 
For a trading system to work, the tradable commodity needs to be expressed in a 
common unit of measurement for a specific pollutant form (typically kilograms per 
day or year) in order to quantify and track effluent reductions and enforce discharge 
limits (Swift, 2005). Careful attention needs to be given to the chemical form of the 
traded pollutant since different pollutants have different chemical characteristics and 
their interaction and impact on the water body of concern may differ (USEPA, 1996). 
In addition, the certification, verification, and enforcement conditions of the tradable 
commodity are to be determined during the designing phase of the trading program. 
Many worldwide water quality trading programs are focused on phosphorus 
and/or nitrogen, although inclusion of different pollutants, such as sediment and 
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salinity into water quality trading policies has been growing. For instance, 
Pennsylvania's Chesapeake Bay Water Quality Trading program addresses pollution 
reductions for nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment to meet water quality standards in 
the Bay and tidal rivers (USEPA, 2010); and the Hunter River Trading Scheme in 
Australia, provides a mechanism where point sources trade salinity credits in order to 
reduce and maintain salinity levels in the river (Department of Environment, Climate 
Change and Water (DECCW), 2009).  
Types of trading, eligibility, and baseline 
In addition to addressing different pollutants, these programs illustrate different 
types of trading as well. Most programs allow only one type of trading, either between 
point sources or between nonpoint sources, the former being the most prevalent type. 
However, there are programs (e.g. Neuse River and Great Miami River) allowing 
trading between point and nonpoint sources, such as trading between agriculture 
landowners and wastewater treatment plants, and other programs (e.g. Lower St. 
Johns River pilot program located in Florida, USA) permitting trading between urban 
stormwater and waste treatment facilities.  
An important element to consider in any trading program is the determination of 
trading eligibility. Since a successful program requires an adequate level of credit 
supply and demand (USEPA, 2004), a preliminary assessment of the type and number 
of sources located across the watershed needs to be performed. This preliminary 
assessment of the market's potential while identifying potential sources that may 
participate in a trading program include: 1) characterization of effluent loadings, 2) 
proximity to the receiving water body, 3) whether or not they already have pollutant 
limit requirements, 4) their pollution reduction cost and, 5) their willingness to 
participate in the program (Obropta and Rusciano, 2006). A substantial difference of 
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pollution abatement costs among sources within a watershed is another key factor to 
be considered (Collentine, 2006; FDEP, 2010a). This will provide financial incentives 
for sellers, to have an additional revenue stream while generating and selling credits 
in the market, and for buyers to save on pollution control costs while purchasing 
credits from the market (Borisova and Roka, 2009). 
The concept of baseline arises when nonpoint sources are involved in a trading 
program. A baseline is the level of performance against which changes create credits 
for sale in a market; this means that a seller needs to reduce below its baseline to be 
able to generate credits (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Baseline determination differs 
among water quality trading programs and can be set based either on loads recorded 
during a specific period, (Hamstead and BenDor, 2010), or on load reduction through 
a TMDL (Borisova and Roka, 2009), or on agriculture pollution control practices 
implemented before trading (Ribaudo et al., 2005). As an example, the baseline for 
nitrogen in the Neuse River Basin program was set based on the 1991-1995 annual 
average nitrogen loadings. 
Goal and allowances 
The goal refers to the total permissible amount of a pollutant allowed to be 
discharged into a water body in a given period of time. Generally defined as the cap, it 
is the leading driver that propels pollution sources to seek effluent reductions. Usually 
a TMDL or a water quality-based requirement in a NPDES permit are the legal 
mechanisms establishing target conditions in a water quality trading program (FDEP, 
2010b). Scientific research provides estimates of the total amount of a pollutant that 
can be discharged into a specific watershed, while still meeting its designated uses. 
After the cap is set, discharge allowances are determined for pollutant sources across 
the watershed. These allowances will establish the baseline for individual sources to 
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generate credits to trade (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). Generally, while the 
allocations to point sources are reflected in a binding requirement in the NPDES 
permit, no emission restriction are imposed on nonpoint sources by federal law 
(USEPA, 2004). 
Policy and regulation 
There are also some differences in the policy driver that motivates pollution 
sources to seek credits to comply with their pollutant limit requirements. Among the 
programs presented in Table 2-3, the primary water quality driver was the adoption of 
a TMDL and more stringent discharge limits in the NPDES permits (e.g. Long Island 
Sound or Lower St. Johns River trading programs). Other programs defined their 
reduction targets through a general permit providing flexibility in pollution control 
measures and not forcing point sources to comply with their individual NPDES 
permits, as long as the group cap is met (e.g. Neuse River Basin trading program). 
However, in this case, if the collective cap is exceeded, the group is penalized with a 
fee to secure equivalent load reductions from sources not covered under the group 
permit (Stephenson and Shabman, 2010). 
International water quality trading drivers were based on different guidelines. For 
example, the Provincial Ministry of Environment (MOE) in Canada required zero 
phosphorus discharge for new or expanded facilities (O'Grady, 2006). In the case of 
the Hunter River Salinity Scheme in Australia, established to limit salinity discharges 
from major point sources, the total allowable salt discharge depends on the river flow 
and its capacity to assimilate saline discharges (Ferguson, 2005). 
Trading ratios 
Generally, water quality trading programs rely on trading ratios to account for 
uncertainties and to achieve equivalency among the traded credits, particularly when 
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nonpoint sources are participating in the program (USEPA, 2008). The most common 
trading ratios are the delivery, uncertainty, water quality, retirement, and reserve 
ratios. 
The delivery (or location) ratio is set to account for pollutant attenuation 
throughout a watershed before reaching the impaired water body. This ratio can be 
applied to point and nonpoint sources while considering their location and distance 
from the impaired water body. Generally, the greater the distance the pollutant has to 
travel, the greater the pollutant attenuation will be (CPNT, 2001). Therefore, by 
implementing this delivery trading ratio, trading between sources at different 
locations does not infringe on the overall watershed cap (Borisova and Roka, 2009). 
The uncertainty ratio is set to account for seasonal loading variability and for the 
uncertainties related to nonpoint source control practices efficiencies. It is set to 
compensate for the lack of scientific measurement of nonpoint sources loadings and 
BMP reduction efficiencies. The most commonly adopted ratio is 2:1, set based on 
BMPs reduction potentials rather than on measured values. Other studies are reporting 
that lower trading ratios (less than 1:1) should be used particularly when nonpoint 
sources BMPs reduction uncertainty is greater than point sources control mechanisms 
uncertainty (Horan and Shortle, 2005).  
A water quality ratio may be used to require additional reductions and ensure 
more progress toward the attainment of water quality goals (CPNT, 2001). This ratio 
is also set to account for situations when sensitive areas such as wetlands or lakes may 
require additional water quality considerations. Generally, a percentage of the 
available credits is retained to reflect the pollution source location relative to sensitive 
areas. 
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The retirement ratio provides a safety margin for the overall trading program. A 
percentage of all credits generated may be discounted or retired before any trades are 
negotiated to enhance the potential water quality benefits of the program. These ratios 
cannot be sold to offset new loads (Selman et al., 2009). 
The reserve ratio requires a portion of the total credits generated to be reserved to 
provide insurance for failed pollution reduction practices. These credits are placed in 
a reserve fund to be drawn from when purchased credits default. This ratio adds 
another level of protection to the credits but does not account for the nonpoint sources 
reduction efficiency uncertainty (PADEP, 2009; Selman et al., 2009). 
Most of the water quality trading programs include trading ratios such as in Long 
Island Sound where a delivery trading ratio of 1.0 was given to the zones with the 
greatest impact on the dissolved oxygen levels and a ratio of 0.14 was given to areas 
with less influence on the hypoxia zone (CTDEP, 2010a). In other words, if the seller 
is located in a trading ratio zone of 1 and the buyer is in a trading ratio zone of 0.14, 
the delivery trading ratio is 1:0.14. This means that the seller would need to remove 1 
unit of nitrogen in order to compensate 0.14 units of nitrogen generated by the buyer. 
A ratio combining the attenuation and uncertainty factors could also be used as in the 
case of the South Nation River where the MOE requires a 4:1 ratio, meaning that 4 kg 
of phosphorus must be removed by nonpoint sources for every 1 kg of phosphorus 
discharged from point sources (O'Grady, 2011). Different ratios could also be used as 
in the case of the Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program containing three 
different types of ratios: delivery, reserve, and edge-of-segment (EOS) (Branosky et 
al., 2011).  
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Market structure and credit price 
The market structure specifies trading conditions and covers all guidelines and 
rules needed for a successful and transparent trading program (Stephenson and 
Shabman, 1997). Generally, trading markets fall in four main categories: 1) 
clearinghouses, 2) bilateral negotiations, 3) exchange markets, and 4) sole source 
offset (USEPA, 2008). 
The most common market structure used to support the trading program is the 
clearinghouse market, where there is an intermediary between the credits seller and 
buyer (Woodward et al., 2002). The Neuse River and the Great Miami River 
programs used a clearinghouse entity to translate nutrient credits with variable prices 
into a uniform commodity, thus reducing transaction costs and mitigating the buyer 
risk for potential pollution reduction failure (Selman et al., 2009). The Neuse River 
trading program uses an association of the dischargers to coordinate the trade activity. 
In the case of the Great Miami River program, the Miami Conservancy District 
(MCD) serves as a third party broker acquiring credits through contractual agreements 
with entities subsidizing agricultural producers applying specific BMPs (such as 
conservation tillage, rotation, pasture seeding/prescribed grazing, etc.) and selling 
voluntary pollution reduction to regulated sources under a different contractual 
agreement (Breetz et al., 2004; Bacon and Dupuis, 2011; Newburn and Woodward, 
2012). Bilateral trading is another common market structure where there is direct 
contact between trading partners to exchange information and bargain the terms of the 
trade, with a public authority participating to approve the negotiation and set suitable 
trading ratios (USEPA, 2008). In this case, the credit price is reached through a 
negotiation process, and not by simply checking or noticing an existing credit price on 
the market (Woodward et al., 2002). This bilateral structure increases transaction 
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costs and also the contractual links between trading partners. Exchange markets are 
less common given the high initial cost incurred to establish the infrastructure 
allowing the exchange of information, communication and transactions between 
buyers and sellers. Online marketplaces, such as NutrientNet used in the Pennsylvania 
trading program, have been successful for tracking credits, providing transparency, 
monitoring trading activities, and facilitating market participants to find each other 
(Hennessy, 2001; WRI, 2007; Selman et al., 2009). In the Hunter River program, a bi-
annual auction is conducted whereby the New South Wales Environmental Protection 
Agency (NSW EPA) auctions 200 new salinity credits every two years, with a 10 year 
life-span, regardless of whether they are sold at the auction or retained by the 
Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water (DECCW). This auction 
process allows equal participation and potential access to the credits for all bidders 
including new participants to the market (stakeholders, environmental agencies, etc.) 
(DECCW, 2009). While the auctions occur every two years, the program scheme 
supports bilateral trading at any time (Ferguson, 2005). It is worth noticing that 
because the program's location in a semi-arid region, the total allowable salt discharge 
depends on the river flow and its capacity to assimilate saline discharges. For 
instance, no discharge is allowed during periods of low flow, a limited discharge is 
permitted during periods of high flow, and an unlimited discharge is allowed during 
flood periods (Ferguson, 2005). A less common market structure is the sole source 
offset, which takes place when a source is allowed to offset their pollution loadings 
either on-site or by taking reduction loading activities off-site. Here, there is not 
trading involved (Selman et al., 2009). 
The range of credit prices is indicated in Table 2-3 and generally depends on 
several factors (indicated in Figure 2-2) such as the market structure and the trading 
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program policy, the transaction and monitoring costs, the construction and operation 
costs to remove the pollutant, and the cost of implementing BMPs or other 
remediation technologies. It is noteworthy that the credit price principally depends on 
the market rules of supply and demand. When the number of point sources buying 
credits increases, credit prices increase as well.  
Accountability and assistance 
Every trading program must have an administrative system that oversees the 
monitoring and reporting of pollution reductions with enforcement capabilities. Legal 
liability and responsibility when effluent reductions are not met must be clearly 
addressed with specific fees and penalties (Woodward et al., 2002). The 
administrative entity plays a key role in the implementation and management of a 
trading program. State agencies should also commit to assume additional economic 
and regulatory responsibilities associated with the trading program (Keplinger et al., 
2004; Borisova and Roka, 2009). Trading partners need also to be assisted throughout 
the trade negotiations. Some of the actions to facilitate the trades include: 1) 
identification of sellers and buyers, 2) helping potential point and nonpoint sources 
understand the trading policy, 3) tracking production, use, and durability of credits, 
and 4) regularly updating information regarding credit availability, prices and 
interested trading partners (CPNT, 2001). 
Stakeholder engagement 
A successful education and outreach program is important in a water quality 
trading program. Interested parties (e.g., federal, state and local government, local 
businesses, universities, and interested citizens) need to be involved and engaged 
during all stages of the trading program. Potential participants are to be identified and 
encouraged to participate in order to guarantee a viable water quality trading program 
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(King and Kuch, 2003). Several studies investigated the essential role of trust and 
effective communication with local environmental agencies and its impact on 
increasing trading partner participation (Mariola, 2009). An example of a successful 
communication program was developed within the Great Miami River program, 
where longstanding relationships between environmental agents in the watershed and 
farmers was cited as an important factor to achieve high rates of farmers involvement 
(Newburn and Woodward, 2012). Moreover, conducted surveys indicated that the 
nonpoint source initial participation (willingness to understand, discuss and 
participate) in a trading program is contingent with the degree of trust in program 
administrators (Breetz et al., 2005). 
2.6. Meta-Analysis of Water Quality Trading Programs 
Several authors attempted to define a trading program success using different 
approaches (Breetz et al., 2005; Mariola, 2009; Newburn and Woodward, 2012). An 
economic approach would define success as a function of market efficiency, low 
transaction costs, and tools for minimizing uncertainty. Another approach would 
define success as whether or not a program has resulted in the implementation of 
agricultural BMPs, directly relating success to social relations between market 
participants (Mariola, 2009). In the first approach, water quality trading programs are 
analyzed using a set of economic and institutional variables without accounting for 
the social aspect (stakeholders and farmers participation) of this type of program. The 
second approach, defining success based on social embeddedness or on the sole 
implementation of BMPs, would also be missing the basic definition of a market 
driven approach. 
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In this paper, acknowledging the need for an adequate market structure and the 
importance of social interactions among participants, the success of a trading program 
involving point and agricultural nonpoint sources was defined as the ease of making 
trades while taking into account the enhancement of social relationships among 
participants affecting the willingness to participate. However, it should be noted that 
even if a trading program was considered here as successful (and had all the 
components to facilitate trading), polluting sources could decide not to trade. 
Moreover, attainment of water quality goals was not considered here as a measure of 
success since, for most of the trading programs herein evaluated, the realized loading 
reductions could not be explicitly and exclusively linked to the trading program 
implementation. Furthermore, cost saving was also not considered here as a success 
measure since a detailed economic analysis was lacking in most of the evaluated 
trading programs. As an alternative, the structure of water quality trading markets was 
considered as it plays a key role on how trading partners respond to pursuing 
achievement of water quality goals and also on the cost effectiveness of the program. 
The economic / social definition of success considered here takes into account the 
economic aspect of trading activities, highlighting the need for an open information 
structure to facilitate trading. Indeed, the difficulty of creating an effective and 
smoothly operating market place where trading partners can identify each other 
(social aspect), find information and engage in negotiations, is the reason for high 
transaction costs and market stagnancy (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). In fact, in 
some cases, even with financial and policy drivers, farmers remain unwilling to 
participate in water trading activities. Enhancing social relationships is critical for the 
success of trading programs. Social relationships and networks could be classified as 
embedded or at arms-length (Uzzi, 1999). Arm's-length ties function without any 
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prolonged social contact between parties and do not require any extended 
communication or social contracts. In embedded ties, information exchanges between 
actors are dependent on social attachments that produce expectations of trust and 
reciprocity – important elements of water quality trading programs. These high levels 
of trust and reciprocity facilitate the sharing of private information (Adali et al., 
2012). In a water quality trading program, embedded relationships create a unique 
value and motivate exchange partners to share the value of their mutual benefits 
through transfer of private resources and self-enforcing governance (Uzzi, 1997). 
Table 2-4 summarizes 10 trading programs involving point and agricultural 
nonpoint sources. It illustrates a diverse array of approaches to solving watershed 
water quality problems. Each program was evaluated based on the established 
structure for searching partners and for bargaining. Programs with an exchange 
market or a clearinghouse structure were assessed as having a trading framework that 
simplifies the trading of credits, because of their lower transaction costs, while 
offering an open information structure (with an enhanced education outreach 
program) and creating embedded relationships among trading partners facilitating the 
interactions between buyers and sellers without increasing the transaction costs. 
Based on this definition of success, and from the 10 cases evaluated here, six were 
categorized as successful. Some of them are in agreement with results published 
elsewhere (USEPA, 2008; Mariola, 2009; Newburn and Woodward, 2012). The Rahr 
Malting Company program was evaluated as not successful because of the heavy 
market structure - designing a permit and trading framework, negotiations with 
landowners, writing detailed contracts, and monitoring the implementation of 
nonpoint source controls – leading to high transaction costs. Breetz et al., (2004) 
reported that the high administration and transaction cost as the major obstacle for the 
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ease of trading for this Rahr Malting Company program. In the case of the Lower St. 
Johns program, it is up to the seller to find a willing buyer with an individual NPDES 
permit, thus increasing transaction costs associated with the identification of trading 
partners. It is important to highlight that this is a relatively new program with only a 
few formal credit trades, mainly due to the uncertainty about the upcoming new 
numeric nutrient limits that facilities would have to meet. A lower trading ratio before 
the implementation of the nutrient limits would have encouraged the trading 
(following the Great Miami River trading program example). 
In order to determine the variables with the strongest effect on the success or 
failure of water quality trading programs, a meta-data analysis was conducted using 
the 10 trading programs (Table 2-4). This statistical assessment was based on a 
binomial correlation methodology used by Mariola (2009) and explained below. This 
approach was selected because of statistical limitations imposed when having a small 
number of case studies. Independent and dependent variables were classified into a 
binomial form, constructing a 'truth table', in which the absence or presence of each 
independent variable was evaluated based on their contribution to the dependent 
outcome. This quasi-quantitative approach is provided insights on the correlation 
between variables and the success of a trading program. The selected independent 
variables driving our definition of a program success are policy drivers, minimization 
of uncertainty, flexibility, trading activity, and social embeddedness. It is worth 
noticing that measures of success selected by Mariola (2009) were policy drivers, 
trading ratio < 2:1 (a tool for minimizing uncertainty), market freedom or flexibility 
and social embeddedness while assessing a trading program success between point 
and nonpoint agricultural sources. The measures of success selected in this paper to 
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conduct the meta-analysis were similar to those used by Mariola (2009) but the 
variables were differently defined as detailed below. 
Table 2-4 presents the five independent variables matched with the 10 selected 
water quality trading programs. Each program was labelled with a (+) or (-) score 
based on how they influence the easiness of trading. The final row of the table lists 
the binomial correlation coefficients (BCC) linking the trading programs and each 
respective independent variable. These coefficients represent the degree of association 
between each variable and the success of a trading program as it is defined earlier in 
this review.  
Policy drivers 
The policy drivers can be in the form of binding obligations, such as TMDLs, 
NPDES permits or nutrient criteria, or in the form of incentives (whenever nutrient 
requirements have not been imposed). Policy drivers are a key element motivating 
point and nonpoint sources to participate in a trading program, thus affecting the 
'willingness to participate', a success factor of the trading programs. In Table 2-4, a 
program with a policy driver was allocated a (+) score and a program without a policy 
driver or with an inadequate cap was allocated a negative (-) score. Inadequate caps 
refer to setting a binding regulation that is either too high or too low. Programs with 
other drivers different than a policy one, were allocated a '(+/-)' score if the program 
has resulted in significant demand for pollution reduction credits. An example of a 
program without a policy driver is the Great Miami River trading program that 
emerged before stricter state-wide nutrient limits and watershed TMDLs were in 
place. This program encouraged facilities (under threat of regulation) to purchase 
phosphorus credits generated through voluntary and less costly nonpoint source 
reductions (Water Conservation Sub-district of the Miami Conservation District 
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(WCS), 2005). Despite the absence of a regulatory obligation, this program has been 
successful in creating a large credit supply and a high number of agricultural 
abatement funded projects (Newburn and Woodward, 2012).  
Minimization of uncertainty 
The uncertainty associated with nonpoint sources BMPs efficiencies and 
monitoring is one of the most cited barriers responsible for a limited success of a 
water quality trading program. This factor is a key element affecting the 'willingness 
to participate' of sources in a trading program. Therefore, the 10 programs were 
evaluated based on the methods used to calculate the credits generated by nonpoint 
sources by implementing a specific management practice. Some trading programs 
have developed their own tools (NutrientNet for Pennsylvania and STEPL - 
Spreadsheet Tool for Estimating Pollution Loads for the Great Miami River) based on 
scientifically sound modeling, and others have required monitoring for the 
verification of load reductions. Programs falling in either case were assigned a (+) 
score, because they reduce the uncertainty attributed to nonpoint sources, hence 
increasing the willingness of participation and easiness of trading. The South Nation 
River program was assigned a (+/-) score (intermediary score) because it relies on 
published documents to calculate the amount of phosphorus removed by different 
BMPs (O'Grady, 2011). This method of pre-determined nutrient reductions, 
regardless of location, is less accurate than site-specific calculations (Selman et al., 
2009). The Lower St. Johns program was also assigned a (+/-) score because it does 
not require the use of any specific and standardized tool for credit calculation, which 
is currently based on estimates of adjustment factors, to address the uncertainty.  
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Flexibility 
Programs offering flexibility (impacting the ease of trading) for pollution sources 
to implement technologies to control their pollution were allocated a (+) score. For 
instance, the South Nation River Watershed program was allocated a (+) score 
because it clearly states that it is up to the discharger to develop and implement the 
most cost-effective method to reduce phosphorus loadings. In contrast, other 
programs (assigned a (-) score) are somehow constrained by the already evaluated and 
available BMPs. However, if the program allows sources to propose new mitigation 
practices to be considered as eligible activities to generate credits were given a (+/-) 
score. 
Trading activity 
This criterion was evaluated positively if credits were traded during the program 
duration – a direct indication of the ease of trading. Trades occurring as a result of 
point source emission offset by implementation of nonpoint BMPs were also 
considered. A negative evaluation was given to programs, such as the Tar-Pamlico 
trading program (North Carolina, USA), because by implementing several operational 
measures and minor capital improvements by point sources, the nutrient reduction 
goals were reached without the need for credit trading. 
Social embeddedness 
This variable evaluated how trading programs alleviate social constraints, such as 
lack of trust, communication, and participation among stakeholders. Programs with 
established communication mechanisms (e.g. education and outreach, use of existing 
relationships, and creation of information sharing channels), were assessed to be 
socially embedded, with a positive (+) score. Lack of these mechanisms hinders the 
identification of trading opportunities and makes it more difficult to exchange credits 
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and thus increasing the transaction costs. It is important to note that these are 
communication mechanisms, not programs structures. One positive example is the 
Miami River Watershed trading program using the Miami Conservancy District 
(MCD) as a clearinghouse for wastewater treatment plants, participants, and farmers. 
This program has been able to use a pre-existing network of relationships and 
institutional infrastructure to disseminate information and recruit participants 
(Newburn and Woodward, 2012).  
The binomial correlation coefficients (BCC) (Table 2-4) revealed that 
minimization of uncertainty is highly correlated to the trading program success 
definition (BCC=0.85). The nonpoint source load reduction estimation using site-
monitoring or modeling techniques is crucial for enhancing participation of point 
sources. Likewise, the meta-analysis indicated that policy drivers (BCC=0.8) are 
correlated to the trading program success definition given that they represent the first 
motivation for the implementation of and participation in a trading program. Social 
embeddedness (BCC=0.7) also showed to be significant for the functionality of a 
program. Trusted social relationships are needed to reduce concerns of nonpoint 
sources about impacts of risk and equity on benefits and responsibilities, to decrease 
transaction costs, and to create a more efficient market.  
2.7. Conclusions 
Increased regulatory interest in controlling pollutants causing the impairment of 
water bodies has stimulated the growth of water quality trading programs. Advocates 
of this initiative claim that market-based trading programs provide an additional tool 
for solving watershed-based water quality problems. Cost effectiveness, decision 
making flexibility, involvement of non-regulated pollution sources, and technological 
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advancements for abatement verification and market transactions are also highlighted 
as factors contributing to the development of water quality trading programs. 
Recognizing the benefits, challenges, and key elements associated with these types of 
programs is the first step for an effective program design. Furthermore, understanding 
the drivers for the pollution reduction achievement is essential to guarantee sufficient 
trading activity. The watershed goal and the associated allocations are the foundation 
of a well structured trading program. A successful trading system carefully assesses 
conditions such as pollutant suitability, financial attractiveness, feasible market 
structures, and stakeholder willingness. In addition, the meta-analysis conducted using 
several water quality trading case studies revealed that minimization of uncertainty, 
policy drivers, and social embeddedness are the most significant variables influencing 
the success of a trading program. It is noteworthy that a program success is not solely 
based on providing economic incentives, nor having a structure that minimizes 
transaction cost, nor is it solely based on having regulatory drivers. Rather it is an 
interaction among all these variables, handled properly within each program, that 
makes a program successful. Although water quality trading programs face 
regulatory, technical and economic challenges, there are viable approaches to 
overcome these barriers and effectively implement a water quality trading program. 
Many of the challenges that emerge during the design and implementation of the 
program can be solved if innovative thinking is introduced.  
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2.10. Tables 
Table 2-1. Advantages of water quality trading programs. 
Environmental 
Cost-effective approach to attain water quality standards 
Improved compliance levels 
Implementation of innovative technologies to reduce water pollution levels 
below the requirements 
Ancillary and indirect ecological benefits 
Economic 
Reduced individual pollution abatement cost 
Reduced aggregate cost of achieving water quality goals in the watershed 
Financial incentives and flexibility on how to control effluent reductions 
Market demand for new innovative technologies 
Funding for new methodologies for emission prevention and control 
Social 
Encourage communication among trading partners, regulatory agencies, public 
and other stakeholders 
Shared responsibility and commitment for water quality pollution control 
Population growth considered while achieving water quality objectives 
 
Table 2-2. Challenges of water quality trading programs. 
Regulatory 
Lack of regulatory liabilities for nonpoint sources  
Lack of education and awareness among regulated communities 
Limited support from federal and state environmental agencies  
A preconceived skepticism from regulatory agencies 
Lengthy permitting process  
Uncertainty 
Creation of hotspots, localized areas with high pollution levels 
Need for additional scientific data to evaluate the trading ratios 
Nonpoint source effluent reductions 
Lack of trust among trading partners and regulatory agencies 
Potential participants do not have a clear understanding of the marked-based 
programs  
Economic 
Cost associated with the quantification and monitoring of nonpoint sources 
loadings 
High transaction costs incurred when identifying trading partners, negotiating 
and exchanging information 
Program 
Design 
Sufficient credit demand and supply 
Cost / price dynamics supporting a market 
Geographic restrictions 
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Table 2-3. Summary of some examples of water quality trading programs. 
Program 
Pollutant 
/Trading 
type  
Goals Ratios Credit Price (US$/kg) 
Market 
Structure Observations References 
1. Neuse River 
Basin TN 
Trading Program, 
NC, USA 
TN /  
PS-PS 
PS-NPS 
Collective 
NPDES permit 
(30% reduction 
or allowable 485 
mtons/yr) 
U  US$ 24.2-62.5 C 
- 23 facilities trade within a group 
compliance association to meet an 
overall cap for TN. 
- 69 % reduction of TN loads to the 
estuary since 1995. 
(USEPA, 
2008; 
Hamstead and 
BenDor, 
2010)  
2. Long Island 
Sound TN Credit 
Exchange 
Program, CT, 
USA 
TN /  
PS-PS 
Multi-state 
TMDL (58.5 % 
reduction) and 
General NPDES 
Permit 
D  US$ 3.6-10 C 
- 50 % reduction of the TN daily 
loads from 79 facilities. 
- Potential savings with TN trading 
are in the US$300M-400M range 
over individual permitting 
approaches. 
- During 2002-2009, 
approximately 15.5 million credits 
were traded, representing 
US$45.9M in economic activity. 
(USEPA, 
2008; 
CTDEP, 
2010b) 
3. Lower St. 
Johns River Pilot 
Water Quality 
Trading Program, 
FL, USA 
TN, TP / 
PS-PS 
PS-NPS 
Allowable: 
TMDL mtons/yr 
Freshwater: 
TN = 8,572  
TP = 500  
Estuary: 
TN = 1,377 
D & U  US$ 151.8 for TP B, ThP 
- Two types of trading were 
allowed, before and after BMAP 
adoption. 
- All credits exchange has been 
from WWTF to MS4s. 
- There has been only one credit 
exchange with money involved. 
(FDEP, 
2010a; LSJR 
TMDL 
Executive 
Committee, 
2011) 
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Table 2-3. Continued. 
Program 
Pollutant 
/Trading 
type  
Goals Ratios Credit Price (US$/kg) 
Market 
Structure Observations References 
4. Great Miami 
River Watershed 
Trading Pilot, 
OH, USA 
TP, TN / 
PS-PS 
PS-NPS 
A TMDL is in 
place for one of 
the three sub-
watersheds, and 
TMDLs are 
under 
development for 
the remaining 
two sub-
watersheds 
D, R 
Cost estimate 
range 
(combined 
TN & TP) 
US$ 0.7-28.2 
C, ThP 
- The clearinghouse (credit bank) 
was capitalized with money from 
grants and from PS purchasing 
credits. Farmers providing the 
greatest TP reductions at the least 
cost are funded from the credit 
bank. Credits were then allocated 
to investors based on their initial 
investment amount. 
- Create incentives (lower trading 
ratios) for WWTFs that fund 
nutrient reductions in advance of 
their permit requirements. 
- A total of 49 projects have been 
funded, with payments totaling 
US$ 937,550. The projects have 
produced 326 mtons in TP 
reductions.  
- Estimate cost savings of US$ 
314M - 384M during a 20-year 
period compared with traditional 
approaches. 
(Kieser & 
Associates, 
2004; Graziani, 
2007; Hall, 
2009) 
5. Pennsylvania 
Water Quality 
Trading Program, 
PA, USA 
TN, TP, 
sediment / 
PS-NPS 
Allowable: 
TMDL 
(mtons/yr) 
TN = 33,534 TP 
= 1,329 
Sediment = 
899,823 
D, R, EOS 
For TN: 
US$ 6.6-33.1 
For TP: 
US$ 8.8-22 
EM, C 
- 55 projects have been approved. 
Approximately 1.7 million TN 
credits and 202,000 TP credits. 
- Online trading tool (NutrientNet) 
used to register, as a marketplace 
and credit estimation tool. 
(PADEP, 
2009; 
USEPA, 
2010; 
Branosky et 
al., 2011; 
PADEP, 
2011) 
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Table 2-3. Continued. 
Program 
Pollutant 
/Trading 
type  
Goals Ratios Credit Price (US$/kg) 
Market 
Structure Observations References 
6. South Nation 
River Watershed 
Trading Program, 
Canada 
TP /  
PS-NPS 
Allowable: 
Zero increase in 
TP loads for new 
or expanded 
WWTF 
 
 
Combined 
U & D 
Project 
average cost: 
US$ 410  
C 
- This program allows TP loading 
offsetting from new or expanding 
WWTFs by implementing NPS 
BMPs. 
- A fund allocates money to 
farmers to pay for BMPs that 
generate credits. The farmers are 
paid for their projects and not to 
reach kg of TP removed. 
- PS may purchase credits from the 
fund to offset their increased P 
discharge. 
- 269 verifiable trades were 
completed from 2000 to 2009. The 
estimated annual TP removal ~ 
10,000 kg 
(O'Grady, 
2006, 2011) 
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Table 2-3. Continued. 
Program 
Pollutant 
/Trading 
type  
Goals Ratios Credit Price (US$/kg) 
Market 
Structure Observations References 
7. Hunter River 
Salinity Trading 
Scheme, 
Australia 
Salinity / 
PS-PS 
Allowable:  
900 EC (lower 
and middle 
sector) 
600 EC (upper 
sector) 
N/A US$526-983  EM, B 
- Participants include 23 coal 
mining and power generation 
facilities, holding a total of 1,000 
salinity credits. 
- The initial credits are issued with 
different life spans (200 credits 
expire every 2 years) and then 
using a public auction to distribute 
200 credits every 2 years. 
- During high flow conditions, 
each credit allows a discharger to 
release up to 0.1% of the Total 
Allowable Discharge or sell the 
credit to another participating 
facility over the scheme's online 
trading platform. During low flow 
conditions, no discharges are 
allowed, and during flood 
conditions discharges are 
unrestricted. 
- Participants can continue to 
purchase credits from other credit 
holders as needed after the auction, 
using the online trading website. 
(DECCW, 
2003; 
Ferguson, 
2005; 
DECCW, 
2009) 
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Table 2-3. Continued. 
Program 
Pollutant 
/Trading 
type  
Goals Ratios Credit Price (US$/kg) 
Market 
Structure Observations References 
8. Tar-Pamlico 
Nutrient Trading 
Program, NC, 
USA 
TN, TP / 
PS-PS PS-
NPS 
Allowable: 
TMAL 
(mtons/yr) 
TN = 400  
TP = 70 
U, R 
Phase I:  
US$ 55.1  
Phase II:  
US$ 28.7 
C 
- Point sources would meet nutrient 
reduction goals by funding 
agricultural BMPs.  
- In Phase I: 16-member 
association (94% of the point 
sources discharging into the basin) 
has a common TN and TP cap. In 
Phase II: nonpoint sources were 
charged with a voluntary 30% 
nutrient reduction goal. 
- Once PS have purchased credits, 
they are no longer liable. The State 
assumes responsibility for the 
monitoring and verification of 
BMPs. NPS in non-compliance 
must return the cost-share funds. 
- The Association has consistently 
discharged below the nutrient cap 
without engaging in trading.  
- The program achieved its nutrient 
reduction goal at a significantly 
lower cost than initially projected. 
(Gannon, 2003; 
Breetz et al., 
2004; Bacon 
and Dupuis, 
2011) 
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Program 
Pollutant 
/Trading 
type  
Goals Ratios Credit Price (US$/kg) 
Market 
Structure Observations References 
9. Rahr Malting 
Company Permit, 
MN, USA 
TN, TP, 
sediment to 
create 
CBOD5 
credits / 
PS-NPS 
Allowable:  
24.9 mtons/yr of 
CBOD5 (68 
kg/day) 
Nutrient 
conversion 
ratios to 
CBOD5, 
D, U 
US$ 18.9 
Sole-
source 
offsets, B 
- Rahr negotiated an agreement 
with the Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency to offset 
CBOD5 discharged from its new 
WWTF by funding upstream NPS 
pollutant reductions. 
- NPS BMP sites must be upstream 
of Shakopee in the Minnesota 
River Basin. 
- Rahr was required to establish a 
US$ 250,000 trust fund within the 
5-year permit term to pay for its 
NPS offsets. In 5 years, Rahr 
achieved the needed NPS loading 
reductions through 4 NPS offsets. 
(MPCA, 1997; 
Breetz et al., 
2004; Selman 
et al., 2009) 
10. Red Cedar 
River Nutrient 
Trading Pilot 
Program, WI, 
USA 
TP /  
PS-NPS 
Allowable:  
2 mtons/yr U US$ 4.1 B 
- The City of Cumberland POTW 
used water quality trading to reduce 
compliance costs (1 mg/L TP 
discharge limit). 
- Farmers can only receive payment 
for a BMP for 3 years. As of 2004, 
the City of Cumberland has paid a 
total of US$ 58,000 to remove 14.3 
mtons of TP. 
(Breetz et al., 
2004; Selman 
et al., 2009) 
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Program 
Pollutant 
/Trading 
type  
Goals Ratios Credit Price (US$/kg) 
Market 
Structure Observations References 
11. Virginia 
Water Quality 
Trading Program, 
VA, USA 
TN, TP / 
PS-PS 
PS-NPS 
General VPDES 
permit. 
Concentration 
for annual WLAs 
vary by river 
basin 
U 
For TN:  
US$ 24.4  
For TP:  
US$ 11.1 
C, B 
- PS accommodate growth by 
purchasing offsets in the form of 
WLAs from other PS or offsets from 
NPS. 
- Sellers must meet baseline 
requirements before selling offsets 
and before generating credits. 
Agricultural operations must first 
comply with a state nutrient 
reduction goal. 
- There are 127 existing and 12 
new/expanding facilities eligible for 
participation. 
(VDEQ, 
2008; 
Stephenso
n et al., 
2010)  
12. Cherry Creek 
Reservoir 
Watershed 
Phosphorus 
Trading Program, 
CO, USA 
TP /  
PS-PS 
PS-NPS 
Allowable:  
6 mtons/yr or 
40 µg/L 
D, U US$ 17,632 
Sole-
source 
offsets, C 
- The trading program identifies two 
types of projects: 1) New trade 
projects allowing entities in the 
watershed to construct NPS TP 
projects for credit trading to respond 
to the continued population growth, 
and 2) Historic trade projects 
including 4 projects constructed by 
the water quality authority between 
1991 and 1997. These projects made 
up a 'phosphorus bank' of 98 kg of 
credits, available for purchase. 
- This (Department of Environmental 
Quality, 2000) program has provided 
ancillary environmental benefits such 
as flood control and wildlife habitat. 
(WERF, 
2001; 
Earles et 
al., 2008) 
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Table 2-3. Continued. 
Program 
Pollutant 
/Trading 
type  
Goals Ratios Credit Price (US$/kg) 
Market 
Structure Observations References 
13. Kalamazoo 
River Phosphorus 
Trading 
Demonstration 
Program, MI, 
USA 
TP /  
PS-NPS 
Allowable: 
Steady WLA of 
1 mg/L 
U 
No credits 
were 
purchased 
C 
- A multi-disciplinary steering 
committee directs and oversees the 
project. 
- Six NPS projects were implemented 
to generate credits for trading; 
estimated load reduction is of 972 kg 
of TP. 
- PS could purchase credits to 
accommodate growth but not to 
discharge above their NPDES limits. 
- No actual trades occurred because 
the main PS discharger went out of 
business. 
(Kieser & 
Associates, 
2004) 
B: Bilateral; BMAP: Basin Management Action Plan; BMPs: Best Management Practices; 
C: Clearinghouse; CBOD5 : Carbonaceous Biochemical Oxygen Demand;  
D: Delivery ratio; EC: Electrical conductivity units; EM: Exchange market; EOS: Edge of segment factor;  
MS4s: Municipal Separate Stormwater Sewer System; NPDES: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; NPS: Nonpoint sources;  
POTW: Publicly Owned Treatment Works; PS: Point sources; R: Reserve ratio; ThP: Third party; TMAL: Total Maximum Annual Load; TN: Total 
Nitrogen;  
ThP: Third party; TP: Total Phosphorus; U: Uncertainty ratio; R: Reserve ratio; VPDES: Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System;  
WLAs: Waste Load Allocations; WWTF: Wastewater Treatment Facilities;  
All the credit costs were converted to US$ (September 2011 currency converting rate). The credit price is reported per kg of pollutant removed (except for 
the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme, Australia).  
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Table 2-4. Correlation between elements of a water quality trading program and the program success, involving point and 
agricultural nonpoint sources. 
Program 
Evaluation Criteria 
Policy 
Drivers 
Minimization 
of 
Uncertainty 
Flexibility Trading Activity 
Social 
Embeddedness 
Success  
(ease of trading) 
Great Miami River Watershed Trading Pilot +/- + +/- + + + 
Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading 
Program + + +/- + + + 
Lower St. Johns River Pilot Water Quality 
Trading Program + +/- +/- + +/- - 
Kalamazoo River Phosphorus Trading 
Demonstration Program - +/- + - + + 
Red Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot 
Program +/- + - + + - 
South Nation River Watershed Trading 
Program + +/- + + + + 
Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program + + +/- - + + 
Rahr Malting Company Permit + + - + - - 
Cherry Creek Reservoir Watershed 
Phosphorus Trading Program + + +/- + + + 
Lower Boise River Effluent Trading 
Demonstration Project + + +/- - - - 
Total 8 8.5 5 7 7 6 
Binomial Correlation 0.80 0.85 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.60 
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2.11. Figures 
 
Figure 2-1. Key benefits and challenges of water quality trading programs with some of 
the suggested solutions. 
 
Figure 2-2. Key elements of a water quality trading program, pre and post trading in a 
temporal perspective. 
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Figure 2-3. Locations of some water quality trading programs in North America. The 
remaining water quality trading program discussed is located in Australia. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MODELING A PHOSPHORUS CREDIT TRADING PROGRAM IN AN 
AGRICULTURAL WATERSHED 
Corrales J, Naja GM, Bhat MG, Miralles-Wilhelm F. 2014. Modeling a phosphorus credit 
trading program in an agricultural watershed. Journal of Environmental Management 
143: 162-172. 
 
3.1. Abstract 
Water quality and economic models were linked to assess the economic and 
environmental benefits of implementing a phosphorus credit trading program in an 
agricultural sub-basin of Lake Okeechobee watershed, Florida, United States. The water 
quality model determined the effects of rainfall, land use type, and agricultural 
management practices on the amount of total phosphorus (TP) discharged. TP loadings 
generated at the farm level, reaching the nearby streams, and attenuated to the sub-basin 
outlet from all sources within the sub-basin, were estimated at 106.4, 91, and 85 mtons 
yr-1, respectively. Almost 95% of the TP loadings reaching the nearby streams were 
attributed to agriculture sources, and only 1.2% originated from urban areas, accounting 
for a combined TP load of 87.9 mtons yr-1. In order to compare a Least-Cost Abatement 
approach to a Command-and-Control approach, the most cost effective cap of 30% TP 
reduction was selected, and the individual allocation was set at a TP load target of 1.6 kg 
ha-1 yr-1 (at the nearby stream level). The Least-Cost Abatement approach generated a 
potential cost savings of 27% ($1.3 million per year), based on an optimal credit price of 
$179. Dairies (major buyer), ornamentals, row crops, and sod farms were identified as 
potential credit buyers, whereas citrus, improved pastures (major seller), and urban areas 
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were identified as potential credit sellers. Almost 81% of the TP credits available for 
trading were exchanged. The methodology presented here can be adapted to deal with 
different forms of trading sources, contaminants, or other technologies and management 
practices. 
3.2. Introduction 
Nutrient over-enrichment of freshwater lakes, streams, and reservoirs is a rapidly 
growing environmental problem, severely impacting freshwater resources worldwide. 
Many of the world’s freshwater lakes suffer from eutrophication including Lake Erie and 
Lake Okeechobee (United States), Lake Victoria (Tanzania/Uganda/Kenya), and Tai 
Lake (China), among others. The rise in eutrophic events is generally attributed to the 
rapid increase in intensive agricultural practices, industrial activities, and population 
growth which have increased nutrient flows into the environment. 
Lake Okeechobee, the largest lake in the southeastern United States (1890 km2), is 
located in the center of the greater Florida Everglades ecosystem. It constitutes a critical 
link between lakes and rivers to the north, wetlands and bays to the south, and estuaries to 
the east and west. The environmental health of the Lake has been degraded as wetlands 
and natural habitats in the Lake Okeechobee watershed have been replaced with farms, 
urban areas, and dairy operations. Excessive phosphorus loadings from these diverse 
sources – including agriculture and livestock, municipal and industrial wastewater 
discharges, and urban stormwater runoff – have been identified as the leading causes of 
the Lake’s impairment (FDEP, 2001). In order to protect the Lake and its designated uses 
(e.g., drinking, fishing, recreation, irrigation), a phosphorus Total Maximum Daily Load 
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(TMDL) for it was adopted in 2001. This TMDL establishes an annual target load of 140 
mtons of total phosphorus (TP) to Lake Okeechobee, including atmospheric deposition 
(35 mtons) and the sum of all TP-bearing surface water inputs to the Lake (105 mtons) 
(Zhao et al., 2012).  Watershed projects, along with on-site agricultural and urban Best 
Management Practices (BMPs), are being implemented to reduce TP transport from 
uplands and capture runoff during high rainfall periods. BMPs are individual or 
combined management practices usually classified into management or structural 
practices. Management practices, such as efficient use of fertilizers, are owner-
implemented BMPs.  Structural practices involving the construction of more capital-
intensive BMPs, are generally divided into typical practices (i.e., erosion control, etc.) 
and alternative practices (i.e., edge-of-farm stormwater retention/detention, etc.) 
(FDACS, 2011; SWET, 2006). Despite the high number of acres enrolled in the BMP 
program, a large percentage of the lands have neither reached the full level of 
typical/owner BMP implementation, nor have adopted more efficient alternative BMPs. 
This is mainly due to lack of funding and to the high costs associated with more advanced 
and efficient chemical treatments (FDACS, 2011). Consequently, the establishment of 
innovative economic incentives is essential to drive landowners to implement BMPs to 
their full extent.  
Water quality trading programs have emerged as a promising alternative to assist in 
meeting nutrient water quality standards at an overall lower cost (Corrales et al., 2013; 
Kardos and Obropta, 2011). Studies conducted for the Great Miami River Watershed 
Trading Pilot program and for the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange reported 
cost saving estimates of $314 to $385 million (Kieser & Associates, 2004) and  $200 
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million (CTDEP, 2010), respectively for each program. Trading allows one polluting 
source to meet its regulatory obligations by using pollution reductions achieved by 
another source with lower abatement costs (King and Kuch, 2003).  The latter, in turn, 
obtains revenue for their efforts in reducing pollution. Because trading programs are 
expected to reduce the overall cost of complying with water quality goals, environmental 
agencies have recently focused their effort on this type of programs over traditional 
Command-and-Control approaches for water pollution control.  Command-and-Control 
approaches are generally cost-inefficient and consist of implementing technologies that 
agencies deem to be most effective for controlling the amount of pollutant that may be 
emitted by pollution sources, with violators facing rigid financial penalties (Field and 
Field, 2006; Mariola, 2009; Paniccia, 2002). 
The main objective of this study was to assess the economic and environmental 
benefits of implementing a phosphorus environmental credit trading program, as 
compared to a Command-and-Control approach.  The S-191 sub-basin located within the 
Lake Okeechobee watershed was selected as a model focus area. A computational 
methodology coupling a water quality model to an economic model was developed in 
order to identify P-credits buyers and sellers, determine the optimal credit price, and 
assess the cost savings of a nutrient credits trading program. A complete trading scenario 
was detailed to assess the cost-effectiveness of a water quality trading program in the 
studied sub-basin. The specific objectives included simulating the optimal combination of 
BMPs to minimize the cost of achieving a specific phosphorus reduction goal, assessing 
the delivery trading ratios, and estimating the costs savings of a Least-Cost Abatement 
scenario versus a Command-and-Control approach. 
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3.3. Materials and Methods 
3.3.1. Study area description 
The study area is the S-191 sub-basin located in Taylor Creek / Nubbin Slough Lake 
Okeechobee sub-watershed in southern Florida, directly north of Lake Okeechobee (Fig. 
3-1a). The sub-basin covers 48,470 hectares of a flat landscape with generally poorly 
drained soils characterized by a low phosphorus retention capacity (Zhao et al., 2012). 
This investigated area consists of a collection of tributary streams flowing into Lake 
Okeechobee through the S-191 flow control structure (Fig. 3-1b).  The main tributaries 
are Taylor Creek, Nubbin Slough, Henry Creek, Lettuce Creek, Mosquito Creek, and 
Myrtle Slough (Fig. 3-1b). The annual average rainfall in the investigated sub-basin is 
1,168 mm (Zhao et al., 2012), and the land use classification is composed of agriculture 
accounting for approximately 74%, followed by forested areas (11%) and wetlands (9%).  
Runoffs from farms have been identified as the major source of the TP water quality 
problem in the S-191 sub-basin (Gale et al., 1993). Even though this sub-basin covers 
only about 3.5% of the drainage area in Lake Okeechobee watershed, it annually 
contributed about 34 mtons of TP to the Lake (during the last five years) (SFWMD, 
2010), representing 32% of the TMDL.  In addition, 99% of this sub-basin’s waterbodies 
have been verified as impaired (USEPA, 2008). Therefore, local authorities have listed 
this sub-basin as a top priority basin for TP reductions.  
The present study used a modeling framework, illustrated in greater detail in 
Supplemental Fig. 3-S1, integrating a basin-wide hydrology / water quality model and an 
economic model to assess the cost-benefit of implementing a phosphorus credit trading 
program in the S-191 sub-basin. The hydrology and water quality model captured the 
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effects of rainfall, land use management practices, and soil characteristics on water flows 
and phosphorus loads generated and transported within the basin and reaching the Lake.  
The results of the hydrology and water quality model were then used as input data for the 
economic model to identify the nutrient management practices, achieving a targeted load 
reduction at the lowest total cost. 
3.3.2. Hydrology and water quality modeling 
Description of the model 
The Watershed Assessment Model (WAM) developed by Soil Water Engineering 
Technology (SWET), Inc. was used in this study to perform hydrology and water quality 
analysis in the S-191 sub-basin. WAM is a Geographic Information System (GIS) based 
model that simulates surface and ground water flow and nutrient constituents on a daily 
basis based on the detailed physical properties of the watershed, underlying 
hydrogeological system, and land use management practices (SWET, 2011a). WAM has 
been already calibrated and validated for the northern Lake Okeechobee watershed to 
characterize the hydrology and water quality of the watershed (HDR, 2004). WAM was 
also specifically calibrated (calibration period 2002-2004) and validated (validation 
period 2005-2009) for the S-191 sub-basin, where different Goodness-of-Fit (GOF) 
statistic measures indicated that the WAM model results closely fitted the observed 
hydrology and constituent loading data.  During the calibration period, the Root Mean 
Square Error (RMSE), Mean Bias Error (MBE), and the Nash-Sutcliffe coefficient of 
efficiency (NS) obtained for monthly flows at the S-191 structure were 2.96 m3 s-1, 0.17 
m3 s-1, and 0.90, respectively. During the validation period, the RMSE, MBE, and NS 
obtained for monthly flows at the same structure were 2.45 m3 s-1, 0.25 m3 s-1, and 0.84, 
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respectively. The RMSE, MBE, and NS obtained for monthly TP loadings at the S-191 
structure during the calibration period were 7,383 kg, 174 kg, and 0.88, respectively and 
during the validation period, those values were 5,345 kg, 1,545 kg, and 0.77, respectively 
(SWET, 2011b).  
The WAM model has been used in different studies to assess the nutrient 
assimilation, and to conduct nutrient and water budgets throughout the Lake Okeechobee 
watershed (Chebud et al., 2011; SFWMD et al., 2011; SWET, 2011a; SWET and JGH 
Engineering, 2007; USEPA, 2008). The WAM model provides a spatial representation of 
nutrient sources and transport processes (McCormick et al., 2011), and allows for the 
assessment of the effectiveness of current and future management practices in the 
watershed.  
Input / output data 
Input GIS data required for the WAM model set-up are land use, soil, rainfall 
stations, topography, reach network, and basin drainage areas. Optional information 
includes wastewater utility zone, point source locations, water control structures, and 
springshed areas. Time series dataset consist of rainfall, flow, stage, and water quality 
data (SWET, 2011a). In this study, the 2006 land use classification was obtained from the 
South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) using the Florida Land Use, Cover, 
and Forms Classification System (FLUCCS) to define the land use types (SFWMD, 
2013). Soil, topography, and hydrography data were obtained from the US Department of 
Agriculture, Natural Resource Conservation Service database (USDA, 2013). Rainfall 
data was collected from the SFWMD’s DBHYDRO database from four rainfall 
monitoring sites (Fig. 3-1b) for the model simulation period (1999 to 2009), including a 
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three-year model spin-up period (from 1999 to 2001) that allows for the variables to 
stabilize. The output results were obtained from 2002 through 2009. 
The model interface provides different formats for reviewing the output data such as 
1) tables to compare annual average loads for different land uses under different 
management scenarios, 2) graphs to assess flow and constituent time series in each reach 
or to compare model output with monitored data, and 3) maps to understand the spatial 
distribution of the annual averages flows and loads generated in each source cell within 
the basin.  The constituent loads and concentrations can be examined based on their un-
attenuated (amounts generated at the farm levels) or attenuated values (amounts reaching 
the nearby stream) after the overland attenuation had been accounted for.  
In-stream phosphorus attenuation analysis 
WAM uses an algorithm that routes and attenuates the farm level nutrient loads to the 
nearest stream based on distance, flow rate, and land use conditions between the source 
and the nearby stream. An additional algorithm was developed here.  A first order decay 
equation, Equation (3-1), adopted from SWET (2011a), was used to attenuate TP load 
from the nearby stream to the sub-basin outlet. As the two main forms of phosphorus, 
dissolved (soluble – SP) and attached to the sediments (particulate – PP), are transported 
through the stream network, they could be partially attenuated through diverse bio-
physico-chemical assimilation processes. The main factors driving these processes are the 
stream velocity and rate of nutrient exchange between the water column and sediments. A 
similar methodology was used by Chebud et al. (2010), Reddy et al. (1999), and Zhang et 
al. (2002) to assess phosphorus attenuation in Lake Okeechobee watershed. 
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where Cf is the TP concentration at the outlet of the sub-basin (mg L-1), Co is the TP 
concentration at the outlet of each reach segment (mg L-1), Cb is the TP background 
concentration in the stream (mg L-1), v is the stream velocity (m s-1), and a is the rate of 
load transfer (m s-1) referring to the rate at which TP is removed from the water column 
and retained in the stream sediments (Reddy et al., 1999). Values of Cb and a were 
obtained from the WAM documentation (SWET, 2011a) and were calibrated for the 
watershed. For the Soluble Phosphorus (SP), Cb and a values were 0.02 mg L-1 and 
0.00015 m s-1, respectively.  For the Particulate Phosphorus (PP), Cb and a values were 
0.02 mg L-1and 0.0015 m s-1, respectively.   
The S-191 sub-basin was then divided into zones with similar attenuation values, 
which are ratios calculated from the TP load attenuated to the sub-basin outlet and the TP 
load attenuated to the nearby stream. The attenuation values were then used to determine 
the trading ratios required to balance the TP loads from trading sources located at a 
different distance from the sub-basin outlet. This delivery type of ratio is commonly set 
to account for pollutant attenuation throughout a watershed before reaching the impaired 
waterbody. The trading ratio determined here is based on the stream velocity and load 
transfer (the slower the rate the pollutant has to travel, the greater the attenuation will be).  
3.3.3. Economic modeling 
Description of the Least-Cost Abatement model 
Several studies used empirical models to determine Least-Cost Abatement 
approaches to comply with water quality standards and nutrient reduction goals (Kieser & 
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Associates, 2004; Paniccia, 2002; Schleich and White, 1997; Schwartz, 2010). In the 
present study, a conceptual model was developed to determine the optimal combination 
of BMPs in order to reach an emission reduction goal at the minimum cost, assess the 
optimal credit price, and quantify the cost-savings achieved while implementing a credit 
trading program in the S-191 sub-basin. The conceptual Linear Programming (LP) 
model, Equations (3-2) – (3-4), was formulated using the General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS) software. The objective function Min Z, represented in Equation (3-2), 
was set to minimize the cost of implementing BMPs and new treatment technologies for 
point and non-point sources, respectively. This would be the objective of a planner with 
regard to the proposed TP trading program: minimization of the basin-wide total costs of 
abating TP loading. 
∑∑∑ ×=
i k j
jkijki XcZMin ,,,,                              (3-2) 
Subject to: 
∑∑∑ ≥××
i k j
redjkijkji PTargetXrL _,,,,                    (3-3) 
∑ ∀≤
k
jki jkiX ,,1,,                                           (3-4) 
where the sub-indices i, j, and k represent the number of zones, the type of land use, and 
the BMP or technology type, respectively. ci,k,j is the annual cost ($ yr-1) of implementing 
a BMP or a new technology type (k) at a land use (j) in zone (i). Xi,k,j is a binary variable 
with a value of 1 if a BMP or a new technology type (k) is implemented, 0 otherwise. rk,j 
is the TP load reduction (%) attained when implementing a BMP or a new technology 
type (k) at land use (j). Li,j is the current TP load (kg yr-1) in the runoff from land use (j) 
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located in zone (i), and Target_Pred is the TP load reduction (kg yr-1) in the runoff at the 
zone level when following the Command-and-Control approach. Supplemental Tables 3-
S1, 3-S2 and 3-S3 list the available three types of BMPs per land use (owner, typical, and 
alternative), the corresponding costs, and TP removal efficiencies, respectively. 
The first constraint, Equation (3-3), reflects that the sum of TP load reductions from 
all sources or land uses (j) in each zone (i), after implementing a BMP or a new 
technology type (k), needs to meet an established TP load reduction target (Target_Pred) 
at the zone level. The second constraint, Equation (3-4), is using a binary variable (0 or 1) 
to indicate if a BMP or a new technology is implemented or not.  For instance, a value of 
1 is used when a BMP type (k) was adopted by land use (j) in zone (i), and 0 otherwise.  
The developed model code contained one decision making variable, two constraints, 
and allowed for the direct reading of the: 1) minimum cost of implementing several 
management practices to reduce TP loads within the sub-basin in order to achieve a pre-
determined goal or reduction target, 2) optimal mix of BMP and technology types per 
point and non-point sources to be implemented in order to cost-effectively reduce TP 
loads in the sub-basin, 3) TP amount reduced, and 4) total cost of BMP or technology 
implementation for each land use. 
Input / output data 
The four input data required to run the economic model were: 1) current TP loads per 
area in the runoff from the different land use types obtained from the output results of the 
hydrology and water quality WAM modeling, 2) surface area of the land use types per 
zone estimated using ArcGIS tools (presented in Supplemental Table 3-S4), 3) annual 
cost of implementing the three BMP types (i.e., owner, typical, and alternative) per land 
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use obtained from SWET (2006), and 4) TP load reduction efficiency per BMP type and 
per land use also obtained from SWET (2006). Similar data were needed for point 
sources regarding the implemented technologies. However, since the point sources in the 
investigated sub-basin were dairies, the implemented technologies were also considered 
as BMP types. Note that the annual costs included the operational and maintenance costs 
and were indexed to 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index inflation calculation.  
3.3.4. Phosphorus trading analysis 
In order to determine the potential cost savings of implementing a TP trading 
program in the sub-basin, two abatement scenarios were assumed: (a) a Command-and-
Control program, which is usually a non-market, regulatory program, and (b) a Least-
Cost Abatement scenario. Under the first scenario, the desired reduction target or cap was 
set, and then the target was allocated across all sources using a pre-defined rule. The 
second scenario is the market outcome expected to occur if landowners were to engage in 
trading once the allocation is determined. The Least-Cost Abatement model presented in 
Equations (3-2) – (3-4) was used to determine the least-cost management strategy and the 
corresponding reduction levels of each source.  The entire TP trading in the S-191 sub-
basin was assessed using six steps illustrated in Supplemental Fig. 3-S1b and explained in 
the Supplemental Information section. 
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3.4. Results and Discussion 
3.4.1. Hydrology and water quality modeling 
Runoff and percolation 
The annual average values of water runoff and percolation within the S-191 sub-basin 
were 20.0 and 6.4 cm yr-1, respectively, for a simulation period from years 2002 – 2009. 
The average runoff value presented here was comparable to average values of 27.4 cm yr-
1 (time period 1991 – 2005) and 30.2 cm yr-1 (period 1991 – 1999) as reported by Zhang 
et al. (2002) and Zhao et al. (2012), respectively, for different sites within the Lake 
Okeechobee watershed.  The highest runoff values were also characterized by the lowest 
percolation rates due to the specific soil characteristics. Indeed, sandy spodosols, the 
predominant type of soil in the basin, is a poorly drained soil (Bottcher et al., 1995) that 
features surface water runoff as the primary flow pathway for TP transport to streams 
(Campbell et al., 1995).  WAM simulation results indicated that the average flow leaving 
the sub-basin was around 3.68 m3 s-1 for the simulation period from 2002 – 2009. A 
similar discharge value obtained from the SFWMD’s DBHYDRO database of 3.46 m3 s-1 
was calculated at the S-191 structure for the same time period (SFWMD, 2013). 
Phosphorus loads by land use 
The TP loadings obtained from the WAM model for the major land use types within 
the S-191 sub-basin are summarized in Table 3-1. The TP loads generated at the farm 
level, at the nearby streams, and at the outlet of this sub-basin from all sources within the 
sub-basin were estimated at 106.4, 91, and 85 mtons P yr-1, respectively. The TP loading 
leaving the sub-basin obtained with the WAM model is comparable to the monitored data 
at the S-191 structure of 72.8 mtons P yr-1 for the same simulation time period. It is worth 
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mentioning that although the S-191 sub-basin area represents only 3.5% (48,470 ha) of 
the Lake Okeechobee watershed drainage area, it contributed 81% (85 mtons P yr-1) of 
the Lake TMDL (Zhang and Sharfstein, 2013).  Moreover, the TP loads exceeded about 
five times the tributary TMDL set for this sub-basin at 19 mtons P yr-1 (USEPA, 2008) 
during this 7-year period. 
From the TP loading of 91 mtons P yr-1 (attenuated to the nearby stream), 95% were 
attributed to agriculture sources and 1.2% to urban areas, accounting for a combined TP 
load of 87.9 mtons P yr-1 from non-point and point sources (Table 3-1).  The remaining 
3.4% of the TP load was attributed to natural areas.  TP levels in surface water runoff are 
associated with the land use and land management practices within the sub-basin 
(Hiscock et al., 2003). Improved pastures represented the major land use type (56.5%) 
and the major source of TP loadings with 56.2% (51.2 mtons P yr-1) generated within the 
sub-basin. Dairy farms also represented a disproportionately large source of TP loadings, 
contributing 22.6% (20.5 mtons P yr-1) of the total TP loadings, although they represented 
only 4.6% of the total area. Other studies have also identified dairies as the primary TP 
source within the northern Lake Okeechobee watershed (Bottcher et al., 1995).  
TP fluxes at the farm level are also reported in Table 3-1 for several land uses. Dairy, 
ornamental, and sod land use types presented the highest TP loading per hectare with 
10.5, 9.0, and 6.5 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively.  The same range of values was found in other 
studies reporting TP in runoff of 3.4, 2.4, and 6.6 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively, for the same 
land uses (SFWMD, 2010). In addition, Campbell et al. (1995) and Rechcigl and 
Bottcher (1995) reported average TP losses in surface water runoff of 1.6 kg ha-1 yr-1 and 
of 0.7 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively from improved and unimproved pastures located in Lake 
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Okeechobee watershed. These TP flux values were similar to the values estimated here 
with WAM and presented in Table 3-1.  They are 2.2 and 0.7 kg ha-1 yr-1 for improved 
and unimproved pastures, respectively.  Other studies conducted on different watersheds 
also reported comparable average TP loads in runoff.  For instance, Zhang et al. (2012) 
estimated TP loads from improved pastures, row crop, and urban sources for watersheds 
in the state of Michigan at 0.95, 0.6, and 0.3 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively. However, it is 
worth noticing that TP loads are greatly influenced by the hydrology, geology, and land 
and soil site conditions, affecting local loading contributions by land use from watersheds 
located in different geographic regions (Scott et al., 2011). Thus, it is important to 
emphasize that the values reported above corresponded to TP loads from different 
watersheds (Zhang et al., 2012) or from a different time period (Campbell et al., 1995; 
Rechcigl and Bottcher, 1995; SFWMD, 2010). 
Phosphorus attenuation 
The TP loads un-attenuated (at the farm level) and attenuated (reaching the nearby 
stream network once overland attenuation has been accounted for) are illustrated in Figs. 
3-2a and 3-2b, respectively.  Annual TP loading rates at the farm level averaged 2.2 kg 
ha-1 yr-1 (Table 3-1), whereas attenuated TP loading rates to the nearby stream averaged 
1.9 kg ha-1 yr-1. The major attenuation was observed in areas where features such as 
wetlands were present along the flow pathway.   The actual TP loading, from each stream 
catchment area, reaching the sub-basin outlet was obtained using the in-stream 
attenuation algorithm developed in the present study. Fig. 3-2c illustrates the TP loading 
contribution from each source cell to the sub-basin outlet after stream attenuation factors 
have been accounted for. The annual TP loading rate to the sub-basin outlet averaged 1.7 
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kg ha-1 yr-1, which is comparable to the average unit TP load to the Lake reported by 
Zhang et al. (2002) of 2.0 kg ha-1 yr-1 (from 1991 – 1999). When comparing the TP 
loading spatial distribution at the farm level (Fig. 3-2a) to the one attenuated to the outlet 
(Fig. 3-2c), the major changes occurred at the zones most distant from the sub-basin 
outlet (north and west of the sub-basin). Moreover, when comparing the two figures, it is 
worth noticing that the areas with high TP loadings (or hotspots) remain unchanged.  
Fig. 3-3 represents the average attenuation factors classified by zones with different 
assimilation conditions.  The calculated attenuation factors represented the percent of 
load assimilated by physical, chemical, and biological factors through the stream 
network, thus reducing the load reaching the Lake (Reddy et al., 1999).  These factors 
depended mainly on the stream velocity, rate of nutrient exchange between the water 
column and sediments, and the distance to the sub-basin outlet. Results indicated that 
areas closer to the outlet yielded an attenuation factor of 1%, whereas areas further away 
yielded an attenuation factor of 13%. This means that 13% of the TP loadings from a 
source located in zone 6 (Fig. 3-3) will be assimilated or retained in the sub-basin through 
natural processes, and the remaining load will reach the outlet to Lake Okeechobee 
(assuming no phosphorus assimilation from the sub-basin outlet to the Lake). Previous 
studies have estimated higher percentage of TP attenuated through the transport system.  
For instance, Zhang et al. (2002) reported that 53.2% of TP was assimilated in the Lake 
Okeechobee watershed; additionally, SFWMD (2010) estimated a 33.2% TP assimilation 
for Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough sub-watershed. However, these percentages represented 
larger areas and considered overland and stream attenuation rates.  The SWET (2008) 
report indicated TP assimilation rates for Lake Okeechobee watershed of 20 to 50% for 
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upland overland flow and small streams, whereas lower assimilation rates of 2 to 20% 
were reported for canals and stream conveyances systems, agreeing with the attenuation 
factors represented here. 
The calculated attenuation factors were then used to estimate the delivery trading 
ratios (TRs) following Supplemental Equation (3-S3). TRs lower than one (Supplemental 
Table 3-S5) are applied when a seller source is located downstream of the buyer source. 
For example, a source, located in zone 3, buying credits from a seller located in zone 2 
would have to apply a TR of 0.98, as indicated in Supplemental Table 3-S5. In contrast, 
TRs greater than one were obtained when the seller source was located upstream of the 
buyer’s location. Other trading programs also developed geographically-based trading 
ratios to equalize the loading discharged from sources at different locations from the 
basin outlet.  For instance, delivery trading ratios for the Long Island Sound Total 
Nitrogen Credit Exchange program (CT, USA) ranged from 0.14 – 1 based on the 
location (CTDEP, 2010).  
The TP loads attenuated to the nearby stream from each land use were aggregated per 
zone (listed in Supplemental Table 3-S6) and were then used as input data for the 
economic modeling methodology, as illustrated in Supplemental Fig. 3-S1. 
3.4.2. Economic modeling 
Cap and allocations 
In water quality trading programs, the cap is generally defined based on a watershed 
mandatory goal for a particular pollutant, commonly known as the TMDL. For instance, 
the goal of the Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program was based on phosphorus, 
nitrogen, and sediment TMDLs previously established for the Chesapeake Bay (Branosky 
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et al., 2011). In other trading programs, such as in the case of Neuse River Basin, a preset 
percent load reduction was used to define the goal of the program (Hamstead and 
BenDor, 2010).  In the present study, the cap of the TP credit trading program for the S-
191 sub-basin could be calculated based on: 1) Lake Okeechobee TMDL of 105 mtons 
yr-1, and 2) Lake Okeechobee tributary TMDL.  At the S-191 sub-basin level those 
numbers could be translated to 4.6 mtons P yr-1 (flow proportionality) and 19 mtons P yr-
1, which are necessary caps to meet Lake Okeechobee and the tributary TMDLs, 
respectively. Since WAM results indicated that 85 mtons yr-1 of TP were discharged from 
this sub-basin (from 2002 – 2009), this means that a respective 95% and 78% TP load 
reductions would be required to achieve the two possible caps presented above.  The full 
implementation of advanced alternative BMPs across the sub-basin would not achieve the 
TP reduction needed for those two caps.  Therefore, source control strategies cannot rely 
exclusively on BMPs to reduce TP loads in order to achieve the Lake Okeechobee TMDL 
or its tributary TMDL. An integrated approach encompassing different TP reduction 
projects, such as water quality treatment, water storage, wetland restoration, and nutrient 
trading among others, should be implemented in the sub-basin.   
The costs resulting from implementing a Command-and-Control or a Least-Cost 
Abatement scenario to achieve different TP loading caps (set at the nearby stream levels), 
and the corresponding cost savings are illustrated in Fig. 3-4a. Cost savings ranged from 
1% to 63%, representing two extreme cases. The highest cost savings corresponded to a 
TP load of 2.3 kg ha-1 yr-1. The lowest cost savings were obtained when setting a TP load 
target at 30.8 mtons yr-1, leading to the implementation of advanced BMPs on all land use 
parcel sites. A TP load target of 1.6 kg ha-1 yr-1 (corresponding to a 30% load reduction at 
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the zone level or at the nearby stream) reflected the most cost-effective situation, 
achieving high cost savings (inflection point of the curves) of 31% ($1.5 million per year) 
when comparing the Least-Cost Abatement scenario to a Command-and-Control 
approach (Fig. 3-4a). This TP reduction target of 30% at the zone level represented a cap 
of 61.5 mtons P yr-1 for the S-191 trading program. Since the economic modeling used 
the TP loads from the potential trading sources (agricultural and urban land uses), a total 
of 87.9 mtons P yr-1 was assumed as the TP load before BMP implementation at the 
nearby stream level. The zone level cap of 61.5 mtons P yr-1 was equivalent to 57.1 
mtons P yr-1 at the sub-basin outlet after phosphorus attenuation was considered for the 
entire basin.  A higher percentage of TP reduction could be set as the cap of this trading 
program; however, as illustrated in Fig. 3-4a, this implies higher pollution abatement 
costs, and therefore lower cost savings, when comparing the Least-Cost Abatement 
scenario to a Command-and-Control approach.  
The individual allocation was determined by uniformly distributing the cap among 
the potential trading sources. The resulted uniform allocation was set at 1.6 kg ha-1 yr-1, 
corresponding to the maximum TP load rate allowed to be discharged at each zone from 
the different land use types. Other methods exist for setting the allocation; however, 
almost every method presents some inequities. For example, the cap can be distributed 
equally among all existing sources or proportionally to the current loadings. The problem 
with the former method is that it does not consider that sources within the sub-basin 
greatly differ in size and their discharged load. Allocations based on load reduction by a 
fixed percentage might be perceived equitable.  However, it does not recognize previous 
efforts and investments to implement technologies in order to reduce emissions (Field 
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and Field, 2006).  The approach selected in the present study to define allocation loads 
ensured a measurable cap and was proportional to the source size.  
The Command-and-Control and the Least-Cost Abatement Scenarios 
• BMP optimization 
Under the Command-and-Control approach, the best available technology or BMP for 
each land use type and zone was selected in order to meet individual TP load allocations 
(Supplemental Fig. 3-S2a).  Some land use types, such as citrus, unimproved pastures, 
rangelands and wooded pastures, and urban areas did not require application of any 
BMPs, because they were already in compliance with their individual allocation loads. In 
contrast, dairies, field crops, ornamentals, and soy land use types needed respectively up 
to 88%, 70%, 86%, and 73% of TP reduction to reach their individual load allocations. 
Therefore, the most advanced and expensive type of BMP – type III – (a combination of 
owner, typical, and alternative BMPs) had to be implemented for these land uses.  On the 
other hand, under the Least-Cost Abatement approach, the selection of the BMP types 
was optimized in order to achieve the lowest cost while reaching the overall TP reduction 
target for the S-191 sub-basin (Supplemental Fig. 3-S2b).  In this case, BMP type I 
(owner type) was selected to be implemented on citrus and urban areas, reaching a TP 
load reduction of 5% and 12%, respectively, at no cost (Supplemental Tables 3-S2 and 3-
S3).  Moreover, a BMP type I was selected to be implemented on most of dairy farms, 
instead of the BMP type III needed under the conventional approach, thus decreasing the 
annual investment from $3.3 million to $0.4 million for this land use type within the sub-
basin. 
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• TP loads after BMP implementation  
The total TP load from agricultural and urban sources reaching the nearby stream and 
the sub-basin outlet following the implementation of BMPs was 52.2 and 48.5 mtons P 
yr-1, respectively, under both scenarios.  This is equivalent to a TP reduction of 41% 
higher than the preset TP reduction target of 30%, because of the discrete nature of the 
BMP data used in this study (Supplemental Table 3-S3).  In other words, in some cases, 
the required percentage load reduction was lower than the percentage efficiency of the 
BMP needed to be applied – thus leading to an overall higher TP reduction.  
Potential land use buyers were identified whenever TP loadings under the Least-Cost 
Abatement were above the Command-and-Control TP loadings; otherwise the land uses 
were identified as potential sellers (Supplemental Table 3-S7). The difference in the loads 
under both scenarios reflected the number of credits available to sell or the number of 
credits needed to buy (defined as the difference in TP load amount in kg). For example, 
citrus, improved pastures, and urban land uses could potentially sell 144, 11,632, and 57 
TP credits, respectively.  Alternatively, dairies, ornamentals, row crops, and sod land uses 
would need to purchase 11,000, 320, 85, and 418 TP credits, respectively.  These results 
suggest that 11,832 credits were available for sell and for purchase to offset TP loadings 
in the entire sub-basin. Therefore, enough supply of TP credits existed in this sub-basin to 
offset the demand of potential trading buyers.  
• Credit price 
The credit price was obtained from the Least-Cost Abatement scenario while deriving 
the marginal abatement costs for all trading sources to meet a specific TP load as 
illustrated in Fig. 3-4b. This aggregate supply curve indicates the price that trading 
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sources would be willing to pay to reduce the basin TP loads to different levels.  In the 
present case, in order to reach a TP loading of 52.2 mtons yr-1 from all trading sources, 
the credit price was around $179.  A similar methodology to calculate the marginal costs 
was used by Paniccia (2002) resulting in credit prices up to $12,000, when developing a 
trading program among metal wastewater treatment plants.  Point to non-point nutrient 
trading programs, located in different watersheds within the United States, such as in the 
Lower St. Johns River (FL), Chesapeake Bay (PA), and Great Miami River (OH) 
watersheds, reported credit prices of $151.8, $22, and $28.2, respectively, for TP credits 
exchanged (Corrales et al., 2013).  It is worth noticing that marginal abatement cost 
curves represent the abatement cost for a single point in time and hence are subject to 
inter-temporal dynamics. This means that marginal abatement costs depend on abatement 
actions realized in earlier time periods and expectations about later time periods (Kesicki, 
2011).  
• Credits exchanged and cost savings 
Tables 3-2 and 3-3 represent the list of potential buyers and sellers that were 
identified in this sub-basin, as well as their respective cost savings. In total, 10 buyers and 
14 sellers were identified. The total number of TP credits exchanged was 9,579, 
corresponding to 81% of the credits available for trading.  Dairy farms were the major 
buyer source, purchasing in total 8,879 credits, whereas improved pastures were the most 
important seller source, selling in total 9,378 credits. As illustrated in Table 3-2, the costs 
of BMP implementation under the Command-and-Control approach for all buyers was 
1.5 times higher than the costs obtained under a trading scenario approach, representing 
an annual cost savings of $966,443.  Although sellers incurred an additional cost of $1.4 
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million by switching from the Command-and-Control scenario to the Least-Cost 
Abatement scenario, they also sold $1.7 million worth of credits, representing an annual 
cost savings of $376,022.  A transaction fee of 10% was added to the credit cost for buyer 
sources, in order to consider the cost associated with research, negotiation, approval, 
monitoring, and finding trading partners (Stavins, 2003). Transaction cost estimates for 
market-based or conservation programs ranged between 10% and 50%. Galik et al. 
(2012) assessed transactions cost for the U.S forest carbon offset program as 25% per 
credit sold. Heimlich (2005) estimated transaction cost factors of 10% to 15% for 
Conservation Reserve Programs (CRP). Fang et al. (2005) estimated a 35% transaction 
cost for the Minnesota River Basin nutrient trading program.  Knowing that high 
transaction costs could jeopardize the trading activity (Corrales et al., 2013), a low 10% 
was adopted as the transaction cost in order to retain the cost effectiveness while still 
meeting environmental benefits. 
Overall, the total cost savings of a credit trading program, obtained under the current 
scenario to reduce TP loadings in the S-191 sub-basin, were 27% ($1.3 million per year) 
in comparison to a conventional Command-and-Control approach.  Other studies have 
estimated cost savings about 36% and 74% for trades between point and non-point 
sources over traditional Command-and-Control approaches, respectively for the 
Chesapeake Bay (Van Houtven et al., 2012) and the Great Miami River watershed 
(Kieser & Associates, 2004). However, it is important to emphasize that cost savings vary 
substantially depending on different factors, such as 1) the type of trading allowed in the 
program (i.e., only between point sources, between point and non-point sources, or 
between non-point sources), 2) the geographic region – the larger the area where trading 
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is allowed, the wider range of trading opportunities, and therefore the larger cost savings 
– (Van Houtven et al., 2012), and 3) the technology and management practices available 
for nutrient reduction for diverse sources in the watershed.  
3.5. Conclusions 
The economic and environmental benefits of implementing a phosphorus credit 
trading program were assessed for the S-191 sub-basin located in the Lake Okeechobee 
watershed. A water quality model was linked to an economic model to assess the 
feasibility of a phosphorus credit trading program in this agricultural sub-basin. The 
hydrology and water quality model was used to quantify the effects of rainfall, land use 
type, soil characteristics, and management practices on the phosphorus loadings 
generated at the farm level, attenuated to the nearby stream, and attenuated to the sub-
basin outlet. The most cost effective cap of 30% TP reduction (equivalent to a total 
loading of 61.5 mtons P yr-1 at the zone level) was set and two abatement approaches 
(Least-Cost Abatement and Command-and-Control) were compared in this study.  
The Least-Cost Abatement approach provided the optimal combination of 
management practices that minimized the cost to achieve the cap in the S-191 sub-basin. 
When comparing the two approaches, the estimated potential cost savings were of 27% 
($1.3 million per year), based on an optimal credit price of $179. In this study, dairies 
(major buyer), ornamentals, and sod land use types were identified as potential credit 
buyers, whereas citrus, improved pastures (major seller), and urban land uses were 
identified as potential credit sellers. The results of the trading scenario also suggested an 
adequate supply of TP credits to meet the buyers demand. Almost 81% of the TP credits 
83 
 
available for trading (corresponding to 9,579 TP credits) were exchanged.  It is worth 
emphasizing that the cost savings achieved are greatly influenced by site-specific factors 
such as the type of pollution sources, the geographical location, BMPs nutrient removal 
efficiencies and cost data, etc.  Expanding the geographic scope of trading to the entire 
Taylor Creek / Nubbin Slough sub-watershed or to the whole Lake Okeechobee 
watershed, would lead to a different trading scenario with different delivery trading 
ratios, and potentially higher cost savings. However, the methodology presented here can 
be used and easily modified to incorporate other forms of trading (e.g., point-to-point 
trading), other contaminants, or other technologies and management practices.  
Implementation of a phosphorus trading program in the S-191 sub-basin should be 
considered as part of an integrated approach to reduce phosphorus loadings in the Lake 
Okeechobee watershed. 
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3.8. Tables 
Table 3-1. Average annual Total Phosphorus (TP) load per land use type. 
Land Use Area (ha) 
TP load at 
the farm 
level 
(mtons yr-1) 
TP load 
attenuated to 
the nearby 
stream 
(mtons yr-1) 
TP load 
attenuated 
to the sub-
basin outlet 
(mtons yr-1) 
TP load flux at 
the farm level 
(kg ha-1 yr-1) 
Citrus 1,415 (2.9%) 1.2 1.2 (1.3%) 1.1 0.9 
Improved Pastures 27,372 (56.5%) 59.2 51.2 (56.2%) 47.5 2.2 
Unimproved Pastures 1,571 (3.2%) 1.1 1 (1.1%) 1 0.7 
Rangeland and Wooded Pastures 201 (0.4%) 0.2 0.1 (0.2%) 0.1 0.8 
Dairies 2,210 (4.6%) 23.3 20.5 (22.6%) 19.5 10.5 
Field Crop 1,745 (3.6%) 10.3 8.5 (9.3) 8 5.9 
Ornamentals 222 (0.5%) 2 1.7 (1.9%) 1.6 9.0 
Row Crop 214 (0.4%) 0.5 0.5 (0.5%) 0.4 2.4 
Sod 373 (0.8%) 2.4 2 (2.2%) 1.9 6.5 
Urban 2,423 (5%) 2.1 1.1 (1.2%) 1.1 0.9 
Natural Areasa 10,724 (22.1%) 4.0 3.1 (3.4%) 2.9 0.4 
Total 48,470 (100%) 106.4 91 (100%) 85 2.2 
a TP loadings from natural areas were not considered in the credit trading program assessment. 
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Table 3-2. Summary of credits bought and costs for the buyer sources. 
ID Buyer/ Zonea Seller ID
b c' 
($)c 
c'' 
($)d 
Credits 
Bought  
c''' 
($)e 
Cost savings 
($)f 
B1 D/ 1 S8, S9, S10, S11 766,780   2,997  2,883  567,679  196,104  
B2 O/ 1 S3, S4, S5 12,904  4,322  42 8,194  388  
B3 D/ 2 S11, S12, S13, S14 1,099,001  4,296  2,503  492,907  601,799  
B4 O/ 2 S5 12,289  4,116  32  6,398  1,776  
B5 S/ 2 S5 117,545  30,007  413  81,349  6,188  
B6 D/ 3 S5, S6, S7, S8 321,840  1,258  1,384  272,432  48,150  
B7 O/ 3 S5 58,990  19,756  82  16,131  23,102  
B8 O/ 4 S5 46,700  15,640  118  23,285  7,775  
B9 D/ 5 S9 498,333  1,948  2,109  415,266  81,119  
B10 S/ 6 S1, S2 2,466   -    12  2,422  44  
      2,936,847  84,339  9,579  1,886,065  966,443  
a (D), Dairies; (O), Ornamentals; (S) Sod. 
b Identification of the sellers (from Table 3-3) selling credits to the specific buyer. 
c Annual cost under the Command-and-Control approach. 
d Annual cost under the Least-Cost Abatement approach. 
e Cost of the credits bought plus a 10% transaction fee. 
f Annual cost savings calculated following Supplemental Equation (3-S6). 
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Table 3-3. Summary of credits sold and costs for the seller sources. 
ID Seller/ Zonea Buyer ID
b c' 
($)c 
c'' 
($)d 
Credits 
Sold  
c''' 
($)e 
Cost savings 
($)f 
S1 U/ 1 B10 -    -    6  1,062  1,062  
S2 C/ 2 B10 -    -    6  1,126  1,126  
S3 U/ 2 B2 -    -    18  3,299  3,299  
S4 C/ 3 B2 -    -    5  812  812  
S5 IP/ 3 B2, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8 58,978  235,912  1,585  283,735  106,801  
S6 U/ 3 B6 -    -    25  4,519  4,519  
S7 C/ 4 B6 -    -    48  8,654  8,654  
S8 IP/ 4 B1, B6 257,152  819,671  3,714  664,813  102,294  
S9 U/ 4 B1, B9 -    -    4  774  774  
S10 C/ 5 B1 -    -    38  6,759  6,759  
S11 IP/ 5 B1, B3 50,990  650,119  4,079  730,167  131,037  
S12 U/  5 B3 -    -    1  150  150  
S13 C/ 6 B3 -    -    47  8,371  8,371  
S14 U/ 6 B3 -    -    2  363  363  
   
367,119  1,705,702  9,579  1,714,605  376,022  
a (U), Urban; (C), Citrus; (IP), Improved Pastures. 
b Identification of the buyer (from Table 3-2) purchasing credits from the specific seller. 
c Annual cost under the Command-and-Control approach. 
d Annual cost under the Least-Cost Abatement approach. 
e Cost of the credits sold. 
f Annual cost savings calculated following Supplemental Equation (3-S5). 
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3.9. Figures  
 
Figure 3-1. (a) Maps of Florida, Lake Okeechobee watershed, and S-191 sub-basin study 
area. (b) S-191 sub-basin hydrography and rainfall stations. 
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Figure 3-2. Total Phosphorus (TP) loading spatial distribution (kg ha-1 yr-1): (a) un-
attenuated at the farm level, (b) attenuated to the nearby stream, (c) attenuated to the sub-
basin outlet. (d) Land use classification in the S-191 sub-basin. 
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Figure 3-3. Zone classification of the phosphorus attenuation factors. 
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Figure 3-4. (a) Costs and cost savings (in million dollars per year) of achieving different 
TP loading caps at the zone level under a Command-and-Control approach and a Least-
Cost Abatement scenario. (b) Credit price ($) determination. 
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3.10. Supplemental Information 
It includes details about the Watershed Assessment Model, the equimarginal cost 
principle, the marginal abatement cost, and the six steps for phosphorus trading analysis. 
It also includes Figs. 3-S1, 3-S2 and 3-S3, as well as Tables 3-S1, 3-S2, 3-S3, 3-S4, 3-S5, 
3-S6 and 3-S7 as indicated in the text. 
3.10.1.  Watershed assessment model (WAM) 
WAM model uses a cell-grid based system that overlays land use, soil, rain zone, and 
wastewater treatment zone input data to create a group of unique cells to be modeled 
using the most appropriate field-scale sub-model. The Basin Unique Cell Shell program 
(BUCSHELL) selects one of the three field-scale sub-models differing in their ability to 
deal with the specific and distinctive natural characteristics of land use and soil type. 
Well drained soils are generally simulated by the Groundwater Loading Effects of 
Agricultural Management Systems (GLEAMS) (Knisel, 1993). High water table soils are 
simulated using the Everglades Agricultural Area Model (EAAMOD) (SWET, 2008). 
Land use/soil combinations not handled by either GLEAMS or EAAMOD, such as 
wetlands, impervious urban areas, aquaculture, and mining operations are modeled using 
a special case module created specifically for WAM (SWET, 2011a).  Each field-scale 
model calculates daily surface and groundwater flows and constituent concentrations 
leaving each source cell in the watershed. The flows and loads are then routed to the 
nearest stream within the Basin Land Area to Stream Routing sub-model 
(BLASROUTE). Water and constituents reaching the streams are then routed hydro-
dynamically through the stream network to the outlet while being attenuated based on 
features encountered along the way, such as wetlands or depressions, or based on the 
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stream and structure types. WAM uses Thiessen polygons to create rainfall zones linked 
to daily rainfall records.  The rainfall data, the driving force of the model, will determine 
how much runoff or groundwater percolation would originate at each source cell and then 
be routed to the nearest stream.  
3.10.2.  Equimarginal cost principle and marginal abatement cost 
Theoretically, when there are multiple sources of a particular pollutant with differing 
marginal abatement cost, and if it is desired to achieve a given goal at the lowest possible 
cost, then emissions from various sources must be in accordance with the “equimarginal 
cost principle” (Field and Field, 2006). This economic principle, illustrated in Fig. 3-S3 
depicting the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves of two hypothetical TP sources (A 
and B) with different abatement costs, is related to the fact that pollution sources use 
different management practices or technologies to control emissions. MAC curves act 
essentially as supply curves, showing the amount of load reduction that sources would 
achieve at different costs (Field and Field, 2006). The intersection of the two marginal 
abatement costs (Fig. 3-S3) is where economic efficiency, also known as the 
equimarginal cost principle, is met (Bockel et al., 2012). In other words, least-cost 
solutions for achieving a desired abatement level (e*) are only reached when marginal 
abatement cost of different pollution sources are equal (Field and Field, 2006). The MAC 
value p* is associated with the efficient abatement level e*, and represents the credit 
price (or shadow price) that potential buyers or sellers will be willing to pay or sell for 
nutrient credits. For the source A, the total cost to attain the reduction level e* is denoted 
by the area a, whereas for source B the total cost is denoted by the area b. The efficient 
abatement level, e*, shows that a source with a low abatement cost (Source B) should 
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reduce more emissions than the high abatement cost source (Source A). A source will be 
willing to purchase credits if its marginal abatement cost is higher than the credit price, to 
save the difference in abatement cost. In contrast, a source will be willing to sell credits if 
its marginal abatement cost is lower than the credit price, because the revenue from the 
sale would cover the added abatement cost incurred to reduce additional emissions. In 
general, buyers in trading programs want to minimize the price of purchasing an offset 
credit, and sellers want to minimize the cost of producing them (King and Kuch, 2003). 
MAC curves have been used in different sectors to identify cost-efficient means to 
meet with emission reduction targets (Kesicki, 2011).  For instance, MAC curves have 
been used to analyze air pollutant reduction (Rentz et al., 1994), waste reduction 
(Beaumont and Tinch, 2004), water consumption reduction (Addams et al., 2009), and 
mitigation potential of technical practices in the agriculture sector (Bockel et al., 2012) to 
prioritize investment opportunities and shape policy discussions.  
3.10.3.  Phosphorus trading analysis 
Step 1: Cap and allocations 
In the present study, the cap was defined as the TP loading feasibly achieved at the 
zone level by implementing the three available types of BMPs per land use (owner, 
typical, and alternative) within the study area (Table 3-S1). This means that the sum of 
the TP loads attenuated to the nearby stream from all land uses should be equal or less 
than the cap. A proportionality factor, based on the zone attenuation factor obtained for 
the entire S-191 sub-basin, was then applied to translate the cap set at the land users’ 
zone location to the S-191 sub-basin outlet. This was done to account for the fact that the 
TP loads discharged at the nearby stream will be attenuated before reaching the basin 
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outlet. The resulting area normalized allocation load (kg P ha-1 yr-1) was then set for 
every TP loading source in the sub-basin.  
Step 2: Cost under a Command-and-Control approach 
Under this approach, the cost was calculated based on the BMPs available that can be 
implemented to meet TP loading individual allocations (Table 3-S2). The corresponding 
TP removal efficiencies for each land use per BMP type are presented in Table 3-S3. The 
TP load (L’i,j in mtons P yr-1), if BMPs were implemented, was calculated for each land 
use and zone following Equation (3-S1). 
jijkji LrL ,,, )1(' ×−=                               (3-S1) 
where rk,j is the TP load reduction percentage obtained at the land use j due to the 
implementation of BMP (k), Li,j (mtons P yr-1) is the current average annual TP load 
discharged from land use (j) located in zone (i) obtained from the output of the WAM 
model for the simulation period of 2002 – 2009.  
The TP load (L’i,j) after BMP implementation under a Command-and-Control 
approach represents the baseline load. The difference between this baseline TP load and 
the TP load obtained under a trading program determined the number of credits to 
purchase or to sell in a market program (Corrales et al., 2013). The total sub-basin load 
reduction target at the zone level (Target_Pred) for the S-191 sub-basin was calculated by 
adding the TP load reductions across all TP sources within the area. The cost of BMP 
implementation was also estimated for each zone and land use combination (i,j) using 
Equation (3-S2). 
jijkji acc ,,,' ×=                                                (3-S2) 
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where ck,j ($ ha-1 yr-1) is the annual cost per area and per implemented BMP (Table 3-S2) 
and ai,j (ha) is the area of each land use per zone (Table 3-S4). The annual costs included 
the amortized capital cost at 10% interest over a twenty-year life span and the annual 
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs represented 20% per year of the capital cost 
(SWET, 2006). The total cost of the Command-and-Control approach (tot_c’) was 
estimated by adding the individual costs. 
Step 3: Cost under the Least-Cost Abatement approach 
The mathematical optimization model described in Equations (3-2) – (3-4) developed 
in the paper, was solved to determine the optimal combination of BMPs to achieve the TP 
load reduction target (Target_Pred) at the lowest cost. TP loads per land use and zone 
(L’’i,j) and individual (c’’i,j) and total costs (tot_c’’) after optimal-BMPs have been 
selected, were also calculated. The difference in total costs (tot_c’ - tot_c’’) between 
Command-and-Control and Least-Cost Abatement approaches, identifies the maximum 
potential cost savings of the TP credit trading program.  
Step 4: Credit price and identification of sellers and buyers 
Total Abatement Cost (TAC) curve was derived for the S-191 sub-basin by running 
the optimization model and recording the cost of achieving different TP load targets. The 
slope of the cost versus TP load curve reflected the credit price or the maximum price 
that pollution sources are willing to pay for removing an additional unit of pollutant 
(Field and Field, 2006). Theoretically, this slope also represents the equimarginal 
abatement costs across all the sources at the respective loading target.  Land users 
discharging above their baseline, obtained under the Command-and-Control approach 
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(L’i,j), were identified as buyers of credits.  On the other hand, land users discharging 
below their baseline were identified as credit sellers.  
Step 5: Credits traded and cost 
The amount of credits needed (Creditsneeded) for buyers to offset the difference in TP 
load between the Command-and-Control and Least-Cost Abatement approaches was 
subject to a trading ratio (TR) to account for differences in load attenuation from each 
discharger relative to the basin outlet (Kardos and Obropta, 2011; Lal et al., 2009; 
Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Attenuation factors, previously determined for different 
zones, were used to calculate the buyer-to-seller TR following Equation (3-S3). 
Therefore, the number of credits a buyer will purchase depended on the buyer and seller’s 
zone location and were calculated following Equation (3-S4). 
)'1(
)'1(
factornattenuatiosSeller
factornattenuatiosBuyerTR
−
−
=                           (3-S3) 
neededbought CreditsofNumberTRCreditsofNumber ×=                (3-S4) 
The cost of the credits (c’’’i,j) was based on the number of credits bought and the 
credit price plus a transaction fee of 10% of the credit price (Stavins, 2003). It is worth 
noticing that the transaction fee was only added to the costs when purchasing credits.  
Step 6: Cost savings and a trading scenario 
The net cost savings for each source trading credits was calculated following 
Equations (3-S5) and (3-S6). The cost savings for a seller was calculated by subtracting 
the additional cost incurred under the Least-Cost Abatement approach from the market 
value of credits sold as shown in Equation (3-S5). The additional cost, represented by the 
expression within the parenthesis, is resulting from the implementation of more capital-
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intensive BMPs through the Least-Cost Abatement approach, i.e., the incremental costs 
of shifting from a command and control scenario to a Least-Cost Abatement scenario. In 
contrast, the cost savings for a buyer was calculated by subtracting the cost of buying 
(including the cost obtained after optimization, cost of purchasing credits and transaction 
costs) from the cost incurred under the Command-and-Control approach as expressed in 
Equation (3-S6). 
)'''(''' ,,, jijijisellers cccSavings −−=                            (3-S5) 
).'''''(' ,,, feetranscccSavings jijijibuyers ++−=                          (3-S6) 
Considering that a buyer cost savings will be maximized if credits were bought from 
a source downstream of its own location, buyers with less cost savings were first allowed 
to purchase credits from sellers located in the closest zones to the basin outlet. The grand 
total cost savings from a trading program relative to a Command-and-Control approach 
adopted within the S-191 sub-basin was estimated by combining the individual cost 
savings from all buyers and sellers sources. 
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3.10.5.  Tables  
Table 3-S1. Best Management Practices (BMPs) description. 
BMP 
Type Description C IP UP RWP D FC  O RC S U 
Owner  
Phosphorus reduced to zero, better 
nutrient management, grass 
management, and feeder/minerals 
and water placement 
x x       x         
Improved grass management, 
watering facilities, and feed 
placement 
    x x             
Feed ration management         x           
Reduce phosphorus fertilization             x x x x 
Typical  
Stormwater R/D and wetland 
restoration x       x           
Rotational grazing, new water 
facilities, retention basin by working 
pens, critical area fencing, and 
moderate wetland 
restoration/detention 
  x       x         
Some rotational grazing, retention 
basin by working pens,  and 
moderate wetland 
restoration/detention 
    x x             
Water management, additional 
stormwater retention, cover crop, and 
limited wetlamd restoration/retention 
            x x x   
Limited dry retention, street 
sweeping, sediment R/D and wetland 
restoration 
                  x 
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Table 3-S1. Continued. 
BMP Type Description C IP UP RWP D FC  O RC S U 
Alternative  
Fertigation, grassed waterways, and 
edge-of-farm stormwater R/D with 
chemical treatment 
x                   
Provide alternative shade to move 
cattle from streams, and edge-of-
farm Stormwater R/D and chemical 
treatment 
  x       x         
Critical area fencing, and edge-of-
farm stormwater R/D and chemical 
treatment 
    x x             
Solids separation for off site 
disposal, add housing to move 
animals off field, stormwater 
retention/expanded sprayfields, edge-
of-field chemical treatment, buffer 
strips, edge-of-farm stormwater R/D 
and chemical treatment, water reuse 
from R/D ponds, erosion control, and 
edge-of-farm stormwater R/D and 
chemical treatment 
        x           
Edge-of-farm stormwater R/D and 
chemical treatment                   x 
Water reuse from R/D ponds, erosion 
control, and edge-of-farm 
stormwater R/D and chemical 
treatment 
            x x x   
R/D: Retention and detention; C: Citrus; IP: Improved pastures; UP: Unimproved pastures; RWP: Rangeland and wooded pastures; D: Dairies; 
FC: Field crops; O: Ornamentals; RC: Row crops; S: Sod; U: Urban. 
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Table 3-S2. Annual cost of implementing the three BMP types per land use and per area ($ ha-1 yr-1) (from SWET, 2006). 
BMP 
Typea Citrus 
Improved 
Pastures 
Unimproved 
Pastures 
Rangeland 
and 
Wooded 
Pasture 
Dairies Field Crop  Ornamentals 
Row 
Crop Sod Urban 
I - 11.6 2.9 2.9 5.8 11.6 11.6 10.2 6.4 - 
II 71.4 46.4 14.5 14.5 973.0 46.4 205.8 204.0 104.9 463.8 
III 294.6 147.8 66.7 66.7 1,483.1 147.8 614.5 612.2 411.0 3,431.8 
a Type I: Owner type BMPs; Type II: Owner and typical BMPs; Type III: Owner, typical, and alternative BMPs. 
 
Table 3-S3. Best Management Practices (BMPs) efficiency – TP load reduction in percentage (%) (from SWET, 2006). 
BMP 
Typea Citrus 
Improved 
Pastures 
Unimproved 
Pastures 
Rangeland 
and 
Wooded 
Pasture 
Dairies Field Crop  Ornamentals 
Row 
Crop Sod Urban 
I 12% 11% 7% 4% 9% 15% 32% 30% 20% 5% 
II 32% 30% 20% 10% 37% 40% 67% 60% 47% 10% 
III 61% 64% 55% 42% 67% 62% 84% 80% 74% 73% 
aType I: Owner type BMPs; Type II: Owner and typical BMPs; Type III: Owner, typical, and alternative BMPs. 
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Table 3-S4. Land use distribution per zone in the S-191 sub-basin (ha). 
 Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Zone 6 
Citrus - 49 45 474 414 433 
Improved Pastures 669 4,529 5,087 5,545 4,398 7,144 
Unimproved Pastures 3 113 740 487 142 86 
Rangeland and Wooded 
Pastures - 66 60 34 41 - 
Dairies 517 741 217 162 336 237 
Field Crop - 575 162 514 231 263 
Ornamentals 21 20 96 76 9 - 
Row Crop - 6 10 61 32 105 
Sod - 286 - - 81 6 
Urban 138 768 990 376 35 116 
 
Table 3-S5. Delivery trading ratios. 
Buyer’s 
location 
Seller’s location 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Zone 6 
Zone 1 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.09 1.14 
Zone 2 0.98 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.07 1.11 
Zone 3 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.09 
Zone 4 0.94 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.02 1.07 
Zone 5 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.05 
Zone 6 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 1.00 
 
Table 3-S6. Total phosphorus load attenuated to the nearby stream per land use and per 
zone in the S-191 sub-basin (kg ha-1 yr-1). 
Land Use Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Zone 6 
Citrus - 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Improved Pastures 1.5 2.5 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.7 
Unimproved Pastures 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.5 
Rangeland and Wooded 
Pasture - 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 - 
Dairies 8.9 8.2 10.9 13.4 11.1 6.7 
Field Crop - 5.4 4.5 4.9 4.8 3.7 
Ornamentals 11.3 9.4 5.0 9.4 9.6 - 
Row Crop - 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.1 
Sod - 5.2 - - 6.0 3.1 
Urban 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.4 
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Table 3-S7. Total phosphorus load attenuated to the nearby stream per land use after Best 
Management Practice (BMP) implementation under a Command-and-Control approach 
and a Least-Cost Abatement scenario. 
Land Use 
TP load under 
Command-and-
Control 
(kg yr-1) 
TP load under 
Least-Cost 
Abatement 
(kg yr-1) 
Potential 
buyer or 
seller 
Citrus 1,197 1,054 Seller 
Improved Pastures 37,565 25,934 Seller 
Unimproved Pastures 1,040 1,040 - 
Rangeland and Wooded Pastures 148 148 - 
Dairies 6,780 17,780 Buyer 
Field Crop 3,223 3,223 - 
Ornamentals 273 592 Buyer 
Row Crop 311 396 Buyer 
Sod 522 940 Buyer 
Urban 1,136 1,079 Seller 
 52,196 52,188  
Note: Total Phosphorus loads were expressed in kilograms (kg) to identify the buyer and seller sources and 
the respective number of credits to be purchased or available to sell. 
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3.10.6.  Figures  
 
 
Figure 3-S1. Diagram illustrating the methodology followed to: (a) estimate the total 
phosphorus (TP) loadings before implementation of Best Management Practices (BMPs) 
at each zone i and land use j as well as the trading ratios (TR) at each zone i, and (b) 
assess the trading program cost savings. 
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Figure 3-S2. (a) Best Management Practices (BMP) selected under a Command-and-
Control approach and (b) under a Least-Cost Abatement scenario. C stands for citrus, IP 
for improved pastures, UP for unimproved pastures, RWP for rangeland and wooded 
pastures, D for dairies, FC for field crops, O for ornamentals, RC for row crops, S for 
sod, and U for urban 
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Figure 3-S3. Credit price identification from the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) 
curves. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WATER QUALITY TRADING OPPORTUNITIES IN TWO SUB-WATERSHEDS 
IN THE NORTHERN LAKE OKEECHOBEE WATERSHED 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Affecting both freshwater and coastal ecosystems, nutrient eutrophication is a subtle 
yet rapidly growing environmental problem of international significance. Phosphorus 
plays a critical role in the impairment of fresh waterbodies. Addressing the high levels of 
phosphorus reaching the ecosystems is a challenging task, which integrates a multifaceted 
program with the participation of agencies, academic institutions, the private sector, and 
other stakeholders. Phosphorus source control efforts, currently implemented to reduce 
phosphorus in the runoff from watersheds, have not yet yielded the desired improvements 
in water quality (Jarvie et al., 2013), particularly in complex and large watersheds, such 
as the Lake Okeechobee watershed (LOW) in Florida, USA (Figure 4-1). Anthropogenic 
factors, and hydrologic and land use modifications in the LOW have led to water quality 
impairment of Lake Okeechobee (LO) (FDEP, 2014). The water quality impairment has 
been mainly linked to excessive phosphorus loadings, originating from diverse sources, 
including agriculture and livestock, municipal and industrial discharges, and urban 
stormwater runoff (FDEP, 2001). Anthropogenic additions of phosphorus altered many 
aspects of the structure and function of LO’s ecosystem (Havens and Gawlik, 2005). In 
order to prevent further degradation of the lake and protect its designated uses (e.g., 
drinking, fishing, recreation, irrigation, etc.), the Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection (FDEP) adopted a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), establishing an 
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annual target load for total phosphorus (TP) of 140 metric tons (mtons) to be discharged 
into LO from all sources in the watershed and from atmospheric deposition (Zhao et al., 
2012). The TMDL is intended to be achieved in a multi-phased approach by the 
implementation of a series of projects and programs delineated in the LO Basin 
Management Action Plan (BMAP). The first phase of this BMAP includes projects that 
will achieve a TP reduction of approximately 145 mtons yr-1, with an estimated total cost 
of more than $ 937.7 million (FDEP, 2014).  Additional projects and resources would be 
needed to achieve the TMDL and to further improve the water quality of the lake. 
Consequently, it is imperative to establish economic incentive policies to address the 
phosphorus problem in the lake and its watershed in a cost-effective way.  
The theoretical promise of market-based systems to assist in meeting water quality 
standards at an overall lower cost than conventional regulatory approaches and the 
encouragement from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), has led to 
significant attention to water quality trading as a policy alternative to support TMDL 
implementation (Horan and Shortle, 2011). In general, water quality trading programs 
utilize a market-based approach that allows sources to comply with their regulatory 
obligations by using reductions achieved by other sources. These additional reductions 
generally translate into credits with a monetary value that may be sold to sources with 
high marginal abatement costs within the watershed (Field and Field, 2006). Advantages 
of market-based approaches include the involvement of non-regulated nonpoint sources 
to address watershed water quality impairment problems (Shortle and Horan, 2006). In 
addition, these incentive-based alternatives offer flexibility to pollution sources to find 
cost-effective means of meeting individual loading limits (Collentine, 2006).  
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The current study builds on a previous investigation conducted by Corrales et al. 
(2014), which designed a modeling framework to quantify TP loadings from nonpoint 
sources and evaluate the cost savings that could potentially result from implementing a 
WQTP, in comparison to a conventional regulatory or command-and-control (CAC) 
approach. Several novel aspects were examined in the present study. First and foremost, 
the phosphorus sources allowed to participate in the trading program were extended to 
both nonpoint and point sources. Indeed, a more diverse pool of trading sources could 
increase the potential financial attractiveness of the program by creating differences in 
the control costs faced by individual sources (Newell and Stavins, 2003). Second, the 
geographic boundaries of the study areas were expanded to two larger and more 
hydrological complex sub-watersheds than the region examined in Corrales et al. (2014). 
Third, recognizing that the potential economic gains associated with trading are 
influenced by diverse factors specific to the trading area (USEPA, 2003c), this paper 
assessed the potential cost savings of a trading program in two sub-watersheds with a 
direct or an indirect discharge location relative to LO and with distinct land use 
characteristics. Fourth, the optimal cap per study area was selected through an 
optimization process considering several factors impacting the market potential, namely 
the least-cost solutions, credit prices, potential cost savings, and credit supply and 
demand. Hypothetical trading scenarios were also developed, using the optimal caps 
selected for the two sub-watersheds, to highlight the economic advantages of a WQTP 
over a CAC approach in order to improve LO’s water quality.  
Furthermore, the present study is intended to provide the public and private sectors 
with critical information to assess the environmental and economic potential of WQTPs 
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to reduce TP loadings into LO and to determine whether WQTPs are worth further 
exploration and development. Although the potential of a WQTP is illustrated here 
through case studies, the same analysis could be applied in other watersheds to explore 
the feasibility of a trading program in order to achieve water quality goals in a cost-
effective way. 
4.2. Materials and Methods 
4.2.1. Study areas description 
The Lake Okeechobee watershed (LOW), divided in nine sub-watersheds on the basis 
of hydrology and geography, drains into Lake Okeechobee (LO) (Figure 4-1). Two sub-
watersheds, Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS), were 
used as study areas to evaluate and compare the cost effectiveness of implementing a 
water quality trading program (WQTP) to reduce the phosphorus emissions reaching LO. 
The two sub-watersheds have different land use and hydrologic characteristics and have 
been identified as major sources of total phosphorus (TP) loadings to the lake. In the case 
of the UK sub-watershed, TP loads are mainly the result of high surface water flows 
(Sharfstein et al., 2015). In the case of the TCNS sub-watershed, TP loads are associated 
to high TP loads per unit area originating from dairy farms and beef cattle ranches 
(Hiscock et al., 2003; Zhao et al., 2012). Therefore, water quality improvements in these 
areas could significantly contribute to reducing TP loadings to LO. 
Upper Kissimmee sub-watershed 
The UK sub-watershed, located north of LO, covers approximately 4,150 km2 
(414,994 ha), representing 35% of the total drainage area of the lake. Lake Kissimmee 
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and the Chain of Lakes in Orange and Osceola counties (SFWMD et al., 2011) are 
located in the UK sub-watershed and represent the major hydrologic components of the 
area (Figure 4-2a). The land use in the UK sub-watershed is mainly composed of natural 
areas (56%), such as wetlands, forest, and water bodies; followed by agricultural areas 
(24%), including citrus groves, improved pastures, and sod farms, and by urban areas 
(21%), such as residential, commercial, industrial, and institutional areas (Table 4-1). In 
addition, the largest wastewater facilities within the LOW are located in this sub-
watershed. With a historical average annual rainfall of 1,272 mm (Abtew and Ciuca, 
2015), runoff from the UK sub-watershed is directly reaching the Kissimmee River (C-38 
canal) through the S-65 spillway and passes through several downstream basins before 
reaching LO. As a result of the large surface flows, this sub-watershed contributes 
significant TP loads into the lake. According to the data from the South Florida Water 
Management District (SFWMD) DBHYDRO database, the UK sub-watershed accounted 
for approximately 39% (750,170 acre-feet) of the total inflow and 18% (77.3 mtons) of 
TP loads to LO for the period from 2000 – 2013. 
Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough sub-watershed 
The TCNS sub-watershed covers 7% (785 km2) of the LOW and drains into LO from 
the northeast through the S-191 flow control structure (Figure 4-2b). The hydrology is 
dominated by creeks, sloughs, and canals.  The historical average annual rainfall is 1,168 
mm (Abtew and Ciuca, 2015), and the land use of this sub-watershed is mainly 
constituted of agricultural lands (67%), such as improved pastures, dairy farms, and 
sugarcane, natural areas (20%), as well as urban areas (13%) (Table 4-1). Because of the 
large TP loads generated from this sub-watershed, it has been listed as a priority area for 
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the implementation of several TP source control programs. According to the data from 
DBHYDRO, the TCNS sub-watershed accounted for approximately 22% (93.0 mtons) of 
the TP loads discharged to LO for the period from 2000 – 2013. 
4.2.2. Identification of sources of phosphorus and quantification of loadings 
Point sources 
Point sources (PS) are pollution sources that have a confined and identifiable effluent 
location, such as wastewater treatment facilities (WWTFs) and concentrated animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs), where animals are maintained in confined situations. Any 
PS discharging to surface waters is subject to the Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection’s (FDEP) federally authorized National Pollutant Discharged Elimination 
System (NPDES) requirements. The UK sub-watershed has 115 domestic and industrial 
wastewater facilities with a total permitted flow capacity of 145 million gallons per day 
(MGD) (FDEP, 2015). The majority of these facilities use conventional secondary 
biological treatment processes typically designed to remove suspended solids and organic 
compounds and a lesser extent, to remove nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus). In 
addition, these facilities sell their reclaimed water for reuse purposes to further reduce 
nutrient and other contaminant loads. Only two facilities are equipped with Advanced 
Wastewater Treatment (AWT) systems specifically designed to remove nutrients.  In the 
TCNS sub-watershed, there are 26 domestic and industrial facilities, nine of which are 
concentrated cow/calf feeding operations (CAFOs), and only one facility with 
implemented AWT technology have a design flow capacity greater than 1 MGD.  Given 
that WWTFs are increasingly being required to implement advanced treatment processes 
to reduce effluent concentrations to levels that regulators deem sufficiently protective of 
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the environment, this study focused on facilities with a permitted flow capacity exceeding 
1 MGD and that do not have AWT systems currently in place (TP concentration 
exceeding 0.1 mg L-1). Facilities with a permitted flow less than 1 MGD account only for 
4% of the total combined flow in the two studied sub-watersheds (147.6 MGD) and 
therefore, are not expected to be significant phosphorus loading contributors. A TP 
concentration of 0.1 mg L-1 was used to select facilities with no AWT technologies (on 
the basis of performance data from 30 different facilities) (USEPA, 2008). According to 
the above selection criteria, Figure 4-3a shows the location of the PS selected for this 
study (i.e., 12 WWTFs with a combined permitted daily flow of 108 MGD), all located in 
the UK sub-watershed. The TP loads discharged at the end-of-pipe from these WWTFs 
was quantified using the TP effluent concentrations and on the average water flows from 
the monitoring reports obtained from the FDEP OCULUS database (FDEP, 2015). The 
time period used to calculate TP loads differed for each facility and was determined by 
available information of TP effluent concentrations. 
It is worth mentioning that all the CAFOs were located in the TCNS sub-watershed 
(Figure 4-3b) and were also included in the analysis. The CAFO TP loadings were 
quantified using the same methodology used to determine the nonpoint sources’ TP 
loadings. 
Nonpoint sources 
Nonpoint sources (NPS) are polluting sources discharging over relative large diffuse 
areas. Examples of NPS are runoffs originating from agricultural and urban areas. The 
location and type of NPS within the study areas were determined using the 2006 land use 
classification obtained from the SFWMD Geographical Information System (GIS) 
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database (SFWMD, 2014). Figures 4-4a and 4-4b show the land use distribution for the 
UK and the TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively.  
Given that NPS pollution discharges depend on several exogenous factors including 
land use, topography, vegetation, and sediment generation (Zhang et al., 2015), direct 
measurement of TP load discharges and removal efficiencies of different control 
practices is a challenging and often a very expensive task. Therefore, WQTPs rely on 
computer models and/or web-based platforms using site characteristics, such as rainfall, 
land use, and soil types to simulate the constituent loads generated at the source level. For 
instance, Zhang et al. (2015) used the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to 
simulate NPS contaminant loadings from agricultural zones for trading purposes in the 
Xiangxihe River watershed (China). Trading programs in the Kalamazoo River 
watershed (MI, USA) and the Chesapeake Bay watershed (USA) use the standardized 
nutrient loading estimation tool –NutrientNet-- to estimate loadings and potential 
reductions of different management strategies (Lal et al., 2009). In the present study, the 
Watershed Assessment Model (WAM) developed by Soil and Water Engineering 
Technology, Inc. was used as a TP load estimation tool at the source, stream, and sub-
watershed outfall levels. A detailed description of the model can be found in Corrales et 
al. (2014). The WAM model dynamically routes the flows and constituent loads to and 
through the stream network to the discharge location, allowing the quantification of the 
un-attenuated constituent loads (at the source level) and the attenuated loads (at the 
nearby stream system), after overland assimilation has been taken into account (SWET, 
2011). The model has been extensively used in the LOW for a variety of projects (SWET, 
2011) and it was recently applied by the FDEP for the LO Basin Management Action 
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Plan (BMAP) development (FDEP, 2014). For the purpose of the present study, WAM 
was calibrated and validated for the UK sub-watershed and for three of the four basins of 
the TCNS sub-watershed (S-133, S-135, and S-154) (Figure 4-2b) for a simulation period 
from 2002 – 2009. Results of the calibration and validation analysis and goodness-of-fit 
(GOF) statistical measurements are reported in the Supplemental Information. The 
simulation period (2002 – 2009) was selected for the present study, because during this 
period minimal Best Management Practices (BMPs) were implemented in the two sub-
watersheds to reduce nutrient loadings from agricultural and urban areas (FDEP, 2014).  
4.2.3. Determination of attenuation rates and delivery trading ratios 
The TP loads from PS and NPS can be land and water assimilated through several 
physical-chemical-biological processes (Zhang et al., 2002). For TP loads generated from 
NPS, the overland attenuation was calculated using the WAM model as different 
attenuation rates were applied to nutrient loads depending on the type of landscape 
feature encountered en-route to a nearby reach (SWET, 2011). For TP loads generated 
from PS, an attenuation factor of 90% was used in order to estimate the TP loads 
attenuated to the nearby stream. The overland attenuation factor, taken from published 
data (Crites et al., 2000; Evanylo et al., 2010; USEPA, 2003b), reflects the attenuation of 
TP in reclaimed water discharged to a slow-rate public access reuse system, consisting of 
irrigation of residential lawns, golf courses, and landscape areas. In the present case, 
although the reclaimed water from PS was not directly discharged to a surface waterbody, 
it was assumed that the surface and groundwater catchment areas were similar in the sub-
watersheds. Therefore, the TP loads from PS were attributed to the WAM reach 
associated with the drainage area where the PS is located. 
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The in-stream phosphorus attenuation was used to account for additional TP 
assimilation as different hydrologic conveyance features, such as slough, streams, and 
canals are encountered en-route to the sub-watershed outlet. A first order decay equation 
(Equation 4-1) was used to attenuate TP loads from the nearby stream to the sub-
watershed outlets. The main factors influencing the in-stream attenuation are the stream 
velocity and the rate of nutrient exchange between the water column and sediments 
(Corrales et al., 2014). 
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where Cf is the TP concentration at the outlet of the sub-watershed (mg L-1), Co is the 
TP concentration at the outlet of each reach segment (mg L-1), Cb is the TP background 
concentration in the stream (mg L-1), v is the stream velocity (m s-1), and a is the rate of 
load transfer (m s-1) referring to the rate at which TP is removed from the water column 
and retained in the stream sediments.  
Values of Cb and a were calibrated for the UK sub-watershed and for the S-133, S-
135, and S-154 basins. Final values of Cb and a are reported in the Appendix for the two 
phosphorus forms: soluble (dissolved in the water) and non-soluble (attached to sediment 
particles).  
Attenuation ratios were calculated using the difference in TP load attenuated to the 
sub-watershed outlet and the TP load attenuated to the nearby stream. Each sub-
watershed was then classified into zones defined by the attenuation ratio values, using the 
natural breaks (Jenks) classification method provided in ArcMap. The TP loads 
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aggregated by zone represented the current average annual TP load per source considered 
in the analysis.  
Attenuation rate values were used to estimate the delivery trading ratios (TRs) using 
Equation (4-2).  The TRs were incorporated in the WQTP to provide equivalence 
between trading sources located at different distances relative to the impaired waterbody 
(Corrales et al., 2013; Feng et al., 2009).  The TRs are an important feature of a WQTP, 
because they ensure that pollutant load reductions achieved at the seller’s location would 
result in the same or better environmental improvement in the receiving waterbody than 
reductions attained at the buyer’s location (USEPA, 2003c).  
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Once the TRs were assessed, the amount of credits needed from a potential buyer was 
adjusted using the buyer zone’s TR to ensure that the proposed trade did not result in 
localized areas of high TP load or “hotspots”.  
4.2.4. Phosphorus abatement approaches 
Least-cost abatement approach 
In the present study, an extended version of the conceptual model developed in 
Corrales et al. (2014) was used to minimize the total costs of abating TP loads to achieve 
specific reduction TP targets. Similar models have been used in other studies to 
determine the least-cost load allocation to meet a given water quality goal (Van Houtven 
et al., 2012). The novel component of the present study is that the least-cost abatement 
(LCA) model was extended to include the participation of both PS and NPS to simulate a 
market-based WQTP. The allocation of a water quality goal for each sub-watershed was 
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optimized among trading sources in such a way that sources with low marginal abatement 
costs would have higher TP reductions than sources with high marginal abatement costs, 
allowing reaching economic efficiency while achieving specific TP reduction targets. The 
LCA model approach, described in Equations (4-3) – (4-6), was solved using the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software. Table 4-2 provides the description and 
units of the variables used in the model. 
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The objective function Min Z, represented in Equation (4-3), was set to minimize the 
cost of implementing 1) agricultural and urban BMPs for NPS and 2) AWT technologies 
for PS. The first constraint, presented in Equation (4-4), reflects that the sum of TP load 
reductions from NPS and PS in each zone (i), after implementing a BMP (k) and/or an 
AWT technology type (m), needs to meet a pre-set TP load reduction target 
(Target_Pred). The second and third constraints, presented in Equations (4-5) and (4-6), 
are using a binary variable (0 or 1) to indicate if a BMP or an AWT technology was 
implemented or not.  For instance, a value of 1 is used when a BMP type (k) was adopted 
by NPS (j) in zone (i), and 0 otherwise.  
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The NPS BMP cost efficiency (TP load reductions and associated costs) were 
determined using estimates developed for the LOW for the three BMPs categories (i.e., 
owner, typical, and alternative) (SWET, 2006).  These estimates were set on the basis of 
an extensive literature review, observed data, and modeling projects around Florida 
(SWET, 2008). Owner-type BMPs refer to nutrient management practices, such as 
reducing fertilizer application. Typical and alternative types of BMPs are structural 
practices involving the construction of more capital-intensive practices, such as adding 
structures that retain water on-site for longer periods of time or edge-of-field pre-
discharge treatment systems (Bottcher et al., 1995). The PS AWT cost efficiency (TP 
load reductions and associated annual costs for a wide range of flow rates) were 
determined using values developed by USEPA (2008) examining different AWT retrofit 
technologies that involve modifying or making additions around an existing biological 
treatment system. The reported cost estimates were used to derive capital cost and 
operational and maintenance (O&M) cost functions for two groups of technologies: 
medium effluent TP target (average TP concentration of 0.5 mg L-1) and low effluent TP 
target (average TP concentration of 0.1 mg L-1). These two groups were selected on the 
basis of the fact that the performance of the treatment processes at the WWTFs, evaluated 
in the USEPA (2008) study, could reach mid-level TP concentrations (between 0.1 to 0.5 
mg L-1) or low TP concentrations (less than 0.1 mg L-1). Table 4-3 presents TP reduction 
efficiencies and unit annual costs ($ per kilogram of TP removed) for agricultural and 
urban BMPs, and for AWT retrofit technologies used in this study. All costs were 
indexed to 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index inflation calculation. 
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Command-and-control approach 
A command-and-control (CAC), also known as a conventional approach, is when a 
regulatory agency outlines specific effluent water quality standards or particular control 
technologies that are deemed to be protective for impaired waterbodies and their 
designated uses (Field and Field, 2006).  In the present study, the CAC approach 
represents the baseline (no-trading) scenario to which the WQTP would be compared to 
in order to evaluate the potential economic benefits in each sub-watershed. Under the 
CAC approach, the TP water quality goal for each sub-watershed was allocated for PS, 
using the total TP amount that would be discharged if an AWT technology was adopted 
in each WWTF to reach an end-of-pipe effluent target TP concentration of 0.1 mg L-1. 
For NPS, the allocation was defined as the difference between the water quality goal and 
the PS allocation. The allocated TP load allocation was then distributed among all NPS 
depending on the land aerial coverage; the resulting load per hectare (kg P ha-1 yr-1) 
represents the maximum TP load rate allowed to be discharged from different NPS types. 
Therefore, while the maximum TP load allowed to be discharged from PS remains fixed 
under this abatement approach, the TP load permitted from NPS is dependent on the pre-
set sub-watershed water quality goal. As opposed to the LCA approach, the selection of 
management alternatives applied to each source is reliant on the best available BMP or 
technology to comply with an individual TP load allocation. 
4.2.5.Setting the cap of a water quality trading program through an optimization 
process 
The cap is generally defined as the maximum pollutant amount allowed to be 
discharged from all trading sources in an impaired watershed for a given period of time. 
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The cap can be defined in terms of load, concentration, or percent reduction targets. In 
theory, the most economically efficient level for the emission cap implies a balance 
between abatement costs and damages (Field and Field, 2006). However, it is often the 
case that environmental damages are difficult to measure accurately. Therefore, in 
practice, policymakers determine the cap level by considering a combination of factors, 
such as cost-effectiveness, fairness, and political feasibility. 
In the present study, different caps were evaluated and their implications on the 
market potential were analyzed while evaluating four different factors: 1) least-cost 
abatement solutions, 2) credit price derived from a market supply curve, 3) potential cost 
savings of the LCA scenario in comparison with the CAC approach, and 4) supply and 
demand of credits. The selection of the cap level affects each of these factors which in 
turn would ultimately influence the efficiency of a WQTP for meeting certain TP loading 
abatement levels. An optimization process was developed using these factors to select the 
most appropriate cap for each of the studied sub-watersheds in order to have a viable and 
sustainable TP trading program. 
For comparison purposes, trading scenarios were developed using the optimal TP 
caps selected for each sub-watershed. For each trading scenario, the buyer and seller 
sources were identified, credit prices and the amount of trades were estimated, cost of 
credits for individual sources were assessed while considering TRs and transaction fees, 
and finally the overall WQTP cost savings relative to a CAC approach were evaluated. A 
10 % of the credit price was added to the cost of the credits as a transaction fee in order to 
account for the time and resources needed to implement a trade (e.g., information 
gathering, negotiation, execution, and monitoring). 
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4.3. Results and Discussion 
4.3.1. Phosphorus loads by source 
Upper Kissimmee sub-watershed 
Annual average TP load values estimated at the source (cell) level, attenuated to the 
nearby stream, and attenuated to the outlet of the UK sub-watershed are reported in Table 
4-4. The total TP loads generated at the source level were 268.6 mtons yr-1 (55%) and 
217.2 mtons yr-1 (45%), from NPS and PS, respectively, for a combined total TP load of 
485.9 mtons yr-1 in the runoff. Sod farms, field crops, and ornamental land uses had the 
highest TP fluxes per hectare at the farm level with 8.1, 5.2, and 3.9 kg ha-1 yr-1, 
respectively. The same range of values was found in other studies reporting TP loads at 
the farm level of 6.6, 1.5, and 2.4 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively for the same land use types in 
South Florida (He et al., 2014). Citrus, improved pastures, and urban land uses had TP 
fluxes of 0.6, 1.5, and 1.1 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively, which are values comparable to the 
ones reported by Boggess et al. (1995). Figure 4-5a depicts the spatial distribution of the 
TP fluxes at the source level and the location of hotspot areas within the UK sub-
watershed. The total annual average TP loads from all sources (including natural areas) 
reaching the nearby stream and the sub-watershed outlet were 111.2 and 99 mtons yr-1, 
respectively (Table 4-4). The average monitored TP loading (obtained from the SFWMD 
DBHYDRO database) at the S-65 structure for the same time period (2002 – 2009) was 
about 105 mtons yr-1, close to the modeled value of 99 mtons yr-1.  The TP sources, such 
as WWTFs, urban areas, and improved pastures had the highest TP load contribution to 
the outlet of the UK sub-watershed, accounting for 20.2, 19.6, and 16.3% of the total TP 
loading, respectively. It is worth mentioning that since TP loadings leaving the UK sub-
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watershed flow through the downstream Lower Kissimmee (LK) sub-watershed before 
reaching LO, a downstream attenuation factor of 30% was used to estimate the TP 
loading contribution from UK sub-watershed reaching the lake. The downstream 
attenuation factor, taken from the FDEP (2014) report, reflects the overland and in-stream 
attenuation associated to the LK sub-watershed. Hence, the total TP loading contribution 
from the UK sub-watershed reaching LO was 69.3 mtons yr-1. 
Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough sub-watershed 
Annual average TP load values from NPS and PS are presented in Table 4-5 for the 
TCNS sub-watershed. The NPS TP loads simulated at the source level were 110.5 mtons 
yr-1. Improved pastures, covering almost 47% of the study area, were the major TP source 
accounting for 46.3% (69.4 mtons yr-1) of the total TP load discharged at the source level. 
In addition, TP loads from CAFOs represented 26% (39.3 mtons yr-1) of the total TP 
loading generated at the source level. The CAFOs had the highest TP load rate per area at 
the source level with 9.9 kg ha-1 yr-1, followed by ornamentals and field crop land uses 
with 8.0 and 5.9 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively. These TP values were consistent with estimates 
reported in a previous study conducted by Corrales et al. (2014) in the S-191 basin, where 
TP fluxes at the source level were 10.5, 9.0, and 5.9 kg ha-1 yr-1 for dairy, ornamentals, 
and field crop land use types, respectively. The TP fluxes of citrus, improved pastures, 
and sod land uses were also consistent with values reported by He et al. (2014) of 0.7, 
1.5, and 6.6 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively. The red areas depicted in Figure 4-5b indicate the 
location of the areas with the highest TP fluxes. The total annual average TP loads from 
all sources (including natural areas) reaching the nearby stream and the sub-watershed 
outlet were 124.9 and 115.7 mtons yr-1, respectively. The average monitored TP loading 
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(obtained from the SFWMD DBHYDRO database) at the S-191 structure for the same 
time period (2002 – 2009) was about 107 mtons yr-1, close to the modeled value of 115.7 
mtons yr-1. Downstream attenuation was not considered in this sub-watershed, since it 
directly discharges into LO.  
In order to develop the two phosphorus abatement approaches (LCA and CAC), TP 
loadings generated from natural sources (significantly important in the UK sub-
watershed) were not considered in the comparison analysis. Therefore, the TP loadings 
set as the baseline before BMP and AWT implementation were 78.7 and 120 mtons yr-1 
for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. 
4.3.2. Attenuation rates and delivery trading ratios 
There was a significant difference in the TP load attenuation from the source level to 
the nearby hydrologic unit in both sub-watersheds. On average, there was an overland 
attenuation of 77 and 17% for the UK and TCNS studied areas, respectively (Tables 4-4 
and 4-5).This dissimilarity could be attributed to the high phosphorus assimilation 
capacity of natural areas, such as wetlands (Boggess et al., 1995), which are the most 
predominant land use types within the UK sub-watershed. TP loads were further 
assimilated or retained through reaches and canals by physical and chemical factors 
before reaching the outlet of the sub-watershed. Zones with different in-stream 
attenuation factors are presented in Figure 4-6. Areas close to the outlet of the two sub-
watersheds had relatively low attenuation factors (an average of 2%), while some 
upstream areas yielded relatively high attenuation factors (an average of 20% for UK and 
29% for TCNS). The in-stream attenuation averages were 11 and 7%, respectively for the 
UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, coinciding with assimilation rates, ranging from 2 – 20%, 
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reported by SWET (2008) for canals and stream conveyance systems in the St. Lucie and 
Caloosahatchee River watersheds (FL, USA). In addition, He et al. (2014) reported 
average overall (land and stream) assimilation rates of 74 and 33%, agreeing with the 
values found in this study of 88 and 24% for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, 
respectively.  
The resulting delivery TRs ranged from 0.82 – 1.23 and from 0.72 – 1.38 for the UK 
and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. Other studies have also used water quality 
models to quantify delivery TRs.  For instance, FDEP (2010) used the Pollution Load 
Screening Model (PLSM) to estimate location factors, ranging from 0.01 – 1.7, in the 
Lower St. Johns River basin (FL, USA). TRs were then used to develop trading scenarios 
to estimate the amount of credits a buyer would need to purchase in order to offset a 
required TP load reduction. A TR less than 1 was used when a buyer purchased credits 
from a seller located downstream. Whereas a TR higher than 1 was used when the seller 
was located upstream of the buyer’s location. Therefore, from an economic perspective, a 
buyer would be more interested to trade credits with a source situated downstream, 
thereby increasing the demand of credits generated from sources closer to the discharge 
outlet of the sub-watersheds.  
4.3.3. Setting the cap of a WQTP scenario in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds 
The TMDL adopted for an impaired waterbody is generally used for setting the cap of 
a WQTP as a legal binding mechanism to incentivize regulated sources to seek credits in 
a market (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Despite this policy driver, an overall low trading 
activity has been observed in the majority of the WQTPs. The success of a WQTP relies 
heavily on setting the correct binding obligation that can either encourage or hinder the 
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participation of trading sources in a credit trading market. For instance, Hamstead and 
BenDor (2010) reported that setting a low-level cap for the Neuse River Basin Total 
Nitrogen Trading program (NC, USA) was one of the causes of low-trade activity, since 
facilities were able to reduce nitrogen loads to compliance levels by technological 
improvements implemented on-site.  Likewise, stringent caps would leave little room to 
provide additional reductions to generate credits, because all available abatement 
measures would be already implemented to comply with the cap.  
Four factors were considered in this study to determine the most suitable cap (or 
reduction target) for a WQTP in each of the sub-watersheds: total annual abatement costs, 
credit prices, potential cost savings, and credits supply and demand.  
Total annual abatement costs 
The total annual costs (in million dollars) incurred from all trading sources when 
implementing the least-cost BMP or technology for achieving different sub-watershed TP 
load reduction targets are presented in Figures 4-7a and 4-7b for the UK and TCNS sub-
watersheds, respectively. Overall, the total annual costs for the UK sub-watershed were 
five times higher than the costs for the TCNS sub-watershed for the same TP reduction 
levels. Figure 4-7 indicates that the total costs and reduction targets are positive 
correlated, reaching total annual costs of $ 327.9 and $ 50.3 million for the highest TP 
load reduction of 75 and 66% achieved for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, 
respectively. Figure 4-7a denotes no significant change in the total cost for TP reduction 
targets ranging from 5 – 50% for the UK sub-watershed. However, once the reduction 
targets exceeded 50%, a substantial increase in the total cost occurred. A similar pattern 
was observed in the TCNS sub-watershed for TP reduction targets greater than 60% 
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(Figure 4-7b). Therefore, in order to develop trading scenarios while keeping the optimal 
cost-effectiveness of the program, TP reduction targets lower than 50 and 60% had to be 
selected as the WQTP caps for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively.  
Credit prices 
Figure 4-8, representing the aggregated supply curves, illustrate the positive 
relationship linking the credit prices and the TP load reduction. Since each point on the 
supply curves corresponds to an equilibrium state between the supply and demand of 
credits, Figure 4-8 also depicts the credit price that trading sources would be willing to 
pay for an additional TP reduction unit. Credit prices in the UK sub-watershed varied 
significantly from $ 27 per kilogram for a 5% TP reduction to $ 7,151 per kilogram for 
the maximum TP reduction of 75%. On the other hand, credit prices in the TCNS sub-
watershed ranged from $ 13 per kilogram for a 5% TP reduction to $ 2,216 per kilogram 
for the maximum TP reduction of 66%. Implemented WQTPs, such as the Great Miami 
River Watershed Trading Pilot program (OH, USA), the Lower St. Johns River Pilot 
Water Quality Trading program (FL, USA), and the South Nation River Watershed 
Trading program (Canada) reported credit prices of $ 28, $ 152, and $ 410 per kilogram 
of TP removed, respectively (Corrales et al., 2013). The market price of the credits can 
vary greatly depending on the type of sources or sectors included in the program (Sado et 
al., 2010). For instance, in the UK sub-watershed (dominated by urban areas) the credit 
price for achieving a 50% TP load reduction was about $ 1000, whereas in the TCNS 
sub-watershed (dominated by agricultural areas) the credit price was close to $ 500 for 
the same TP reduction level.  
133 
 
Figure 4-8a also indicates that the knee-of-the-curve fell at the 50% TP reduction 
level. Indeed, the credit price increased twofold and sevenfold when TP reduction targets 
increased from 50 – 60% and from 50 – 75%, respectively. In the case of the TCNS sub-
watershed (Figure 4-8b), the knee-of-the-curve fell at the 40% TP reduction level, since 
the credit price increased twofold and fivefold when TP reduction targets increased from 
40 – 50% and from 40 – 65%, respectively. Therefore, in order to develop trading 
scenarios, while keeping an optimal credit price of the program, TP reduction targets 
lower than 50 and 40% had to be selected as the WQTP caps for the UK and TCNS sub-
watersheds, respectively.  
Potential cost savings 
The cost-effectiveness (i.e., achieving a given level of environmental improvement at 
the least possible cost) of the two TP control approaches (CAC and LCA) was evaluated 
to select an optimal cap for the WQTPs. The cost-effectiveness is an important criterion 
helping policymakers to select pollution control instruments (Goulder and Parry, 2008). 
Tables 4-6 and 4-7 provide cost comparison of the LCA and CAC approaches for 
achieving different TP reduction levels for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, 
respectively. Abatement costs ranged from 5 – 86% and from 5 – 58% lower under the 
LCA approach than under the CAC scenario in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, 
respectively. These results illustrate the cost advantage that incentive-based policies offer 
over conventional approaches.  However, the cost advantage decreased as TP reduction 
targets became more stringent, because at high TP reduction levels fewer abatement 
alternatives were available to meet the pre-set cap. It would be economically reasonable 
to set the cap of a WQTP at the level where trading sources would have the most 
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economic benefits or savings with respect to other emission control alternatives (Ravesz 
and Stavins, 2004). In the present study, this level was reached when the difference in 
total abatement costs between the LCA and CAC approaches was maximized. In the case 
of the UK sub-watershed (Table 4-6), the highest potential cost savings ($ 127.2 million 
yr-1) were reached for a TP reduction target of 56%. In the case of the TCNS sub-
watershed (Table 4-7), the highest potential cost savings ($ 4.0 million yr-1) were attained 
for a TP reduction target of 30%.  
Credit supply and demand  
Generating enough credit supply and demand is an important factor in a WQTP since 
it is a measure of the degree of competition in the market. In thin markets, with a few 
buyers or sellers, competitive pressures are weak or absent, giving the small group of 
buyers or sellers to exercise control over the market (Field and Field, 2006). In addition, a 
WQTP with few traders could bring several issues related to high transaction costs, price 
volatility, and willingness to participate (USEPA, 2003a). Tables 4-8 and 4-9 present the 
number of credits available to be sold in the market and the number of potential buyers 
and sellers in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. Potential credit buyers 
were identified whenever TP loadings under the LCA approach were higher than those 
obtained under the CAC approach. On the other hand, sources discharging below their 
CAC load were identified as potential credit sellers. An inverse relationship between the 
TP reduction target and the number of potential sellers was observed. Hence, WQTPs 
become a seller-dominated market with more stringent caps. The potential for the 
creation of thin markets was more evident in the UK sub-watershed since there were only 
two potential buyers identified at a TP reduction target of 56% and one potential buyer at 
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a TP reduction target of 61%. In this sub-watershed, a large and almost equal number of 
buyers and sellers was observed for a TP reduction level of 46%, thus creating a 
competitive market scenario. In the case of the TCNS sub-watershed, the potential 
volume of trades was comparable for all TP reduction levels.  
Integrating the four factors influencing the cap level (Figure 4-9) and in order to 
foster competition for a viable and sustainable trading program in the two studied areas, 
TP reduction targets of 46 and 32% were selected as the most appropriate reduction 
levels for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. 
4.3.4. Comparing CAC and LCA scenarios 
Figure 4-10 illustrates the combination of BMPs and AWT technologies that were 
selected under the CAC approach (Figure 4-10a) and under the LCA approach (Figure 4-
10b), in order to meet the 46% TP reduction target in the UK sub-watershed. Under the 
CAC approach, citrus, improved pastures, and rangeland and wooded pastures (across all 
zones in this sub-watershed) were either already in compliance with their individual 
allocations or were supposed to implement BMP types I or II (i.e., owner and typical 
types of BMPs, respectively). In contrast, under the optimized LCA approach, these 
sources were selected to implement additional TP load reduction efforts given their low 
marginal abatement cost relative to other pollution sources. On the other hand, WWTFs, 
sod farms, and urban areas were selected to implement less expensive technologies and 
management practices under the LAC approach, and bought credits from other sources to 
reach their load allocations.  
Figure 4-11 shows the BMP types that each pollution source needed to implement 
(across all zones) under the two TP abatement approaches, in order to meet the 
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aggregated TP load reduction target of 32% for the TCNS sub-watershed. Under the CAC 
approach (Figure 4-11a), citrus, sugarcane, and urban areas were already in compliance 
with their individual allocations, whereas CAFOs, field crops, and ornamentals had to 
implement the most advanced alternative type of BMP (BMP III) to reach their individual 
TP load requirements. Under the LCA optimized approach (Figure 4-11b), citrus, 
sugarcane, and urban areas were selected to reduce their TP loads beyond their baseline 
by implementing BMP type I with minimal additional costs. On the other hand, CAFOs 
and ornamentals reduced their annual investment by implementing BMP types I and II, 
instead of the more capital intensive BMP type III required under the CAC approach. 
Table 4-10 lists the credit prices, number of credits traded, and net cost savings 
estimated for the WQTP scenarios developed in the two studied areas using the selected 
TP load reduction targets. Credit prices were of $ 673 and $ 130 per kilogram of TP 
reduced for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. The number of credits 
traded was 73% (4,601 credits) and 50% (10,495 credits) of the total available TP credits 
for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. In the UK sub-watershed, the major 
sellers were improved and unimproved pastures, and the major buyers were the WWTFs 
and urban areas, selling and purchasing 84 and 76% of the total credits traded, 
respectively. In the TCNS sub-watershed, improved pastures and CAFOs dominated the 
market as sellers and buyers of 94 and 86% of the credits traded, respectively. Although 
sellers incurred an additional cost of $ 2.1 and $ 1.0 million for implementing more 
BMPs in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively, they sold credits for $ 3.1 and 
$ 1.4 million, representing an annual cost savings of $ 956,625 in the UK and $ 337,778 
in the TCNS sub-watersheds. Even with the transaction fees, the annual cost savings were 
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higher for buyers participating in the trading program, representing 97 and 89% of the 
total cost savings for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. The estimated net 
cost savings resulting from implementing a WQTP in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds 
were 76% ($ 34.9 million per year) and 45% ($ 3.2 million per year), respectively. 
Feasibility assessments of the potential of a WQTP in other watersheds have yielded 
similar percentages of potential cost savings. For instance, Faeth (2000) investigated the 
potential for trading in three upper Midwest states (Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota) 
and found in each case cost savings of between 43 and 88% to meet or exceed water 
quality targets, compared to more stringent point source performance requirements. In 
addition, Van Houtven et al. (2012) estimated potential cost savings of 82% for the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed when considering a nutrient trading scenario over a no-
trading scenario. In addition, the net cost savings estimated in this study were higher than 
the net cost savings obtained by Corrales et al. (2014), a study conducted in a small area 
in LOW (S-191 basin). Thus, the cost savings generated from a WQTP generally 
increases when the geographic boundary of the program is extended and more diverse 
sources are included (Newell and Stavins, 2003; Van Houtven et al., 2012). Nevertheless, 
it is worth mentioning that the market suitability and financial attractiveness of a WQTP 
could vary depending on the market structure established to facilitate trading (Ribaudo 
and Gottlieb, 2011; Woodward et al., 2002), risk perceptions of pollution sources 
(Hamstead and BenDor, 2010; Horan, 2001), on trusted and effective relationships 
among regulatory agencies, public sector, and other stakeholders (Newburn and 
Woodward, 2012), and on the specific trading rules determined by regulators (Horan and 
Shortle, 2011). 
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4.4. Conclusions 
This study explored the environmental and economic feasibility of a WQTP over a 
CAC approach in two sub-watersheds within the LOW.  The Upper Kissimmee (UK) and 
the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) studied areas were selected since the two sub 
watersheds are a major TP loading source discharging into LO. Sod farms and CAFOs 
were identified as the major sources of TP load per area (at the source level) in the UK 
and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. Furthermore, delivery TRs of 0.98 – 1.23 for 
UK and 0.72 – 1.38 for TCNS were set using the attenuation rates estimated with the 
hydrologic and water quality WAM model. The financial feasibility of the WQTP was 
assessed while evaluating the effect of different TP caps on the potential for a credit 
market in each of the two sub-watersheds.  Four factors influencing the selection of the 
cap were analyzed: total abatement costs under the least-cost solution, credit price, 
potential cost savings, and credit supply and demand. While attaining cost-effectiveness, 
keeping optimal credit prices, and fostering market competition, TP reduction targets of 
46 and 32% were selected as the most appropriate TP caps, in order to develop a viable 
and sustainable trading scenario in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. The 
estimated net cost savings resulting from implementing a WQTP in the UK and TCNS 
sub-watersheds were 76% ($ 34.9 million per year) and 45% ($ 3.2 million per year), 
respectively. Buyer sources, such as WWTFs and urban areas acquired 97% of the total 
cost savings estimated through trading in the UK sub-watershed. Likewise, 89% of the 
total estimated cost savings in the TCNS were attributed to offsetting CAFOs TP loading 
requirements from other sources. While the results of this study are promising, the 
realization of the environmental and economic benefits of this market-based alternative is 
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also contingent on other important factors such as the market structure, the specific 
program rules, the risk perception, and the education and outreach to develop trusted 
relationships among regulatory agencies, the public sector, and other stakeholders.  
Nevertheless, this study provided some critical results to facilitate the development of 
pilot WQTPs in the LOW and to better understand the potential economic opportunities 
that TP sources would have by participating in a WQTP. 
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4.6. Tables 
Table 4-1. Land use data for Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough 
(TCNS) sub-watersheds. 
 
UK TCNS 
Land Use Area (ha) 
Percent 
(%) 
Area 
(ha) 
Percent 
(%) 
Citrus 23,088 5.6% 1,483 1.9% 
Improved Pastures 53,444 12.9% 37,110 47.2% 
Unimproved Pastures 11,893 2.9% 1,982 2.5% 
Rangeland and Wooded Pasture 2,328 0.6% 283 0.4% 
Dairies 36 0.0% 3,978 5.1% 
Field Crops 636 0.2% 1,756 2.2% 
Ornamentals 232 0.1% 502 0.6% 
Row Crops 1,394 0.3% 213 0.3% 
Sod 3,653 0.9% 1,311 1.7% 
Sugarcane - 0.0% 3,649 4.6% 
Urban 87,881 21.2% 10,444 13.3% 
Natural Areas 230,409 55.5% 15,834 20.2% 
Total 414,994 100.0% 78,545 100.0% 
 
Table 4-2. Description of the variables used in the optimization model. 
Symbol Description Units 
i Set of sub-watershed zones with different percent of attenuation   j Set of land uses representing NPS (agricultural and urban sources)  k Set of best management practices (BMPs) types to apply in NPS   n Set of wastewater treatment facilities (WWTFs) representing PS  
m Set of advanced wastewater treatment (AWT) technologies types to apply in PS  
ci,k,j Annual cost of implementing a BMP (k) at a NPS (j) in zone (i) $ yr-1 
ci,m,n Annual cost of implementing an AWT technology (m) at PS (n) in zone (i) $ yr-1 
Xi,k,j Binary variable with a value of 1 if a BMP (k) is implemented, 0 otherwise - 
Yi,k,j 
Binary variable with a value of 1 if an AWT technology (m) is 
implemented, 0 otherwise - 
rk,j 
Percent TP load reduction attained when implementing a BMP (k) at NPS 
(j) - 
rm,n 
Percent TP load reduction attained when applying an AWT technology type 
(m) at PS (n) - 
Li,j Current TP load from NPS (j) located in zone (i) at the zone level kg yr-1 
Li,n Current TP load from PS (n) located in zone (i) at the zone level kg yr-1 
Target_Pred 
TP load reduction from NPS and PS at the zone level when following the 
command-and-control approach kg yr
-1 
NPS: Nonpoint sources; PS: Point sources; TP: Total phosphorus. 
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Table 4-3. Best management practices (BMPs) and advanced wastewater treatment 
(AWT) technologies total phosphorus (TP) reduction efficiencies (%) and annual unit 
costs ($ kg-1 reduced) for Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough 
(TCNS) sub-watersheds. 
   UK TCNS 
  
Reduction 
Efficiency Unit Cost 
  
(%) ($ kg-1 reduced) 
Agricultural BMPs* 
BMP I 
Reduce phosphorus fertilization, 
better nutrient management, grass 
management  
4 - 30% $ 0 – 828 $ 0 – 76 
BMP II 
Stormwater R/D, wetland 
restoration, water management, 
rotational grazing, new water 
facilities, critical area fencing 
10 - 65% $ 99 – 33,811 $ 24 – 883 
BMP III Edge-of-farm stormwater R/D and chemical treatment 40 - 85% $ 204 – 28,461 $ 49 – 1,537 
Urban BMPs* 
BMP I Reduce phosphorus fertilization  5% $ 0 $ 0 
BMP II 
Limited dry retention, street 
sweeping, sediment R/D and 
wetland restoration  
10% $ 18,349 $ 7,693 
BMP III Stormwater R/D and chemical treatment  73% $ 18,601 $ 7,799 
WWTF AWT Technologies** 
AWT I 
Fermenter retrofit, 1-point 
chemical addition, fermenter with 
sand filter  
50 - 87% $ 115 – 612 - 
AWT II 
Fermenter with sand filter plus 1-
point chemical addition , 2-point 
chemical addition  
90 - 98% $ 219 – 945 - 
BMP I: Owner type BMP; BMP II: Owner and typical BMPs; BMP III: Owner, typical, and       
alternative BMPs. 
AWT I: Treatment technology reaching a target TP concentration of 0.5 mg L-1; AWT II: Treatment 
technology reaching a target TP concentration of 0.1 mg L-1. 
* Annual unit costs for agricultural and urban BMPs include amortized capital costs at 10% interest 
over a 20-year life span. The annual O&M costs were determined using the 20% of the annualized 
capital cost. 
** Annual unit costs for AWT technologies include the annualized capital and O&M costs using an 
amortization of 6% interest over a 20-year life span for the capital costs. 
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Table 4-4. Average Annual Total Phosphorus (TP) load per source in the Upper 
Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed. 
Source 
TP load at 
the source 
level  
(mtons yr-1) 
TP load flux 
at the source  
(kg ha-1 yr-1) 
TP load 
attenuated 
to the 
nearby 
stream  
(mtons yr-1) 
TP load 
attenuated to 
the outlet 
(mtons yr-1) 
Nonpoint Sources     
Citrus 10.9 0.5 3.7 3.2 (3.2%) 
Improved pasture 65.8 1.2 18.1 16.1 (16.3%) 
Unimproved pasture 7.4 0.6 2.7 2.4 (2.4%) 
Rangeland and 
wooded pasture 3.1 1.3 0.9 0.8 (0.8%) 
Field crops 3.3 5.2 0.7 0.6 (0.7%) 
Ornamentals 0.9 3.9 0.1 0.1 (0.1%) 
Row crops 3.9 2.8 1.3 1.2 (1.2%) 
Sod  29.7 8.1 6.5 5.9 (6%) 
Urban 71.6 0.8 22.2 19.4 (19.6%) 
Natural areas 72.1 0.3 32.5 29.0 (29.3%) 
Sub-total 268.6 0.6 88.7 79.0 (79.8%) 
Point Sources     
WWTFs 217.2 n/a 22.5 20.0 (20.2%) 
Total 485.9 0.6 111.2 99.0 (100%) 
WWTF: Wastewater treatment facilities. 
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Table 4-5. Average Annual Total Phosphorus (TP) load per source in the Taylor 
Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watershed. 
Source 
TP load at 
the source 
level  
(mtons yr-1) 
TP load flux 
at the source  
(kg ha-1 yr-1) 
TP load 
attenuated 
to the 
nearby 
stream  
(mtons yr-1) 
TP load 
attenuated to 
the outlet 
(mtons yr-1) 
Nonpoint Sources 
    Citrus 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.2 (1.0%) 
Improved pasture 69.4 1.9 59.4 54.6 (47.2%) 
Unimproved pasture 1.3 0.7 1.2 1.1 (1.0%) 
Rangeland and 
wooded pasture 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.3 (0.2%) 
Field crops 10.4 5.9 8.5 8.0 (6.9%) 
Ornamentals 4.0 8.0 3.4 3.2 (2.8%) 
Row crops 0.5 2.4 0.5 0.4 (0.4%) 
Sod  5.3 4.1 4.6 4.1 (3.6%) 
Sugarcane 1.5 0.4 1.2 1.2 (1.0%) 
Urban 10.2 1.0 6.3 5.8 (5.0%) 
Natural areas 6.3 0.4 4.9 4.5 (3.8%) 
Sub-total 110.5 1.5 91.5 84.3 (72.8%) 
Point Sources     
CAFOs 39.3 9.9 33.4 31.4 (27.2%) 
Total 149.8 1.9 124.9 115.7 (100%) 
CAFOs: Concentrated animal feeding operations. 
 
Table 4-6. Total annual costs and corresponding potential cost savings for the command-
and-control (CAC) and the least-cost abatement (LCA) approaches for achieving 
different TP load reduction targets in the Upper Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed. 
Baseline TP 
load (mtons 
yr-1) 
TP load 
reduction 
target 
(mtons yr-1) 
Total CAC cost 
($ million yr-1) 
Total LCA cost 
($ million yr-1) 
Potential cost 
savings 
($ million yr-1) 
78.7 32.3 (41%) $ 43.2 $ 8.9 $ 34.3 (79%) 
78.7 35.9 (46%) $ 45.6 $ 11.7 $ 33.9 (74%) 
78.7 43.8 (56%) $ 148.6 $ 21.4 $ 127.2 (86%) 
78.7 47.9 (61%) $ 151.6 $ 81.1 $ 70.4 (46%) 
78.7 50.1 (64%) $ 151.0 $ 122.2 $ 38.8 (24%) 
78.7 52.8 (67%) $ 214.8 $ 154.9 $ 59.9 (28%) 
78.7 55.4 (70%) $ 219.3 $ 216.5 $ 2.8 (1%) 
78.7 56.2 (71%) $ 233.5 $ 221.9 $ 11.6 (5%) 
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Table 4-7. Total annual costs and corresponding potential cost savings for the command-
and-control (CAC) and the least-cost abatement (LCA) approaches for achieving 
different TP load reduction targets in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-
watershed. 
Baseline TP 
load (mtons 
yr-1) 
TP load 
reduction 
target 
(mtons yr-1) 
Total CAC cost 
($ million yr-1) 
Total LCA cost 
($ million yr-1) 
Potential cost 
savings 
($ million yr-1) 
120.1 36.4 (30%) $ 6.9 $ 2.9 $ 4.0 (58%) 
120.1 38.8 (32%) $ 7.1 $ 3.4 $ 3.7 (53%) 
120.1 48.6 (41%) $ 8.1 $ 5.0 $ 3.1 (38%) 
120.1 52.2 (43%) $ 8.6 $ 6.1 $ 2.5 (29%) 
120.1 68.0 (57%) $ 11.2 $ 10.1 $ 0.6 (5%) 
 
Table 4-8. Number of credits available to sell and number of potential sellers and buyers 
for different TP load reduction targets in the Upper Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed. 
TP load 
reduction 
target (%) 
No. of credits 
available 
No. of potential 
sellers 
No. of potential 
buyers 
41% 7,785 26 15 
46% 6,339 23 20 
56% 9,694 31 2 
61% 6,400 27 1 
64% 3,270 18 6 
67% 3,003 15 7 
70% 577 7 12 
71% 709 4 18 
 
Table 4-9. Number of credits available to sell and number of potential sellers and buyers 
for different TP load reduction targets in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-
watershed. 
TP load 
reduction 
target (%) 
No. of credits 
available 
No. of potential 
sellers 
No. of potential 
buyers 
30% 20,318 31 8 
32% 20,897 20 13 
41% 20,893 23 14 
43% 20,092 19 14 
57% 2,716 16 11 
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Table 4-10. Net cost savings of the WQTP for the Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor 
Creek/ Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds using the selected TP reduction targets. 
  UK TCNS Units 
Baseline TP load 78.7 120.0 mtons yr-1 
TP load reduction target      46      32  % 
Load after BMPs and technologies are adopted  42.8 81.3 mtons yr-1 
Credits traded  4,601 10,495 kg reduced 
Credit price  $ 673 $ 130 $ kg-1 reduced 
Cost incurred by sellers under the CAC approach $ 0.2 $ 0.2 $ million yr-1 
Cost incurred by sellers under the LCA approach $ 2.3 $ 1.2 $ million yr-1 
Cost incurred by buyers under the CAC approach $ 40.2 $ 4.5 $ million yr-1 
Cost incurred by buyers under the LCA approach $ 2.9 $ 0.2 $ million yr-1 
Cost of credits traded  $ 3.1 $ 1.4 $ million yr-1 
Cost of transaction (10% of credits traded) $ 0.3 $ 0.1 $ million yr-1 
Savings for sellers  $ 1.0 $ 0.3 $ million yr-1 
Savings for buyers   $ 33.9 $ 2.8 $ million yr-1 
Net cost savings  
 $ 34.9 $ 3.2 $ million yr-1 
76 45 % 
TP: Total phosphorus; CAC: command-and-control; LCA: least-cost abatement.  
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4.7. Figures  
 
Figure 4-1. Lake Okeechobee watershed (LOW) detailing the sub-watershed boundaries 
and the major hydrologic components. 
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Figure 4-2. Study areas (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough 
(TCNS) illustrating the major hydrologic components and the rainfall stations. 
 
Figure 4-3. Location of selected point sources in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) 
Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds. 
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Figure 4-4. Land use distribution in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor 
Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds. 
 
Figure 4-5. Total Phosphorus (TP) loading spatial distribution (kg ha-1 yr-1) at the source 
level in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) 
sub-watersheds. 
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Figure 4-6. Zone classification of the phosphorus attenuation factors in the (a) Upper 
Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds. 
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Figure 4-7. Total annual costs ($ million yr-1) for achieving different TP load reduction 
targets in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) 
sub-watersheds. 
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Figure 4-8. Credit prices ($ kg-1 of TP reduced) for achieving different TP load reduction 
targets in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) 
sub-watersheds. 
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Figure 4-9. Summary of the four factors influencing the selection of the cap level for the 
Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds. 
 
 
Figure 4-10. Best management practices (BMP) and advanced wastewater treatment 
(AWT) technologies selected in the Upper Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed under the (a) 
CAC and (b) LCA approaches for meeting a preset 46% TP load reduction target. C 
stands for citrus, IP for improved pastures, UP for unimproved pastures, RWP for 
rangeland and wooded pastures, D for dairies, FC for field crops, O for ornamentals, RC 
for row crops, SO for sod, U for urban, and WWTF for wastewater treatment facilities. 
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Figure 4-11. Best management practices (BMP) selected in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin 
Slough (TCNS) sub-watershed under the (a) CAC and (b) LCA approaches for meeting a 
preset 32% TP load reduction target. C stands for citrus, IP for improved pastures, UP for 
unimproved pastures, S for sugarcane, CAFOs  for concentrated animal food operations, 
FC for field crops, O for ornamentals, RC for row crops, SO for sod, and U for urban. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. Summary and Conclusions 
For the past decades, incentive-based programs have been an area of active 
development to solve environmental problems. Incentive-based policies relie on market 
incentives to both, reduce pollution and minimize abatement costs. In order to better 
understand the prospects of this policy in the water quality arena, this dissertation 
examined the advantages and challenges that have arisen from the nationally and 
internationally implemented programs so far. As discussed in Chapter 2, cost-
effectiveness, decision making flexibility, involvement of non-regulated pollution 
sources, and technological innovation for pollution abatement were highlighted as major 
benefits promoting the development and implementation of water quality trading 
programs. Some of these theoretical advantages were observed in the case studies 
illustrated in this chapter. However, not a single policy comes without its drawbacks. The 
investigated case studies faced significant challenges from the policy design through the 
implementation phase. The major challenges discussed were the creation of localized 
areas with high pollution levels (known as “pollution hotspots”), uncertainties related to 
nonpoint source emissions, and the high transaction costs associated with research, 
negotiations, monitoring, and enforcement. Key elements to consider when designing and 
implementing a water quality trading program were pollutant suitability, abatement costs 
differentials among pollution sources, feasible market structures, and stakeholder’s 
willingness to participate. Furthermore, the meta-analysis conducted using several water 
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quality trading case studies revealed that minimization of nonpoint uncertainty, policy 
drivers, and social embeddedness were the most significant variables influencing the 
success of a trading program. The integration of those variables and the introduction of 
innovative thinking to overcome regulatory, technical, and economic challenges are of 
significant importance for the implementation of a viable and sustainable trading 
program. 
A comprehensive modeling framework, integrating a hydrologic-water quality model 
with an economic model, was developed in Chapter 3 to assess and compare the cost-
effectiveness of two environmental policy strategies to reduce phosphorus loadings to 
Lake Okeechobee. In particular, I explored the benefits of implementing a water quality 
trading program in an agricultural watershed (S-191 sub-basin) in order to achieve a 
specific total phosphorus load reduction. Using the hydrologic-water quality model, water 
flows and phosphorus loads generated on-site (at the source level) and attenuated to the 
nearby stream were simulated. An additional in-stream attenuation algorithm was 
developed to account for further phosphorus loads assimilation from the stream network 
to the outlet of the sub-basin. Using the economic model, the least-cost combination of 
Best Management Practices (BMPs) and technologies was identified in order to achieve 
several phosphorus reduction targets. A cost-effective cap of 30% total phosphorus 
reduction was selected for this sub-basin to develop a trading scenario and assess its 
benefits when compared to a command-and-control approach. Results of this analysis 
identified dairies, sod farms, and ornamentals land uses as potential credit buyers, 
whereas improved pastures, citrus, and urban areas were found as potential credit sellers. 
Furthermore, the estimated potential cost savings of the water quality trading scenario in 
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the S-191 sub-basin versus a command-and-control approach were 27% ($ 1.3 million 
per year) based on a credit price of $ 179 per kg of phosphorus reduced. 
Motivated by the cost savings that could be generated from trading in an agricultural 
sub-basin of the Lake Okeechobee watershed, I explored the application of the modeling 
framework, developed in Chapter 3, in two larger sub-watersheds with different land use 
and hydrologic conditions. The two sub-watersheds selected, the Upper Kissimmee (UK) 
and Taylor Creek/ Nubbin Slough (TCNS), have been identified as major sources of total 
phosphorus loadings to the lake, representing priority areas for the implementation of 
water quality improving efforts. While evaluating and comparing the environmental and 
economic feasibility of a water quality trading program, the effect of different caps on the 
market potential was assessed in the two studied areas. Four factors influencing the 
selection of the cap were analyzed: the least-cost abatement solutions, credit prices, 
potential cost savings, and credit supply and demand. Hypothetical trading scenarios 
were also developed, using the optimal caps selected for the two sub-watersheds, to 
assess the economic advantages of a water quality trading program over a command-and-
control approach in order to improve LO’s water quality. In both sub-watersheds, a 
phosphorus credit trading program was less expensive than the conventional command-
and-control approach. While attaining cost-effectiveness, keeping optimal credit prices, 
and fostering market competition, phosphorus reduction targets of 46% and 32% were 
selected as the most appropriate caps in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. 
Hypothetical trading scenarios identified wastewater treatment facilities (WWTFs) and 
urban areas in the UK, and concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) in the TCNS 
sub-watershed, as potential credit buyers. Improved pastures were identified as the major 
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credit sellers in both sub-watersheds. The estimated net cost savings resulting from 
implementing a phosphorus trading program in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds were 
76% ($ 34.9 million per year) and 45% ($ 3.2 million per year), respectively.  
While the results of this dissertation are promising, it is important to note that water 
quality trading is not the only solution to improve Lake Okeechobee’s health, but rather 
an additional tool to other phosphorus load reduction projects implemented in the 
watershed. The realization of the environmental and economic benefits of this market-
based alternative is also contingent on other important factors, such as the market 
structure, the specific program rules, the risk perception, and the education and outreach 
to develop trusted relationships among regulatory agencies, the public sector, and other 
stakeholders.  Nevertheless, this research provided the foundation for stakeholders to 
better understand whether water quality trading has the potential to work in the Lake 
Okeechobee watershed and to facilitate the development of a pilot program. In addition, 
this dissertation offered some insights on the potential economic opportunities that 
pollution sources would have by participating in the trading program. Although this 
research focused on the Lake Okeechobee watershed, it also provides a base framework 
to assess the feasibility of future water quality trading programs in other watersheds.  
5.2. Recommendations and Future Work 
The results indicate that there is an important potential for a phosphorus trading 
program to generate cost savings and water quality benefits in Lake Okeechobee. 
Therefore, more efforts should be dedicated to this matter. The following 
161 
 
recommendations, directed to future trading program managers, could help enhance the 
potential benefits of a trading program implemented in the watershed: 
• Adopting a monitoring plan and increasing field-site inspections in the watershed to 
verify the modeling results of nonpoint source loadings. Monitoring and verification 
of load reductions from nonpoint sources and environmental performance of BMPs 
should be conducted whenever possible. Regulatory agencies responsibility should be 
shifted from imposing technologies and management practices to requiring 
monitoring and measurement of the discharged phosphorus loads. This would reduce 
the uncertainty about the magnitude of water quality improvement, not only for a 
trading program, but for any program involving nonpoint sources. 
• Developing a market structure, such as clearinghouses or third-party aggregators to 
reduce transaction costs by gathering information and bringing trading partners 
together. In addition, the market structure could be enhanced by creating a 
standardized market platform that can assist potential trading sources to either 
estimate the amount of credits generated by adopting different management practices, 
or to quantify the amount of credits needed to purchase, based on location and trading 
ratios. 
•  Establishing an outreach program to educate stakeholders on the environmental and 
economic opportunities trading might offer, and on how potential trading sources 
could participate. This would strengthen the relationship and communication between 
regulators and trading participants, while encouraging the willingness to participate. 
• Conducting an assessment of the cost-effectiveness and environmental benefits of a 
water quality trading program in all nine sub-watersheds discharging into Lake 
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Okeechobee. Extending the geographic scope would allow the participation of a 
larger number of sellers and buyers and a wider range of abatement cost differentials 
that trading systems are designed to exploit. 
• Developing a regulatory framework supporting a water quality trading program to be 
implemented as part of the Lake Okeechobee Basin Management Action Plan 
(BMAP). Water quality trading rules, protocols to quantify credits and phosphorus 
loads, liabilities in the event of failure to generate the expected credits, and eligibility 
for participation could be incorporated in the revision of the plan, offering an 
additional tool to achieve phosphorus load reductions within the watershed. 
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APPENDIX 
CALIBRATION AND VALIDATION OF THE WATERSHED ASSESSMENT 
MODEL 
This section provides visual comparisons between daily observed (blue) and 
simulated (red) cumulative flows, total phosphorus (TP) concentration, and cumulative 
TP loadings at each of the outlet structures of the calibrated areas. A summary of the 
goodness-of-fit (GOF) statistical measures used for the calibration and validation 
processes of the Watershed Assessment Model (WAM) is also provided. The calibration 
and validation was performed in the Upper Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed and in three 
of the four basins within the Taylor Creek/ Nubbin Slough sub-watershed (S-154, S-133, 
and S135). The calibration and validation of the S-191 basin is presented in SWET 
(2011b). The calibration parameters for the in-stream attenuation analysis are also 
reported in this Appendix. 
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Figure A-1. Calibration results for daily (a) cumulative flow, (b) Total Phosphorus (TP) 
concentration, and (c) cumulative TP loading at the S-154 structure. 
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Figure A-2. Calibration results for daily (a) cumulative flow, (b) Total Phosphorus (TP) 
concentration, and (c) cumulative TP loading at the S-133 structure. 
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Figure A-3. Calibration results for daily (a) cumulative flow, (b) Total Phosphorus (TP) 
concentration, and (c) cumulative TP loading at the S-135 structure. 
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Figure A-4. Calibration results for daily (a) cumulative flow, (b) Total Phosphorus (TP) 
concentration, and (c) cumulative TP loading at the S-65 structure in the Upper 
Kissimmee sub-watershed. 
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Table A-1. GOF statistical measures for monthly flow (m3 s-1). 
Basin No. of observations 
RMSE 
(m3 s-1) 
MBE   
(m3 s-1) NSE 
 Calibration (2002 - 2004) 
S-154 36 1.97 -0.35 0.54 
S-133 36 0.84 0.06 0.80 
S-135 36 0.89 0.01 0.69 
UK 36 40.45 0.61 0.33 
 Validation (2005 - 2009) 
S-154 60 1.11 0.09 0.72 
S-133 60 0.84 0.09 0.54 
S-135 60 0.47 0.01 0.84 
UK 60 29.69 4.40 0.18 
RMSE: Root mean square error; MBE: Mean bias error; NSE: Nash-Sutcliff 
efficiency coefficient. 
 
Table A-2. GOF statistical measures for monthly total phosphorus (TP) concentration 
(mg L-1). 
Basin No. of observations 
RMSE  
(mg L-1) 
MBE  
(mg L-1) NSE 
 Calibration (2002 - 2004) 
S-154 34 0.25 -0.013 -0.55 
S-133 35 0.13 0.05 -0.60 
S-135 36 0.06 0.004 0.38 
UK 36 0.02 0.002 0.19 
 Validation (2005 - 2009) 
S-154 59 0.26 0.05 -0.61 
S-133 59 0.12 -0.01 0.27 
S-135 58 0.05 0.01 -0.03 
UK 58 0.04 -0.002 0.07 
RMSE: Root mean square error; MBE: Mean bias error; NSE: Nash-Sutcliff 
efficiency coefficient. 
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Table A-3. GOF statistical measures for monthly total phosphorus (TP) load (kg day-1). 
Basin No. of observations 
RMES  
(kg day-1) 
MBE  
(kg day-1) NSE 
 Calibration (2002 - 2004) 
S-154 36 172.44 -34.22 0.44 
S-133 36 47.17 -1.16 0.69 
S-135 36 22.37 -1.57 0.70 
UK 36 263.38 23.16 0.47 
 Validation (2005 - 2009) 
S-154 60 93.34 23.42 0.55 
S-133 60 18.90 0.49 0.78 
S-135 60 11.45 2.35 0.60 
UK 60 238.37 15.38 0.13 
RMSE: Root mean square error; MBE: Mean bias error; NSE: Nash-Sutcliff 
efficiency coefficient. 
 
 
Table A-4. Calibrated parameters for the in-stream attenuation analysis. 
Basin 
Soluble P Sediment P 
a  
(m s-1) 
Cb  
(mg L-1) 
a  
(m s-1) 
Cb  
(mg L-1) 
Initial value 0.00015 0.02 0.0015 0.05 
S-154 0.00005 0.02 0.0015 0.01 
S-133 0.00005 0.025 0.00005 0.008 
S-135 0.00005 0.02 0.00015 0.01 
S-191 0.00015 0.02 0.0015 0.02 
UK 0.00015 0.01 0.00015 0.008 
P: Phosphorus; a: Rate of load transfer coefficient; Cb: Stream background 
concentration. 
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